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ABSTRACT 
The relationship between economic deprivation and violent crime has been 
extensively studied in the field of criminology, yet little is known about the impact of 
recent macroeconomic and social policy changes on the relationship between child 
poverty and youth violence trends. The current study aims to fill this gap in the literature 
by assessing whether the macroeconomic conditions and welfare reform policies that 
contributed to child poverty trends during the 1990s and early 2000s also contributed to 
youth violent victimization trends variously disaggregated by race, ethnicity, and family 
structure. Also, the changing effects of poverty on youth’s violence risks were assessed to 
determine the potential impact of welfare reform on the individual-level relationship 
between poverty and violence.  
 For the overwhelming majority of youth, findings suggest that recent changes in 
macroeconomic conditions and federal welfare policies did not influence trends in violent 
victimization. However, significant impacts were found for certain groups of youth, most 
notably those in female-headed families. Also, results from the micro-level analysis 
revealed that the ‘female-headed family’ variable fully mediated the relationship between 
poverty and youth’s violence risks both before and after the passage of welfare reform--
the sum of the evidence suggesting that family structure is a key contingency in the 
poverty-violence relationship. Other noteworthy findings include substantive differences 
in the poverty-violence relationships of non-Hispanic and Hispanic youth.   
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CHAPTER 1 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 Multidisciplinary research has widely documented the detriments of economic 
deprivation for child and adolescent well-being; it has been linked to a number of family 
and child outcomes that adversely affect youth welfare and adjustment including 
inadequate parenting (e.g. Grant et al., 2003), poor family functioning (e.g. Bradley et al., 
2001), cognitive and academic deficits (e.g. Sirin, 2005), emotional and behavioral 
problems (e.g. Felner, 1995), and poor physical health (e.g. Brooks-Gunn & Duncan, 
1997). In addition, criminologists have established numerous theoretical and empirical 
connections between economic deprivation and youth crime via family, community, and 
social processes that affect the socialization and regulation of youth behavior.  
Despite a vast body of knowledge on the effects of economic deprivation on 
youth, there is still much to learn about this relationship. Past research has paid little 
attention to the effects of larger economic and social policy changes on youth violence 
trends, and even less is known about these effects on youth sub-groups such as racial and 
ethnic minorities, married couple and female-headed family members, etc. This research 
will utilize the wealth of demographic and victimization data available in the National 
Crime Victimization Survey to address these specific issues. Moreover, this research will 
employ the use of repeated multivariate models to assess the independent effects of 
economic deprivation, race and ethnicity, and family structure on youths’- violent 
victimization risks over the years, thus filling an important gap in the youth victimization 
literature.  
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 An important first step towards fulfilling these research goals is selecting an 
appropriate indicator of youth economic deprivation. Children under 18 are obviously 
limited in their ability to work and earn income and as a result, they depend 
predominately on their families for financial support (Brooks-Gunn & Duncan, 1997). 
Therefore, family income-based measures such as the official definition of poverty are 
particularly relevant to youth economic well-being. As determined by the Census Bureau, 
the poverty status of children is based on the total cash income of the family unit, which 
differs from the household unit in that it only includes those persons within the household 
that are related by birth, marriage, or adoption (Hoynes, Page, & Stevens, 2006). If the 
total family income before taxes is less than the designated poverty threshold for their 
family size and composition, the family and all of its members is considered to be poor; 
the proportion of 0 to 18 years olds in poverty is represented by the official child poverty 
rate. 
 An additional advantage of the child poverty rate for the purposes of this research 
is its relationship with macroeconomic conditions. As measured by the unemployment 
rate, for example, the state of the economy is an important determinant of child poverty 
rates (Nichols, 2006). More importantly, there has been a close historical association 
between changes in the unemployment and child poverty rate that may have important 
implications for youth violence trends. Though prior research overwhelmingly refutes a 
relationship between changes in the economy and violence trends, there is evidence that 
child poverty and youth violence trends are significantly associated (Messner, 
Raffalovich, & McMillan, 2001). It stands to reason, therefore, that the macroeconomic 
conditions that affect child poverty rates also affect youth violence. The child poverty 
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trends that occurred throughout the 1990s and early 2000s offer a unique opportunity to 
confirm this supposition. 
 Between 1993 and 2004, child poverty rates followed two distinct trends: a steady 
and significant decline from 1993 to 2000 and a modest but steady increase from 2001 to 
2004 (Nichols, 2006). As important as these trends, however, were the economic and 
social policy changes that contributed to them. The 1990s were marked predominately by 
the longest economic expansion of the post-World War II United States. This 
unprecedented expansion led to significant improvements in the job market for low-
skilled, less-educated workers and the first sustained increase in their real wage in over 
thirty years (Jargowsky, 2003). These economic developments contributed to substantial 
reductions in poverty for children and families, but markedly so for minorities and 
female-headed families who are more likely to occupy the bottom of the job market.       
 If the economic expansion contributed to reductions in child poverty, economic 
and social policy developments such as Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) expansions 
and the passage of the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act 
(PRWORA) of 1996 also served as important stimuli. Enacted in 1975, the EITC 
provided refundable tax credits and wage supplements to low-income working families 
and the expansions in 1993 and 2000 were the largest in the program’s history 
(Gunderson & Ziliak, 2004). Prior research has identified the EITC as a major impetus 
for the growth in maternal employment from the mid-1980s to the mid-1990s (Meyer & 
Rosenbaum, 2001).  
PRWORA also had significant implications for maternal employment. This 
legislation introduced major reforms to the federal welfare system which included 
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mandatory work requirements, permanent time limits, sanctions for noncompliance, and 
replacement of the Aid to Families with Dependent Children program with block grants 
to states entitled Temporary Assistance to Needy Families (Greenberg et al., 2002). 
Collectively, these policies contributed to increased work efforts among welfare 
recipients and low-income single mothers, but more importantly the reductions in child 
poverty accelerated in the wake of these reforms.   
The economy entered a recession in 2001 that hit all families and demographic 
groups (Langdon, McMenamin, & Krolik, 2002). As the economy weakened, the 
sustained reductions in child poverty that occurred over the previous decade began to 
stall and rates increased modestly throughout 2004. Although the recession affected all 
groups of people, the gains in poverty for black children and female-headed families were 
more than three times larger than their counterparts, which suggest that the weakening of 
the economy had the greatest impact on the most disadvantaged groups. 
What is the significance of these developments for youth violence? The violent 
crime trends that occurred in the 1990s may offer some clue. The economic expansion 
coincided with substantial reductions in violent crime, particularly among youth. This 
decline in youth violence was particularly noteworthy because it was an unexpected 
departure from the sharp increases that occurred over the previous decade (Butts & 
Travis, 2002). At first glance, these trends share similarities that are suggestive of a 
causal relationship; in addition to the fact that the crime decline occurred amidst an 
unprecedented expansion of the U.S. economy, both trends seem to have pronounced 
benefits for youth. But despite these commonalities, empirical support for a relationship 
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between the economic expansion and concomitant reductions in youth violent crime is 
generally lacking.  
 The lack of empirical support for a relationship between macroeconomic 
conditions and youth violent crime does not warrant the dismissal of a possible 
relationship, however. The economy-crime relationship is complex and it is possible that 
it cannot be understood in terms of a direct causal connection. Instead it may be the case 
that the economic state affects violent crime through its association with other factors 
such as the child poverty rate. Research has already uncovered a significant association 
between child poverty and youth violence trends (Messner et al., 2001), but has failed to 
consider how macroeconomic conditions and social policy changes influence this 
relationship. The state of the economy in the 1990s and early 2000s contributed to 
distinct trends in child poverty and by assessing the impact of these trends on youth 
violence rates, this research aims to identify the larger influence of the economic state on 
changes in youth violence.  
The economic expansion was also characterized by pronounced reductions in 
poverty for minority youth and female-headed families, the former being consistent with 
past patterns in child poverty trends. This research will examine the relationship between 
disaggregated child poverty and youth violent victimization trends to determine how 
changes in the economy influence violence among sub-groups such as racial and ethnic 
minorities. Because researchers have relied heavily on data sources such as the Uniform 
Crime Reports to study racial patterns in violent crime trends, much of our knowledge is 
based on the differences between blacks and whites. By utilizing the race and Hispanic 
origin variables available in the NCVS, this research will contribute to the understanding 
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of how Hispanic youth violence has changed in recent decades and how those changes 
are related to child poverty trends.   
Also contributing to the trends in child poverty were the significant changes to the 
nation’s welfare system. Prior research has extensively examined the effects of welfare 
reform on children’s academic achievement, emotional and behavioral adjustment, and 
physical health, but comparatively less is known about the effects of welfare reform on 
adolescents. By assessing post-reform relationships between child poverty and youth 
violence trends, this research will contribute to the understanding of how welfare reform 
may have affected violence among youth--an aspect of child well-being that has been 
overlooked in the welfare reform literature. 
Because researchers failed predominately to anticipate the effects of welfare 
reform and maternal employment on adolescent well-being, it was somewhat surprising 
that several evaluations of welfare-to-work programs found negative impacts on youth 
that included smoking, alcohol and drug abuse, and delinquency (Gennetian et al., 2002).  
The avenues through which maternal employment may harm adolescents are largely 
unknown, but researchers have advanced a number of hypotheses including decreased 
parental monitoring and adolescents’ increased household responsibilities. Adolescents 
who assume adult responsibilities in the home may feel that they have license to engage 
in adult behaviors, particularly when they live in high-risk setting such as poor families 
(Brooks, Hair, & Zaslow, 2001). Equally important as the relationship between child 
poverty and youth violence trends is the understanding of how poverty impacted youth’s 
risk for violent victimization before and after welfare reform.  
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Welfare caseloads declined dramatically in the early post-reform era. In the three 
years following the implementation of TANF, the number of recipients declined by 
almost half and in 2000 nearly one-fifth of the closed cases were closed due to 
employment (U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, 2002). However, these 
figures may lead to specious conclusions about the success of welfare reform. Many 
states adopted a work-first approach to PRWORA’s mandates and emphasized quick 
entry into the labor force over human capital development. As a consequence, many 
recipients transitioned into low-skilled, low-paying jobs that offered minimal benefits and 
job security, and often remained poor despite meeting the mandatory work requirements 
(e.g. Corcoran, 2000). Many of these low-income working families continued to face 
significant financial struggles and remained vulnerable to repeated welfare use. 
These trends have obvious implications for youth.  Evidence from the National 
Survey of American Families (NSAF) suggests that in the wake of welfare reform, 
parental aggravation more than tripled among transitioning recipients with young 
children (Loprest & Zedlewski, 2006). Parental stress can invoke family conflict, strained 
parent-child relationships, and harsh or inconsistent discipline, which in turn may lead to 
a host of problem behaviors among youth. Parents with adolescent children did not 
experience increased aggravation on the other hand, which may be due to the fact that 
older children were able to ease the welfare-to-work transition by assuming more of the 
household and family responsibilities. Although this line of reasoning is speculative, it 
would explain why many adolescents reacted adversely to their parent’s participation in 
welfare-to-work programs (Gennetian et al., 2002).   
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If this supposition is correct, the trends in the proportion of youth in working poor 
families may offer some insights into their experiences with family poverty. Though 
child poverty rates declined throughout most of the 1990s and accelerated in the post-
TANF era, there were significant increases in the proportion of children in working poor 
families. By 2000, more than three-fourths of all poor children and roughly 80 percent of 
poor Hispanic and non-Hispanic white children lived in low-income working families 
(Child Trends, no date). These proportions declined considerably over the early half of 
the 2000s, possibly as low-income working parents accumulated the necessary skills and 
work experience to secure better paying jobs.  
Poverty has major consequences for parents and children in low-income working 
families (Stanzyck, 2009). These consequences may even be exacerbated for adolescents 
who might be expected to shoulder additional family and household responsibilities in the 
absence of their parents. Through its contribution to the growing proportion of youth in 
working poor families, the work requirements enacted by welfare reform may have 
exacerbated the consequences of poverty for various aspects of child well-being. This 
research will explore the possibility that welfare reform exacerbated the consequences of 
poverty for youth’s violence risks and that these heightened consequences diminished 
over time. This exploration will also achieve the larger objective of determining the 
independent effects of poverty on youth’s risk for violence over time and the extent to 
which this relationship has changed.      
 Again, there is a complex relationship between crime and the economy, and there 
is still a lot that criminologists do not understand about the effects of changing economic 
conditions on youth violence rates. One way to make sense of this relationship is to 
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examine the association between child poverty and youth violence rates. Given the 
significant relationship between the two, it stands to reason that the same economic 
forces that influence child poverty rates also influence youth violence. In the same sense, 
social policy changes such as the 1996 welfare reforms should also influence youth 
violence through its influence on child poverty. Based on knowledge of the social policy 
and economic climate of the 1990s and early 2000s and the response of child poverty 
rates to these developments, this research seeks to make important deductions about the 
effects of these economic changes and policy reforms on youth violence trends in recent 
decades.   
 This line of research is important for several reasons. First, the social and 
economic policies that impact child poverty rates most likely impact youth violence but 
yet there is a general disconnect in the literature on the effects of economic and social 
welfare policies such as the Earned Income Tax Credit and AFDC/TANF on youth 
violence rates. Previous research has established both direct and indirect links between 
welfare assistance levels and adult homicide rates in U.S. cities (e.g. DeFronzo, 1997) 
and cross-national relationships between levels of welfare spending and child homicide 
rates (e.g. Briggs & Cutright, 1994; Fiala & LaFree, 1988). However, researchers have 
failed to consider how social policy might affect youth violence rates through its impact 
on factors such as the child poverty rate. 
 Understanding this relationship will help policymakers and researchers to better 
anticipate the effects of economic and social policy changes on child poverty and youth 
violence, and hence allocate the appropriate resources toward prevention. Welfare reform 
proponents believed that mandatory work requirements would serve to establish working 
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parents as positive role models for adolescents preparing to enter the workforce, but they 
did not anticipate the potential consequences for youth in working families; this oversight 
was due largely to the fact that the body of knowledge on the effects of welfare reform on 
youth was based predominately on young children (e.g. Gennetian et al., 2002). Since the 
passage of welfare reform, significant strides have been made in this area of research but 
there are still important limitations. As welfare policies continue to evolve and change, it 
is particularly important to understand how future revisions might affect violence among 
youth.   
 Second, this research may inform new ways to target anti-poverty initiatives 
toward the prevention of youth violence. Violence prevention programs have 
encompassed a number of peer, family, school, community, and faith based initiatives 
over the years but if changes in the child poverty rate are indeed correlated with youth 
violence trends, it is plausible that policies designed to alleviate poverty will also impact 
youth violence. Often times, initiatives that target family poverty have parents with 
young children as a priority and are commonly designed to promote health and nutrition, 
school readiness, effective parenting, and healthy child development. However, including 
protective measures for older children may go a long way toward preventing youth 
violence and other problem behaviors. Although the explicit goals of PRWORA did not 
include youth violence prevention, for example, including measures such as funding for 
after-school programs, flexible work requirements for parents with older children, and 
parent education programs geared toward the specific needs of adolescents could have 
minimized some of the harmful consequences experienced by youth (Brooks et al., 
2001)--many of which were correlated with youth violence.     
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 Last, this research is important because it can potentially aid in predicting the 
effects of future economic changes on youth violence trends. Though forecasting crime 
and economic trends is a difficult task to say the least, understanding the effects of the 
economic state on child poverty will in turn help researchers to anticipate the response of 
youth violence rates to concurring economic conditions. For instance, a downturn in the 
economy will most likely lead to an increase in unemployment and child poverty rates 
(see Figure 2.1, p. 37), the latter of which is particularly pronounced for racial and ethnic 
minorities. Given the positive association between child poverty and youth violence rates, 
one would expect the increase in child poverty to be accompanied by a contemporaneous 
increase in youth violence that is magnified for racial and ethnic minorities. Based on this 
line of reasoning, then, one could plausibly expect youth violence to increase during 
periods of economic downturn, but particularly so for minority youth. 
Organization of Study 
 Pursuant to the research goals of this proposal, the remaining discussion will 
proceed as follows: Chapter 2: Literature Review is a review of the relevant literature 
pertaining to the relationship between economic deprivation and crime, beginning with a 
general discussion of the relationship and proceeding with a more detailed review of the 
literature as it relates to youth violence. This review will encompass common indicators 
of economic deprivation, but special emphasis is placed on the child poverty rate for its 
relevance to youth economic well-being.  
After laying this foundation, the discussion will focus on the trends in child 
poverty over recent decades, the economic and policy developments that contributed to 
these trends as well as the significance of these developments for minorities and families, 
White, Nicole, 2011, UMSL, p.19 
  
and the potential implications of these developments for youth violence trends. Finally, 
the discussion will turn to the consequences of welfare reform for adolescents and 
families, and the implications of the consequences for youths’ violence risks over time. 
 Chapter 3: Goals, Data, and Measures will outline the research goals for this 
study and present an overview of NCVS methodology that includes a discussion of the 
specific strengths and weaknesses for the purposes of this research. This chapter will also 
detail the creation of key measures and present the characteristics of the sample along 
these measures. Chapter 4: Macro-Level Analytic Strategy and Findings will discuss the 
analytic strategy for the macro-level analysis and present the relevant findings while the 
micro-level strategy and findings will be presented in Chapter 5: Micro-Level Analytic 
Strategy and Findings. Finally, the results of all analyses will be summarized in Chapter 
6: Summary and Conclusion, which will also address the research and policy implications 
of the key findings and limitations of the study.    
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CHAPTER 2 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 Economic deprivation has been theoretically linked to youth violence and 
delinquency across a number of different paradigms including Social Disorganization 
(Shaw and McKay, 1942), Institutional Anomie (Messner & Rosenfeld, 2000), Strain 
(Cloward & Ohlin, 1960; Cohen, 1955), Subcultural (Wolfgang & Ferracutti, 1967; 
Miller, 1958) Control (Hirschi, 1969), and Life-Course (Sampson & Laub, 1993) 
theories. A general theme across these otherwise opposing models is that economic 
deprivation indirectly influences youth crime by undermining the legitimacy of the law 
and other conventional values, weakening social bonds, or impeding socialization and 
other family processes such as discipline and supervision that serves to buffer youths 
from criminal involvement. Moreover, economic deprivation is associated with financial 
strains that may motivate youths to commit property and violent crimes as well as youth 
crime rates in disadvantaged areas where social institutions are weaker sources of social 
control. 
 As such, the empirical study of the deprivation-crime relationship has had a 
longstanding tradition in criminology and has generated vigorous debate; much of the 
contention has grown out of attempts to identify the key mechanisms through which 
economic deprivation influences crime and criminality. However, the sum of the 
empirical evidence suggests that there is an important relationship between these two 
variables. Cross-sectional studies have consistently found significant associations 
between various indicators of economic deprivation and violent crime rates in census 
tracts (e.g. Hipp, 2007; Krivo & Peterson, 1996), neighborhoods (e.g. Hannon, 2005; 
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Kubrin, 2003), cities (e.g. White, 1999; Kovandzic et al., 1998), counties (e.g. Lee et al., 
2003; Gould et al., 2002; Kelly, 2000), and states (e.g. Stolzenberg, 2006; Land et al., 
1990), and the preponderance of the empirical evidence suggests that the effects differ for 
blacks and whites (e.g. Parker & McCall, 1999; LaFree & Drass, 1996; Harer & 
Steffensmeier, 1992).  
Less consistent is the empirical support for an individual-level relationship 
between economic status and criminality. Past research has contested the validity of this 
relationship (see Tittle et al., 1978 and Braithwaite, 1981 for opposing viewpoints), but 
has evolved in its understanding of how structural conditions and characteristics affect 
social processes in communities, schools, families, and other institutions that regulate and 
influence individual behaviors (Currie, 1998).   
 Although there is an extensive body of literature on the economic deprivation-
crime relationship, the majority of this research pertains to adult violence. Comparatively 
less is known about the effects of economic deprivation on youth violence. Researchers 
often define youth as older adolescents (i.e. 16 to 19 year olds) or young adults (i.e. 18 to 
24 year olds), though there are many exceptions. The following section is a brief review 
of selected findings on the relationship between youth violent crime and four common 
indicators of economic deprivation: poverty, unemployment, economic inequality, and 
concentrated disadvantage.  
Economic Deprivation and Youth Crime 
Poverty 
  Absolute deprivation refers to a lack of income to meet basic needs according to 
some fixed standard and is commonly demarcated by the official poverty line, which 
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defines the standard for minimum family income according to family size and 
composition (Nichols, 2006). Poverty, and in particular chronic poverty, has detrimental 
consequences for families and children that are often cumulative. Not only does poverty 
cause economic strains such as the inability to pay bills and purchase basic necessities 
such as food and clothing, it also deprives families of the resources and capacity to cope 
with other stressful life events (Wadsworth et al., 2005). This compounded stress can lead 
to problems such as parental depression and strained parent-child relationships, which in 
turn has important ramifications for adolescent development and well-being. Poverty has 
also been linked to adolescent outcomes through its association with other characteristics 
of families and parents such as family structure, age, race and ethnicity, and educational 
attainment (Brooks-Gunn, Duncan, & Maritato, 1997). Therefore, the adversities faced 
by poor families could be a function of economic stress or the fact that parents are most 
likely to be single, young, minority, less educated and thus predisposed to a host of other 
economic and social ills that also have negative impacts on youth.     
Nonetheless, family poverty exposes youth to various individual, family, and 
community level risk factors, including emotional and behavioral problems (McLoyd, 
1998; Felner, 1995); poor academic performance (Sirin, 2005); exposure to marital and 
family violence (Santiago & Wadsworth, 2009; Wadsworth & Compas, 2002); harsh, lax, 
or inconsistent discipline (Grant et al., 2003; Bradley et al., 2001); poor parental 
monitoring (Evans, 2004; Bradley et al., 2001), residence in areas of concentrated 
poverty (Drake and Rank, 2009; Jargowsky, 2003) and exposure to lead and other 
environmental toxins (Evans, 2004; Bernard and McGeehin, 2003) that have been 
identified as risk factors for youth violence across multiple disciplines (Leiber et al., 
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2009; Barnes et al., 2006; Resnick et al., 2004; Hay, 2001; Mitchell & Finkelhor, 2001; 
Herrenkohl et al., 2000; Lipsey & Derzon, 1998; Needleman et al., 1996; Sampson & 
Laub, 1994; Loeber & Stouthamer-Loeber, 1986).  
In one of the only studies to examine the effects of child poverty on youth 
violence, Messner, Raffalovich, and McMillan (2001) also found that changes in the 
child poverty rate are significantly associated with trends in juvenile homicide arrests of 
black and white youth, but more importantly so for blacks. Similarly, Levitt and Lochner 
(2001) found a significant association between child poverty and juvenile homicide 
trends in Chicago census tracts, but concluded that the changes in child poverty 
accounted for less than ten percent of the increase in juvenile homicides from 1980 to 
1990. 
Unemployment 
  Because it impedes the ability to maintain certain income standards and supply 
basic needs, unemployment is also a common indicator of absolute deprivation that is 
theoretically connected to crime via two distinct mechanisms: criminal opportunity and 
criminal motivation (see Cantor & Land, 1985).  The former posits that unemployment 
immediately reduces criminal opportunity by concentrating activities within primary 
group locations such as the neighborhood and home, which is indicative of a negative, 
contemporaneous effect. In addition to a guardianship effect, Messner et al. (2001) 
propose that the concentration of activities around the neighborhood may also result in 
intensive supervision of youths who tend to spend a lot of time around primary group 
locations, which they coin the supervisory effect. According to the latter, the financial 
distress caused by unemployment may serve as a motivation to commit crime, but this 
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effect is not always immediate as newly unemployed persons often benefit from 
unemployment compensation and family support, or may even find a new job. As support 
dwindles and time without work increases, the motivation to engage in criminal activity 
may increase.  
It is also possible that the effects of unemployment may differ for adolescents 
who have a limited ability to work and earn income. Whereas unemployment poses 
significant problems for adults, it may be an advantage for adolescents who are expected 
to devote the majority of their time to academics (Wright, Cullen, & Williams, 1997). 
Not to mention, the majority of school-aged adolescents are not legally permitted to 
work. There is some evidence that the effects of unemployment for youth are different 
from the hypothesized effects for adults. For instance, Messner et al. (2001) found 
negative, lagged effects of unemployment on youth homicide arrest trends, which is 
contradictory to both criminal opportunity and criminal motivation effects.     
Though joblessness is qualitatively different from unemployment, Krivo and 
Peterson reached similar conclusions in their analysis of labor market conditions and 
neighborhood violent crime arrests among three age groups: teenagers (15 to 19), young 
adults (20 to 24), and older adults (25 and older).  In addition to joblessness, the 
percentage of the population employed in the lowest paying occupations was 
significantly related to violent crime arrests among young adults while the former 
influenced arrests among older adults. For adolescents, however, neither the quantity nor 
quality of available jobs affected violent crime arrests, which is consistent with life 
course perspectives that assign limited importance to employment as a conventional bond 
for youth vis-à-vis family and school (e.g. Sampson & Laub, 1993; Thornberry, 1987). 
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Moreover, there is empirical evidence that employment may even have negative 
consequences for youth. 
Some researchers have found that adolescents employed during the school year, 
and in particular those who work more than 20 hours a week, are at greater risk for 
delinquency and problem behaviors than their counterparts (e.g. Heimer, 1995; Agnew, 
1986), and that this relationship is most salient for males at high risk for delinquency 
involvement (Wright et al., 1997). There is also evidence of a positive association 
between the amount of economic resources available to youth from work or other sources 
and delinquent behavior (Heimer, 1995; Agnew, 1986; Cullen et al., 1985), particularly 
when youth are already predisposed to delinquency (Agnew, 1990). Intense work efforts 
and access to economic resources may serve to detach youth from school and parental 
support, both of which play a key role in youth social control.  
But while research has reported significant associations between work intensity 
and delinquency, the findings are equivocal. At issue is whether the relationship reflects 
the harmful nature of youth employment or pre-existing differences between intensive 
and non-intensive workers. Attempting to address this concern, Paternoster et al. (2003) 
estimated random and fixed effects models to evaluate the youth employment-
delinquency relationship net of the effects of unobserved heterogeneity. Previous 
research generally controlled for selection effects with lagged delinquency and other 
delinquency-related factors, which only captured the observed differences between 
workers. 
 Consonant with this research, they found a significant association between intense 
work during the academic year and delinquency that was appreciably reduced, but not 
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eliminated by the introduction of various individual, peer, family, and school related 
covariates. However, the relationship disappeared when random and fixed effects models 
were estimated to control for the unobserved heterogeneity, suggesting that the reported 
relationship between work intensity and delinquency is biased by selection effects. 
Similar conclusions have also been reached about the effects of youth employment on 
academic performance (see Warren et al. 2000). 
Economic Inequality 
While absolute deprivation is determined on the basis of fixed income standards, 
relative deprivation is based on the distribution of income and is commonly 
operationalized as economic inequality, or the gap in income between the rich and poor. 
Generally speaking, relative deprivation models presume that individuals assess their 
social and economic standing in comparison to others and it is their frustration with 
perceived inequalities or injustices that can potentially breed criminal behavior. 
Structural inequalities can also influence macro-level crime rates, particularly in 
extremely disadvantaged areas marked by routine violence and weak social controls. 
Some researchers have attributed racial and ethnic differences in violent crime rates to 
longstanding patterns of economic and racial residential inequality that have 
disproportionately concentrated blacks in socially and economically isolated communities 
(e.g. Massey, 1995). 
Empirical support for an inequality-crime relationship is mixed. The seminal 
study conducted by Blau and Blau (1982) found that total and racial inequality had 
important effects on violent crime rates in 125 of the largest metropolitan areas in the 
United States which tended to nullify the poverty effect. These findings were affirmed by 
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few studies (e.g. Blau & Golden, 1986), but others have found only partial (e.g. Balkwell, 
1990; Williams, 1984) or no support (e.g. Patterson, 1991; Messner & South, 1986). One 
source of these discrepant findings is the differential effects of inequality on black and 
white violent crime rates (Stolzenberg et al., 2006; Parker & McCall, 1999; Harer & 
Steffensmeier, 1992; LaFree et al., 1992; Messner & Golden, 1992), though some 
researchers have argued that selection of the appropriate reference group is an important 
contingency of the inequality-crime relationship (e.g. LaFree & Drass, 1996; Harer & 
Steffensmeier, 1992). It is suggested that individuals gauge their economic standing by 
comparing themselves to those of similar race, educational background, etc.   
Hence, intra-racial inequality should have particular utility for predicting crime rates 
disaggregated by race and ethnicity. 
There are also reasons to suspect that intraracial inequality is an important 
predictor of youth violent crime rates.  First, the conception of social structure and 
economic inequality is a developmental process. In comparison to younger children, 
adolescents have an “increased capacity to consider the perspectives of different groups 
(or roles) within society, with the recognition that these perspectives are systematically 
coordinated through convention or social structure” (Leahy, 1983, p. 112), but they also 
tend to be egocentric, or more concerned with self than society. So despite increased 
social awareness, adolescents tend to be most concerned with themselves and others in 
their immediate social environment (i.e. peers, neighbors, schoolmates, etc.). As such, 
measures of intraracial inequality should prove a more relevant indicator of perceived 
deprivation among youth and hence a better predictor of violent crime rates. 
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 Messner et al. (2001) provide some support for these expectations in their 
assessment of the relationship between economic deprivation and youth homicide arrest 
trends. Their indicator of interracial inequality, the ratio of white to black median family 
income, was found to be unrelated to arrest trends, but changes in various indicators of 
intraracial inequality significantly predicted homicide arrest trends for both black and 
white youth. The income share of the top 5% of households had a lagged effect on white 
homicide arrests and a contemporaneous effect on blacks. However, changes in the child 
poverty rate, which is based on direct measurements of family income, emerged as the 
most significant and robust predictor of black and white youth homicide arrest trends.  
This finding lends credence to the assumption that youth violent crime rates are better 
predicted by more proximate indicators of deprivation.  
Past research conducted by Shihadeh and Steffensmeier (1994) also found that 
income inequality had only trivial direct effects on black youth violence while racial 
inequality failed to exert any significant effect either directly or indirectly.  However, 
intraracial inequality had significant and substantial effects on black youth violence that 
were mediated by family disruption.   
Concentrated Disadvantage 
Neighborhood crime rates have long been associated with endemic structural 
characteristics such as concentrated disadvantage, particularly in urban areas. Commonly 
measured as a summary index of the unemployment and poverty rate and the proportion 
of blacks, welfare recipients, and female-headed households in the population, 
concentrated disadvantage has been theoretically linked to crime via collective efficacy 
(Sampson, Raudenbush, & Earls, 1997), systems of social relationships (Bursik & 
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Grasmick, 1993), and cultural adaptations that subvert community social organization 
and legitimate the use of violence (e.g. Anderson, 1999). 
Research has also established an important empirical connection between 
concentrated disadvantage and youth violence. For instance, MacDonald and Gover 
(2005) found a significant association between concentrated disadvantage, a summed 
index of the proportion of poor, unemployed, black, and female householders in U.S. 
cities, and youth-on-youth homicides. The growth in urban concentrated disadvantage, 
along with rising divorce rates within cities, was also significantly associated with the 
increase in youth homicides in the early 1990s.    
In her analysis of the simultaneous effects of individual, family, and community 
risk factors on youth’s risks for violent victimization, Lauritsen (2003) found 
substantially higher risks for violence among youth in extremely disadvantaged 
neighborhoods though community disadvantage appeared to be unrelated to violence 
risks for most youth. One element of the disadvantage index, the percentage of female-
headed households with children, consistently exerted a significant effect on total, 
stranger, and non-stranger violent victimization risks net of other individual, family, and 
community risk factors.  To put these findings into perspective, however, the individual 
and family risk factors that placed youth at the greatest risk for violent victimization was 
time spent at home and length of current residency, both of which had negative effects. 
Contextual studies have also identified various mechanisms through which 
community disadvantage influence the risk for and perpetration of violence by individual 
youth, which include the presence of traditional male role models (Parker and 
Reckdenwald, 2008), exposure to criminogenic street contexts in the form of deviant peer 
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association and exposure to serious violence (De Coster, Heimer, & Wittrock, 2006), and 
street codes that condone violence (Stewart & Simons, 2006), though the latter was only 
a partial mediator.  
Racial differences in serious youth violence have also been attributed to the fact 
that black youth are more likely to reside in disadvantaged communities than youth in 
other racial groups (DeCoster et al., 2006), but while community disadvantage is key in 
explaining the black-white disparity, other factors such as exposure to gang violence and 
school attachment may better explain the disparity for Hispanic and Native American 
youth (McNulty & Bellair, 2003). 
To summarize, there is considerable evidence of an important association between 
economic deprivation and youth crime. However, it is also apparent from the preceding 
discussion that some special considerations must be observed when assessing this 
relationship, particularly in a sample of school-aged adolescents. One such consideration 
is the measurement of youth economic deprivation. Given their limited access to work 
and income, many of the indicators commonly used to measure absolute deprivation 
among adults have limited relevance for youths.        
Measuring Youth Economic Deprivation 
Because adolescents tend to be developmentally and physically oriented toward 
self and the immediate social environment, it is likely that the most relevant indicator of 
youth economic deprivation is one based on youth’s own economic well-being or that of 
close social networks such as their family or household unit, the latter of which may 
include cohabiters and other unrelated household members that contribute economic 
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resources to the family, and same-race peer groups within the neighborhood or school 
(Lopez Turley, 2003). 
 Again, researchers often use unemployment as an indicator of economic 
deprivation because it limits access to income and basic material resources for daily 
living. As an indicator of youth economic deprivation, however, its utility is hampered by 
the fact that the majority of school-aged adolescents are restricted from participating in 
the full-time civilian labor force. Moreover, the youngest segment of the civilian labor 
force, 16 to 17 year olds, has seen decreases in school-year employment in recent years 
and concurrent increases in the percentage unemployed--a trend that transcends the 
demographic lines of gender, race and ethnicity (Morisi, 2008).  
Contributing to these recent trends are declines in the real wage for teenage 
workers and slow recovery of the teenage employment rate after the 2001 recession, but 
the past twenty years have also witnessed an increase in the proportion of students 
enrolled in and subject to advanced coursework and placement exams (Morisi, 2008). In 
addition, an increasing number of states are requiring students to pass high school exit 
exams as a condition of graduation. Currently, 26 of the 50 states have either 
implemented or plan to implement mandatory exit exams by 2012, and the overwhelming 
majority of these states initialize exams in tenth grade when students are at the cusp of 
entering the labor force (Center for Educational Policy, 2009).  
Other trends suggest a growing acknowledgement of the value of education for 
future earnings. Over the past three decades or so, there has been a positive association 
between educational attainment and earnings as well as an increase in the percentage of 
young adults enrolling in degree-granting institutions (National Center for Educational 
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Statistics, no date), although it is likely that other factors contributed to the latter trend 
such as declining employment opportunities for low-skilled workers and greater 
availability of student financial aid. These trends collectively suggest that working may 
be a less attractive or viable option for school-aged adolescents who face more advanced 
coursework and stricter educational requirements. 
 Income based measures of youth economic deprivation are also problematic for a 
couple of reasons. First, working adolescents are generally employed in part-time, low-
skill jobs that pay a low-wage, so the nature of youth employment and earnings is one 
that inherently situates them at the bottom of the income distribution. Second, the income 
that adolescents acquire from work or other sources is not typically allocated towards 
family living expenses, and thus is not reflective of their access to income for important 
material resources. The following excerpt from Steinberg (1996) illustrates this point: 
 Contrary to popular stereotype, working students are not mainly poor youngsters 
 who are working because their families need their earnings, but middle class  
 youth who are working for additional pocket money to spend on themselves.   
 National surveys show that almost none of the typical student worker’s earnings 
 goes toward family expenses or into a college savings accounts.  Most of it goes  
 toward clothing, cars, stereo equipment and socializing (p. 167). 
Referring to the findings from his own collaborative research, he goes on to state: 
 In our study, for example, close to 60 percent of the workers we surveyed said  
 they spent most or all of their earnings…on immediate personal expenses.  Only 
 about 10 percent said they saved most or all of their earnings for college, and only 
 3 percent said they gave most or all of their earnings to the family (p. 168). 
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Hence, adolescents tend to use their own economic resources to fund social activities and 
fulfill material desires while most likely depending on family income to cover the costs 
of housing, utilities, food, medical care, and educational resources, which makes family 
income a better gauge of the material and economic well-being of youth. 
 Given the significance of family income for youth economic well being, the child 
poverty rate seems a particularly relevant indicator of youth economic deprivation. The 
official poverty measure defines the family as the economic unit for determining poverty 
status, and children are considered to be poor if the total pre-tax cash income for their 
family unit is less than the poverty threshold designated for their family size and 
composition (Hoynes et al., 2006). 
Its utility notwithstanding, the official poverty measure has been extensively 
criticized over the years for its failure to account for the Earned Income Tax credit, in-
kind benefits from government assistance programs, state and federal tax deductions, and 
other family or work related expenses that affect the amount of expendable income 
available to families, and there is particular concern that these omissions may lead to 
inflated child poverty rates as families with children are most likely to receive benefits 
from means-tested government programs. While past research has confirmed that the 
official measure does tend to overstate child poverty, there is also evidence that there are 
no substantial differences in time-series patterns of official and experimental poverty 
rates (Iceland et al., 2001; Short et al., 1999). Therefore, the official measure appears 
capable of producing long-term trends in the poverty rate with some accuracy.  
The proceeding discussion will focus on the distinct trends in child poverty that 
occurred throughout the 1990s and the early half of the millennium, the economic and 
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social climate in which these trends occurred, and the significance of these trends for 
minorities and families. Following is an overview of the crime drop that also occurred in 
the 1990s and suppositions about the relationship between child poverty and violent 
crime trends. Finally, the impact of economic and social policy changes on this 
relationship will be explored.  
Trends in Child Poverty, 1993-2004 
The Economic Expansion of the 1990s 
 According to Nichols (2006), two distinct trends in child poverty occurred 
between 1993 and 2004: a stable and significant decline from 1993 to 2000 and a modest 
but stable increase from 2001 to 2004. However, the significance of these trends cannot 
be fully understood apart from the economic and social context in which they occurred. 
Save a brief recession in the early part of the decade, the 1990s were marked by a period 
of unprecedented economic growth that peaked in 2000 when the U. S. labor market 
reached full employment (Freeman, 2001). More importantly, this economic expansion 
spread to the lower end of the job market and contributed to the first sustained increase in 
real wages for low-skilled workers in over thirty years (Jargowsky, 1999). This feature 
set the economic expansion of the 1990s apart from the expansions of the previous 
decade.   
 In addition to the economic expansion, the 1990s also witnessed a number of 
social policy changes designed to encourage work among poor and female-headed 
families--the populations at greatest risk for welfare dependency. One of these changes 
was federal and state expansions to the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) in 1993 and 
2000 that were the most substantial expansions to the credit since its 1975 enactment 
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(Gunderson & Ziliak, 2004). The EITC provides refundable tax credits and wage 
supplements to low income working families and has been identified as a major 
contributor to the growth in maternal employment between the mid-1980s and 1996 
(Meyer & Rosenbaum, 2001).  
The other change was the passage of the 1996 Personal Responsibility and Work 
Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA), which introduced major reforms to the 
federal welfare system, the most significant being the replacement of the Aid to Families 
with Dependent Children (AFDC) program with block grants to states entitled Temporary 
Assistance to Needy Families (TANF) to be effective July 1, 1997. Under TANF 
guidelines, states were given broad discretion to design their own welfare program and 
determine eligibility, but were prohibited from using federal funds to assist families for 
more than five cumulative years and teenage parents not attending school or under adult 
supervision. In addition, recipients were subject to mandatory work requirements and 
possible sanctions for noncompliance and rule violations, including the reduction or 
termination of all cash and food stamp benefits (Greenberg et al., 2002).   
Collectively, these developments contributed to substantial improvements in the 
job market, particularly among low-skilled, low-income workers. In turn, these job 
market improvements played a major role in reducing child poverty, but most 
prominently for black children whose parents are more likely to be situated at the bottom 
of the job market (Nichols, 2006). While low-skilled workers benefit importantly during 
periods of economic growth, they tend to experience more substantial growth in 
unemployment during periods of economic recession, which in turn is associated with the 
growth in child poverty rates.  
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Historically, there has been a close association between indicators of 
macroeconomic growth (e.g. GDP, unemployment rate) and poverty rates, but the 
strength of the relationship has varied over time. National poverty rates declined 
substantially during the robust economy of the 1960s, but fell at a much slower rate 
relative to GDP growth during the 1970s and particularly in the 1980s (e.g. Blank et al., 
1993; Cutler et al., 1991), which caused researchers to question the poverty-reducing 
effect of the ‘rising tide’. However, more recent research suggests that the weak 
association between economic growth and poverty rates during the ‘70s and ‘80s was a 
departure from historical trends and that the ‘typical’ association re-emerged during the 
1990s (Freeman, 2001; Haveman & Schwabish, 1999).  
Given the economic growth-poverty association and the acute sensitivity of 
minorities to changing macroeconomic conditions, it is expected that periods of economic 
expansion and declining child poverty is characterized by faster declines for minority 
children, and in particular blacks. Figure 2.1 illustrates the long-term trends in economic 
growth as measured by the unemployment rate and child poverty, revealing that 
minorities consistently display greater sensitivity to upturns in the economy. During 
periods of declining child poverty, the reduction for minority children is much more 
pronounced than the reduction for all children. This trend is particularly apparent during 
the economic expansion of the 1990s. 
Between 1993 and 2000, the poverty rate for all children declined by nearly 7 
percentage points while the rate for non-Hispanic white children declined by about 5  
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Figure 2.1
Unemployment and child poverty rates by race and ethnicity, 1974-2008
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points. In comparison, the respective declines for Hispanic and black children were 
roughly 13 and 15 percentage points, which is consistent with Borjas’ contention that 
minorities exhibit greater sensitivity to changing economic conditions. The poverty 
reductions for minority children were also noteworthy because the height of the economic 
boom (i.e. 2000) witnessed the lowest rate ever recorded for black children by the Census 
Bureau and the lowest rate for Hispanic children since the early and late 1970s (Dalaker, 
2001). Despite reaching a record low, however, the black child poverty rate in 2000 was 
still about 15 percentage points higher than the rate for all children.  
 There have also been relatively few changes in the Hispanic child poverty rate 
relative to the non-Hispanic white child poverty over the years (Nichols, 2006). Since the 
early 1970s, the Hispanic child poverty rate has consistently been about three times the 
rate of non-Hispanic white children, the only exception being the mid-1990s when the 
gap in poverty was nearly fourfold. So despite the fact that the changes in child poverty 
have been more pronounced for Hispanic children over the years, the rate has grown in 
similar proportion to non-Hispanic white children.    
In addition to the reductions in child poverty, the economic boom also contributed 
to significant declines in family poverty. The poverty rate fell by about twenty-nine 
percent for both female-headed and all families from 1993 to 2000, but the rate for 
female-headed families fell by about 10 percentage points in comparison to a 4-point 
reduction for all families and 2-point reduction for married couple families.  Similar to 
the black child poverty rate, the proportion of female-headed families in poverty also 
dipped to a record low in 2000 while the rate for married couple families remained 
unchanged from its historic low in 1999 (Dalaker, 2001).   
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The nature of the reduction in family poverty was different from that of child 
poverty in that it was not a steady decline. Between 1995 and 1996, there was a slight 
increase in the proportion of female-headed and all families in poverty while remaining 
stable for married couple families. However, all family groups experienced an 
accelerated decline in poverty after 1997, which coincided roughly with the rise in real 
wages for low-skilled workers and the implementation of the TANF program. In fact, 
about 68 percent of the decline female-headed family poverty occurred during this time 
period as well as nearly half of the decline for black children, three-fifths of the decline 
for non-Hispanic white children, and three-fourths of the decline for Hispanic children.   
The Recession and Economic Slowdown of the Early 2000s 
The longest economic expansion of the post-war United States eventually gave 
way to a brief recession in March 2001. Occurring on the heels of an unusually high 
economic peak, however, this recession was not particularly severe in terms of the 
employment decline. Excluding this past recession, Hall (2007:14) ranked the decline in 
employment associated with the 2001 downturn as the sixth largest of all the post-war 
recessions.  Nonetheless, the labor market softened considerably for workers across all 
racial and ethnic, family and earnings groups as well as for both teenagers and adults. 
The economic downturn also affected both high- and low-skilled workers in a wide range 
of occupations though sharp declines in computer and data processing services, personnel 
services, and various manufacturing-related services stem from the steep downturn in the 
manufacturing industry (Langdon, McMenamin, & Krolik, 2002). The unemployment 
rate continued to increase throughout 2003 before decreasing negligibly in 2004.   
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 After an eight year decline, the child poverty rate also increased steadily from 
2001 to 2004, although the increase was modest compared to the significant reductions of 
the previous decade. During this time period, poverty increased by nearly 2 percentage 
points for all children compared to an overall increase of roughly 4 percentage points for 
black children and 1 percentage point for Hispanic and non-Hispanic white children, 
although the latter trends differed somewhat from the trends for all children. So, while all 
groups of children experienced only slight increases in poverty, black children appeared 
to be most affected by the economic downturn. On the other hand, Hispanic children did 
not appear to be particularly affected at all. 
 In addition to increases in child poverty, the economic downturn was also marked 
by stable but modest growth in the poverty rate for all family groups. The poverty rate for 
all families increased from 9.2 percent in 2001 to 10.2 percent in 2004, an increase of 
roughly 11 percent. In comparison, the increase for married couple and female-headed 
families was 0.6 and 1.9 percentage points respectively, the latter being more than three 
times larger than the former. Table 2.1 summarizes the changes in child and family 
poverty from 1993 to 2004. 
The Crime Drop 
In addition to important economic and social developments, the 1990s were also 
marked by precipitous declines in youth violent crime. This crime drop was an 
unexpected departure from the dramatic increase in violence that occurred from the mid 
1980s to the early 1990s, much of which was due to the emergence of crack cocaine  
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Table 2.1 
 
Changes in Child and Family Poverty in the Current Population Survey, 1993-2004 
             
 
Children by                 1993 1997 2000 1993- 1997-  2001 2004 2001- 
Race/Ethnicity    2000 2000    2004  
 
Non-Hispanic white 13.6 11.4      9.1 -4.5  -2.3   9.5 10.5  +1.0 
 
Black alone  46.1 37.2 31.2    -14.9   -6.0  30.2 33.7  +3.5 
  
Hispanic  40.9 36.8 28.4    -12.5  -8.4  28.0 28.9  +0.9  
 
All children  22.7 19.9 16.2 -6.5 -3.7  16.3 17.8  +1.5  
 
                                    1993 1997 2000 1993- 1997-  2001 2004 2001- 
Family Group     2000 2000    2004  
 
Married couple  6.5 5.2 4.7 -1.8  -0.5   4.9  5.5  +0.6 
 
Female-headed           35.6    31.6     25.4     -10.2  -6.2            26.4      28.3  +1.9 
 
All families  12.3 10.3 8.7  -3.6 -1.6    9.2 10.2  +1.0  
 
Note: Differences reported in percentage points. 
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markets in inner cities and the associated proliferation of guns. In fact, some researchers 
suggest that the rise in homicides during this period was entirely in the use of handguns 
by youth under the age of 25 (Travis & Waul, 2002). The number of juvenile arrests for 
violent index offenses rose by more than 60 percent during the same time period and the 
arrest rate peaked at an all-time high of 512.2 per 100,000 in 1994, which occurred at 
roughly the same time that analysts were projecting an increase in the youth population of 
more than 20 percent over the next two decades (Butts & Travis, 2002).  
The dramatic rise in violent victimization and offending, coupled with the 
projected growth in the juvenile population, launched youth violence to the forefront of 
public concern. Dire predictions of a youth crime wave were cast and many states moved 
toward the adoption of ‘get tough’ juvenile justice policies to punish serious young 
offenders (Feld, 1998). Despite these ominous predictions, however, there was an abrupt 
and substantial decline in violent crime in the mid-1990s that persisted throughout the 
turn of the century. The crime decline occurred so unexpectedly that it was initially 
dismissed as temporary or anomalous (Butts & Travis, 2002), but it would prove to be 
important for several reasons. First, significant declines occurred across all of the major 
crime categories, encompassing both violent and property crimes. Second, the crime 
decline occurred across cities, suburbs, rural areas, and all regions of the country. Third, 
the decline in violence spanned the categories of race, gender, and age, though juveniles 
experienced the most salient declines (Levitt, 2004). 
Between 1994 and 2000, violent crime arrests declined by about 34 percent for 
juveniles, 18 percent for young adults, and 16 percent for older adults, but the reductions 
are even more significant for murder, robbery, and aggravated assault. Murder arrests 
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declined by 68 percent for juveniles, 39 percent for young adults, and 31 percent for older 
adults. For robbery, the corresponding declines were 51 percent, 39 percent, and 31 
percent while the declines in aggravated assault were 22 percent, 12 percent, and 10 
percent. Whereas juveniles contributed to nearly one-third of the increase in violent crime 
arrests between 1980 and 1994, their contribution to the 1994 to 2000 decline was about 
58 percent (Butts & Travis, 2000). 
Macroeconomic Conditions and Violent Crime 
A number of explanations have been advanced for the crime drop of the 1990s 
including demographic changes, tougher gun control laws, innovative policing strategies, 
the decline of the crack cocaine market, and the economic expansion of the 1990s (Levitt, 
2004). That the crime drop occurred at roughly the same time that the U.S. economy was 
undergoing the longest expansion of the 20th Century would seem to suggest that the two 
trends are associated, but the empirical evidence is equivocal.  Econometric evidence 
generally supports a relationship between macroeconomic conditions and crime 
(Freeman, 2001), but this support is limited primarily to economically motivated crimes. 
The basic premise of the economic model of crime is that individuals decide 
whether to engage in crime or legitimate work by weighing factors such as their 
probability of securing a job and earning potential in the legitimate job market with their 
opportunity to commit crime, the potential economic return, and the risk of apprehension 
(Freeman, 2001), obviously choosing the option that yields the greatest returns. 
Macroeconomic shifts can influence crime trends by affecting the relative returns 
associated with criminal involvement and legitimate work. Because most criminals are 
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situated at the bottom of the job market, economic growth is most likely to affect crime 
when it impacts low-skilled workers as was the case in the 1990s expansion. 
The economic expansion drove unemployment below the natural rate in over 44 
percent of metropolitan areas, but the wages of less-educated adult men remained largely 
unchanged. In contrast, there were important gains in employment and earnings among 
less educated young men, and in particular young black men (Freeman and Rodgers, 
1999).  Research conducted by Gould, Weinberg, and Mustard (2001) identified wages, 
and to a lesser extent unemployment, of less-educated males as important determinants of 
long-term economically motivated crime trends, but found that the declining 
unemployment rate contributed more importantly to the crime drop of the 1990s than the 
growth in wages. Other studies have found small but statistically significant effects of 
state-level unemployment on property crime (e.g. Donohue & Levitt, 2001; Raphael & 
Winter-Ebmer, 2001), but generally fail to find any effects for violent crime. These 
negative findings are consistent with evidence that predominately suggests that there is 
no direct association between economic growth and violent crime rates. 
Though the preponderance of the evidence suggests that changes in the economy 
are unrelated to violent crime trends, there are a few exceptions. For instance, Grogger 
(2006) suggests that there is an association between the increase in wages for low-skilled 
workers and the decline in violence in the 1990s, positing specifically that the wage 
increase served to enhance the attractiveness of the legitimate job market for both active 
and potential dealers seeking to leave the violent drug trade. The findings from Messner, 
et al. (2001) also have important implications for the relationship between 
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macroeconomic conditions and youth violent crime, particularly in light of the historical 
association between economic growth and child poverty rates. 
Given the close association between economic growth and child poverty rates, it 
is also possible that the changes in the economy that influence child poverty rates also 
influence rates of youth violent victimization. However, previous research has not 
addressed this possibility. Focusing exclusively on adolescents between the ages of 12 
and 17, one of the primary goals of this analysis is to determine if there is an association 
between child poverty and youth victimization trends from 1993 to 2004, and whether 
larger economic conditions played a significant role. Given the differential effects of 
macroeconomic conditions on minorities, it is necessary to assess child poverty and youth 
violence trends disaggregated by race and ethnicity to gain meaningful insights into these 
possible relationships.  
All children experienced sustained declines in poverty during the economic 
expansion but there were important racial and ethnic differences in the magnitude of the 
decline. Although black, non-Hispanic white and Hispanic children experienced poverty 
reductions of roughly one-third each, the largest overall reductions were experienced by 
blacks and Hispanics. During weaker economic conditions, poverty rose modestly for all 
children as well as for blacks, non-Hispanic whites, and Hispanics. However, black 
children still experienced the largest overall growth in poverty. Did violence trends for 
non-Hispanic black, non-Hispanic white, and Hispanic youth respond similarly to these 
economic conditions? Did non-Hispanic black and Hispanic youth experience the largest 
reductions in violent victimization during the economic expansion of the 1990s? Did non-
Hispanic black youth experience the largest overall growth in victimization during the 
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weaker economic conditions of the early 2000s? Were youth violence trends for non-
Hispanic black, non-Hispanic white and Hispanic youth more closely associated with 
overall poverty or group-specific poverty trends?  These are some of the key questions 
this research will address.  
The trends in family poverty may also have consequences for youth violence. 
Along with race and ethnicity, family structure is one of the most important predictors of 
child poverty that is also consequential for other aspects of child well-being, including 
violent victimization. All families experienced significant declines in poverty throughout 
the 1990s, but the reduction for female-headed families was much more substantial than 
the reduction for married couple and all families. The growth in family poverty during 
the economic downturn was trivial, but the increase for female-headed families was still 
about three times larger than that for married couple families. This research will also 
consider whether the trends in family poverty had any significance for youth violent 
victimization trends by addressing the following questions: Did youth in female-headed 
families experience the largest reductions in violent victimization during the economic 
expansion? Did they also experience the most substantial growth in victimization in the 
early 2000s?    
The passage of welfare reform was one of the most important social policy 
developments of the 1990s, and one of the implicit goals of the reform was to enhance 
the social and economic well-being of disadvantaged children through the promotion of 
work and marriage. Moreover, the 1996 law required states to submit an annual statement 
of their child poverty rate to the U. S. Department of Health and Human Services and 
based on child poverty data from the Census Bureau, submit a corrective action plan if it 
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increased by more than five percent as a result of the TANF program. Upon approval the 
plan was to be implemented until the child poverty rate was sufficiently reduced (P.L. 
104-193, Title I, Sec. 103). After the implementation of the TANF program, there was a 
marked acceleration in child poverty rates.  
Given these efforts to regulate child poverty and the timing of the accelerated 
decline, welfare reform was a likely contributor. In the wake of welfare reform, nearly 
half of the decline in black child poverty occurred as well as the bulk of the decline for 
non-Hispanic white and Hispanic children. Another objective of this analysis is to 
determine whether the marked reduction in poverty in the late 1990s had any significance 
for youth violence trends by addressing the following questions: Was there also a marked 
acceleration in youth violence during the early post reform period (i.e. 1997-2000)? Did 
the bulk of the decline in violence occur for non-Hispanic white and Hispanic youth after 
the implementation of the TANF program? Were there any significant differences in the 
poverty-youth violence association in the early post-reform and entire expansion period?  
However, affirmative findings should not be interpreted as evidence that welfare 
reform caused the marked reduction in poverty, but that it most likely played an 
important supportive role. Instead the objective is to generally determine if the post-
reform period had any particular significance for the decline in youth violent 
victimization, an aspect of child well-being that has been largely ignored in the welfare 
reform literature. 
Poverty and the Risk for Violence 
 Thus far the discussion has centered on the macro-level relationship between 
economic deprivation and youth crime, but it is equally important to consider whether the 
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social developments of the 1990s influenced youth’s risks for violent victimization. 
Previous research has established a connection between one’s economic status and 
violence risks, but has failed to consider whether the strength of this relationship has 
varied over time. Did the social developments of the 1990s exacerbate the consequences 
of poverty for youth violent victimization? There is at least some experimental evidence 
that the mandatory work requirements enacted by welfare reform had adverse effects on 
adolescents whose mother participated in welfare-to-work programs, including poor 
academic performance as well as school suspension and expulsion (Gennetian et al., 
2002).  
Though welfare caseloads declined dramatically and employment among single 
mother increased in the early post-reform years, evidence from the National Survey of 
American Families (NSAF) suggests that many welfare leavers worked low-skilled, low-
wage jobs that offered little to no benefits or job security. As a result, many leavers 
continued to face significant financial and material hardships despite meeting the 
mandated work requirements, including difficulties paying for basic needs such as 
housing and food (Loprest & Zedlewski, 2006; see also Corcoran et al., 2000). Moreover, 
parental aggravation more than tripled among new welfare leavers with young children 
between 1997 and 2002, which may very well reflect stress associated with the welfare-
to-work transition (Loprest & Zedlewski, 2006). In turn, financial stress and parental 
aggravation can obviously strain family and parent-child relationships with harmful 
consequences for youth. 
As such, researchers have cited strained parent-child relationships along with 
inadequate supervision and adolescents’ increased responsibilities in the home as possible 
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explanations for the negative adolescent outcomes (Brooks, Hair, & Zaslow, 2001). The 
experimental evidence suggests that adolescents were most likely to exhibit problem 
behaviors if younger siblings were present in the home, presumably because they 
assumed many of the household and child care responsibilities (Gennetia et al., 2002). 
Research on adolescents suggests that the assumption of adult roles and responsibilities 
may encourage defiance towards authority figures such as parents and teachers, 
engagement in adult behaviors such as drinking, smoking, and early sexual behavior, and 
interfere with schoolwork, particularly among adolescents in high-risk settings such as 
poor families and communities (Brooks et al., 2001).  
 Pinpointing the source of the negative adolescent outcomes is beyond the scope of 
this research, but the preceding discussion was meant to illustrate some of the harmful 
consequences of welfare reform for adolescents in low-income working families. Instead, 
the objective of the micro-level analysis is to determine whether the increased risk for 
violent victimization is one of the harmful consequences experienced by adolescents in 
the post reform era. The national trends for working poor families, which are often high 
risk settings for adolescents, may offer some clues. 
 Many poor children reside in families with at least one full or part time worker. In 
1995 nearly 67 percent of all poor children lived in working poor families compared to 
about 73 percent of non-Hispanic whites, 57 percent of blacks, and 69 percent of 
Hispanics, but by 2000 this proportion had increased to almost 77 percent of all poor 
children, 80 percent of non-Hispanic white children, 68 percent of black children, and 82 
percent of Hispanic children. So despite the fact that child poverty declined significantly 
in the latter half of the 1990s, there was a substantial increase in the proportion of poor 
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children living in working poor families (Child Trends, no date). This growth is likely 
due to the fact that many active and former welfare recipients entered the workforce, but 
yet remained poor. The same trends did not occur for all children; the proportion of all 
groups of children in working poor families declined during this same time period and 
continued to decrease throughout 2008. 
 Over the course of time, the proportion of poor children in working poor families 
declined. By 2005, the proportion of all poor children in working poor families declined 
by 21 percentage points while there was a 25-point reduction for Hispanic children, a 15-
point reduction for black children, and a 15-point reduction for non-Hispanic white 
children (Child Trends, no date). What do these trends mean, if anything, for youth 
violence risks? Did poverty have increased consequences for youth’s violent 
victimization risks during the early post-reform period? Did this consequence diminish in 
the early 2000s, possibly as low-income working parents accumulated enough work 
experience to secure better paying jobs? Addressing these issues will hopefully contribute 
to the understanding of how the consequences of poverty for youth violent victimization 
have changed over time and whether these consequences were more important after the 
passage of welfare reform. 
Summary and Objectives 
 In sum, criminologists have extensively examined the effects of economic 
deprivation on crime, but there is still much to learn about the specific effects of absolute 
deprivation on youth violent crime. One issue to be resolved is the measurement of youth 
economic deprivation and I argue that the child poverty rate is particularly useful for this 
purpose. Indicators of absolute deprivation generally have limited relevance to youth 
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because of their limited access to work and income. However, indicators based on family 
income, as is the case with the official child poverty rate, are particularly important for 
adolescents who depend primarily on the family unit for support.  
 Changes in the child poverty rate have also been linked to youth homicide arrest 
trends (Messner, et al., 2001), and the distinct trends in child poverty that occurred 
between 1993 and 2004 offer a unique opportunity to examine their relationship with 
youth violent victimization trends. Moreover, the social and economic developments that 
also occurred during this time offer the opportunity to examine the influence that 
economic and social policy changes may have had on these trends.  
The economic expansion of the 1990s led to significant improvements in the job 
market for low-skilled workers, which in turn contributed to dramatic reductions in 
poverty for families and children (Nichols, 2006). The most prominent reductions were 
experienced by the groups most likely to occupy the bottom of the job market: minorities 
and female-headed families. The economic expansion was followed by a brief recession 
and slow recovery period that hit all families. The child poverty rate also increased 
modestly during this period, with the most substantial increases for black children and 
female-headed families.      
 By assessing the association between various child poverty and youth violence 
trends, it is possible to gain important insights into the influence of larger economic 
conditions on this relationship. The trends in child poverty that occurred in the 1990s and 
early 2000s have been largely attributed to changes in economic growth and given the 
association between child poverty and youth violence trends, it is possible that the 
economic changes that contributed to poverty trends also contributed to the trends in 
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youth violence. Moreover, this research will contribute to the literature by assessing the 
differences in similarities in the violence trends of various sub-groups, including non-
Hispanic white, non-Hispanic black, and Hispanic youth. Previous research has focused 
predominately on the differences between black and white youth. The analysis of youth 
violence trends disaggregated by family structure is also an important contribution to the 
literature as these trends have not been previously examined. 
 From a social policy perspective, the passage of the Personal Responsibility and 
Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 was an important development. The Act 
was the first federal law to explicitly promote marriage (and work) as a means of 
improving the social and economic well-being of disadvantaged children (Shields & 
Behrman, 2002). Researchers have examined the effects of welfare reform on children’s 
school engagement and academic performance, behavioral and emotional problems, 
physical health, and economic well-being (e.g. Loprest & Zedlewski, 2006; Gennetian, et 
al., 2002), but have failed to consider the possibility that it had some effect on youth 
violence trends.  
This negligence is due partly to the lack of available data but it has also proven 
difficult to isolate the effects of welfare reform from other factors such as the strong 
economy and expansions to the EITC. While it is not possible to estimate the independent 
effects of welfare reform on the child poverty reductions of the late 1990s, it is likely that 
it interacted with other economic forces to cause an accelerated post-reform decline. 
Therefore the goal of this research is not to establish a causal relationship between 
welfare reform and youth violence trends, but to generally determine if the early post 
reform period was significant for youth violent victimization trends. 
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Though policymakers hoped that welfare reform would improve the social and 
economic well-being of disadvantaged families and children, many continued to face 
serious financial struggles despite complying with federal work requirements. Moreover, 
experimental evaluations of welfare reform suggest that adolescents whose parents 
participated in welfare-to-work programs tended to do worse in school and display more 
problem behaviors than adolescents in non-participating families (Gennetian et al., 2002).    
Some researchers have attributed the adverse outcomes to factors such as 
adolescents’ increased responsibility in the home. Moreover, this increase in 
responsibility is more likely to yield problem behaviors when youth live in high-risk 
settings such as poor families (Brooks et al., 2001). Given the post-reform growth in the 
proportion of poor children in working poor families, it is plausible that the mandatory 
work requirements enacted by welfare reform inadvertently exacerbated the 
consequences of poverty for youth’s violent victimization risk. However, it is also 
possible that these consequences diminished as working families accumulated work 
experience, family resources, etc. Previous research has failed to consider whether the 
strength of the relationship between economic deprivation and youth violent 
victimization risks have varied over time. By examining a time frame that includes a pre- 
and post-reform period, this research will be able to offer some insight into how the 
consequences of poverty for youth violent victimization risks have changed before and 
after welfare reform.   
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CHAPTER 3 
 GOALS, DATA, AND MEASURES 
 This chapter is organized into three main sections: Research Goals, Data, and 
Measures. The first section outlines the various research questions to be addressed in this 
study; a summary table is also included for purposes of reference. The next section 
briefly describes the methodology of the National Crime Victimization Survey--the data 
source for this project--followed by a more detailed discussion of its strengths and 
limitations for the purposes of this research. The final section outlines the creation of key 
measures and presents relevant sample characteristics.  
Research Goals 
The objectives of this research are numerous, but may be summarized into three 
overarching goals: 1) to determine whether larger changes in the economy influence 
youth violence trends, 2) to assess whether welfare reform had any impact on rates of 
youth violence, and 3) to estimate the independent effects of poverty on youth’s risks for 
violence and determine if the strength of this relationship has changed over time. 
Pursuant to the first two goals, the following research questions will be addressed at the 
macro-level:   
 Did youth violent victimization rates fall most substantially for black and 
Hispanic youth during the economic expansion of the 1990s? Did youth in 
female-headed families also experience a more substantial decrease in violent 
victimization than youth in married couple families during this time?  
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 Did black youth experience the largest increase in violent victimization during 
the weak economic conditions of the early 2000s? Did youth in female-headed 
families also experience the largest increase? 
 Did Hispanic youth experience the most substantial decrease in violent 
victimization during the early post-reform period? Did youth in female-headed 
families also experience the largest decrease? 
The poverty trends for minority children and female-headed families displayed acute 
sensitivity to economic changes in the 1990s and early 2000s. These research questions 
will assess whether violent victimization trends disaggregated by race, ethnicity, and 
family structure responded similarly to the changes in the economy. In addition, trends 
will be disaggregated by age, gender, and metropolitan status to not only assess whether 
there are important sub-group differences in the poverty-youth violence relationship, but 
to determine if changes in group-specific youth poverty rates are more closely related to 
disaggregated victimization trends than changes in the overall poverty rate. Finally, these 
research questions will assess whether post-reform changes in youth poverty are 
associated with trends in youth violent victimization in the late 1990s.  
The final set of research questions will assess the individual level relationship 
between poverty and youth’s risks for violent victimization over time, specifically 
addressing the possibility that the consequences of family poverty for youth’s 
victimization risks were amplified during the early post-reform period but diminished 
over time. Hence, the research questions that will be addressed in the micro-level analysis 
are as follows:   
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 Have the consequences of poverty for youth violent victimization changed over 
time? If so, are these changes associated with the mandatory work requirements 
enacted by the 1996 welfare reforms? 
In addition to assessing the changing significance of poverty for youth’s violence risks, 
this analysis will also determine the independent effects of poverty on youth violence 
risks net of race, ethnicity, family structure, and other controls (see Table 3.1 for a 
summary of research questions).  
Data 
National Crime Victimization Survey 
 This project utilizes data from the 1993-2004 NCVS, an ongoing national survey 
sponsored by the Bureau of Justice Statistics.  The NCVS has collected information on 
nonfatal violent and property crimes against households and individuals age 12 and older 
since 1973.  Using a multi-stage sampling technique, a nationally representative sample 
of 76,000 households is selected to participate in the NCVS each year, yielding 
interviews with approximately 135,000 individuals (BJS, no date). The national 
household sample is drawn from the Decennial Census, which is an advantage over 
sampling techniques such as random digit dialing that exclude households without 
telephone access. Selected households remain in the NCVS sample for three years and 
interviews are conducted with household members age 12 and older every six months. 
Strengths of the NCVS. The NCVS employs several methodological strategies to 
ensure that incidents are accurately reported. First, information is gathered through a self-
response method in which direct interviews are conducted with as many eligible 
household members as possible. 
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Table 3.1 
Summary of Macro-and Micro-Level Research Questions 
             
 
Macro-level questions          
             
Primary 
 
1) Did youth violent victimization rates fall most substantially for black and Hispanic 
youth during the economic expansion period (i.e. 1993 to 2000)? Did youth in female-
headed families also experience a more substantial decrease in violent victimization than 
youth in married couple families during this time? 
 
2) Did black youth experience the largest increase in violent victimization during the 
weak economic conditions of the early 2000s (i.e. 2001 to 2004)? Did youth in female-
headed families also experience the largest increase in victimization during this time? 
 
3) Did Hispanic youth experience the largest decrease in violent victimization during the 
early post reform period (i.e. 1997 to 2000)? Did youth in female-headed families also 
experience larger post-reform reductions in victimization than youth in married couple 
families? 
 
Secondary 
 
 4) Are there significant sub-group differences in the poverty-youth violence 
relationship? 
 
 5) Are group-specific changes in youth poverty more closely related to group-specific 
youth violent victimization trends than changes in the overall youth poverty rate? 
 
 6) Are there significant differences between the poverty-youth violence relationships of 
the economic expansion, early post-reform, and economic downturn periods?   
             
 
Micro-level questions           
 
1) Have the consequences of poverty for youth’s violent victimization risks changed over 
time? If so, are the changes associated with mandatory work requirements enacted by the 
1996 welfare reforms? 
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Proxy interviews may be conducted on behalf of those who are mentally or physically 
incapacitated to the extent that granting an interview is not possible as well as for 12 and 
13 year olds when insisted upon by a knowledgeable household member.  
Second, a screening process is used to determine whether or not reported 
incidents constitute a crime.  Respondents are first prompted to report incidents through a 
series of screening questions and for each incident reported during this initial screening, 
detailed information is collected and recorded in an incident report including the victim-
offender relationship, presence of weapons, extent of injuries, and whether or not the 
crime was reported to the police. Based on the details in this report, incidents are then 
classified by type of victimization and level of completion.  
Third, NCVS interviews are bounded to reduce the effects of telescoping, or the 
reporting of incidents that occur outside the six month reference period. Bounding is a 
technique that uses the information gathered in each interview as a point of reference for 
subsequent interviews to ensure that duplicate incidents are not counted. As such, the 
initial interview is only used for bounding purposes and does not count toward 
victimization estimates.  Past studies of National Crime Survey (NCS) data have found 
that unbounded interviewing can inflate victimization estimates by as much as 50% 
(Biderman & Cantor, 1984). 
Additional strengths make the NCVS a valuable tool for social science research 
including large sample sizes and high response rates. Between 1993 and 2004, completed 
interviews were obtained from roughly 980,000 individuals in over 540,000 households, 
with response rates ranging from 93% to 86% and 96% to 91% respectively; the present 
study is based on an unweighted sample of more than 300,000 persons between the ages 
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of 12 and 17. When weighted, however, this sample is nationally representative of nearly 
2.85 million youths. The large sample size, small sampling errors, and high participation 
rates contribute to the reliability and generalizability of NCVS estimates. 
 Specific advantages of the NCVS for the purposes of this project include the 
availability of data over many years, a wide range of important demographic information, 
and measures of Latino ethnicity. With more than 35 years of data on criminal 
victimization, the NCVS allows for the study of long-term trends in youth violence and 
because the data contain detailed victim and household demographic information, these 
trends can be disaggregated to better understand how youth violence trends vary by 
family structure and racial/ethnic origin--two of the key predictors of child poverty. A 
particular benefit of using the NCVS to disaggregate youth violence trends by race and 
ethnicity is that it is the only national crime survey that taps the Latino ethnicity of 
victims (Lauritsen & Heimer, 2010).  
The NCVS also contains information on family size and income that are largely 
unavailable in other youth surveys. This information will be used to approximate a 
measure of the official poverty thresholds that are used by the Census Bureau to 
determine the poverty status of individuals and families. Moreover, the wealth of 
demographic information available in the NCVS also makes it possible to estimate 
poverty rates for specific groups such as non-Hispanic white, non-Hispanic black, and 
Hispanic youths. 
 Finally, the NCVS may be used to conduct individual-level analyses despite its 
hierarchical file structure. Data collected by the NCVS are stored into four files: address 
ID, household, person, and incident. The first two files contain identifiers and 
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demographic information for every address and household selected into the NCVS 
sample while the person file contains similar information for every eligible participant in 
the sample household. Finally, the incident file contains information about the nature and 
characteristics of each household and personal victimization incident reported by NCVS 
respondents. 
 Figure 3.1 crudely illustrates the hierarchical organization of these files. The first 
full level consists of the address ID records, which provide important information on the 
addresses selected into the sample (in the NCVS, it is the address--not the individuals 
residing at the address--that is drawn into the sample). In turn, each address ID 
corresponds with a specific unit in the household file (i.e. the household residing at the 
address). According to the present example, our NCVS dataset consists of three address 
records that specifically correspond to three household records in the household-level 
file.  
Because interviews are conducted with every member of the sample household 
ages 12 and older, each household unit can potentially generate several person records. In 
this example, a total of seven individuals can be linked to the three households in the  
sample with each person ‘belonging’ to a specific household unit in the household-level 
file. Finally, each person may report several victimization incidents or none at all, 
generating a separate record for each in the incident-level file. The seven individuals in 
the present example reported a total of eleven victimization incidents. However, the 
incidents per person range from zero to four.    
 Storing these data in a fixed record length format such as a rectangular, or 
flattened file, is impractical for a couple of reasons. Perhaps the most obvious is that it 
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Figure 3.1 
Illustration of NCVS Hierarchical File Structure 
  
NCVS 
 
Address
ID 
1 
 
Address 
ID 
2 
 
Address 
ID 
3 
 
 
Household 
1 
 
 
Household
2 
 
 
Household
3 
 
 
Person 1 
 
 
Person 2
 
 
Person 3
 
 
Person 1
 
 
Person 4
 
 
Person 2
 
 
Person 1
 
Incident 
1 
 
Incident 
2 
 
Incident 
1 
 
Incident 
1 
 
Incident 
2 
 
Incident 
1 
 
Incident 
1 
 
Incident 
2 
 
Incident 
3 
 
Incident 
4 
 
 
Incident 
1 
White, Nicole, 2011, UMSL, p.62 
  
would generate a very large dataset that would no doubt prove difficult to manage, but 
more importantly, a rectangular file would produce a large amount of missing data. To fit 
all the data in Figure 3.1 into a rectangular file, it would have to be large enough to 
accommodate every possible combination of persons and incidents, the maximum of 
which is five. Hence, the complete record for household one would require a space for 
the address ID, household, and five configurations of persons and incidents: person1-
incident1, person1-incident2, person2-incident1, person2-incident2, person3, and 
person4-incident1; in addition to the address ID and household, the record for household 
two would contain the following five configurations: person1-incident1, person1-
incident2, person1-incident3, person1-incident4, and person2-incident1. Between 
households one and two, there are only three person-incident combinations that overlap 
(i.e. person1-incident1, person1-incident2, and person2-incident1), which obviously 
means that each record would contain a large amount of missing data; with only one 
overlap in household three (i.e. person1-incident1), the missing data in record three 
would be even more significant. 
For these reasons, it is more efficient to organize a complex dataset such as the 
NCVS in a hierarchical file structure. However, it does present some challenges for 
empirical analyses, particularly at the micro-level. It is not possible to examine the effects 
of household-related factors on one’s risk for violent victimization, for example, if the 
household information is in one file and the incident information is in another file.   
Fortunately, however, each NCVS file includes a set of identification variables that may 
be used to draw a link between the address, household, person, and incident- level files, 
providing a way to connect each household to every household member that participated 
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in the survey and each survey participant to their reported victimization incidents. Thus, 
the identification variables provide a way to collapse the hierarchically-organized files 
into a flat file that contains all of the relevant address, household, person, and incident 
information for each respondent in the NCVS. This particular method was used to create 
a series of thirteen flattened files for each year in the NCVS sample, which in turn were 
used to conduct individual-level analyses. 
 Creating the flattened files is an involved process that starts with downloading 
and bounding the files by interview year. Obviously, linking the various NCVS files will 
generate a large amount of data, so it is important to take steps to make the files more 
manageable.  This is done in the incident level file by first recoding the variables into 
more refined categories such as the type of victimization incident, presence of injury and 
weapons, and location of the incident. Next, a subset of both the recoded incident and 
person level files is created containing only those variables relevant to the present 
research. A unique person identification number is then created for each case in both the 
person and incident level files by stringing together the NCVS identification variables: 
ICPSR household identification number, year and quarter identification, sample number, 
scrambled control number, and household number. The cases are then sorted by the 
newly created person identification number and a variable is created in the incident file to 
tap the number of incidents reported by each person. A set of codes is used to create four 
vectors for each variable in the recoded incident file and place the correct incident 
information into these vectors. The appropriate variable names and value labels are then 
assigned to each vector and a set of codes that test the aggregating function designed to 
flatten the incident file is run. Finally, the flattened incident file is merged with the 
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person file by the person identification variable and a flattened file is created that 
contains the relevant variables from each file level for every respondent in the NCVS 
sample. 
 Limitations of the NCVS. Though the NCVS generates a large, nationally 
representative sample, high response rates, and detailed information about criminal 
victimization that cannot be found in most official data sources, there are limitations.  
Because the NCVS is an address-based sample, it excludes homeless youths and those 
living in group quarters or institutional settings such as juvenile detention centers. Also 
excluded from the sample are children under the age 12, so it is not possible to assess the 
consequences of poverty for childhood victimization.  
  The NCVS also has two important limitations for the empirical study of youth 
violence: atheoretical measures and the exclusion of community-level variables. 
According to social disorganization and ecological theories of crime, for example, 
community-level disadvantage plays a major indirect role in neighborhood rates of crime 
and delinquency.  In addition, research has linked other indicators of community 
disadvantage such as the percent of female-headed households to adolescent’s risk for 
violent victimization (Lauritsen, 2003). With the absence of theory-based measures and 
community-level variables in the NCVS, it is impossible to test any theoretical 
assumptions about the association between community-level deprivation and youth 
violence trends or assess the relative impact of individual and community level factors on 
the changing consequences of poverty over time. 
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Measures 
The key measures to be analyzed in this project are violent victimization, poverty, 
family structure, and race and ethnicity. To determine the association between youth 
poverty and violent crime at the macro-level, violent victimization trends will be 
disaggregated by family structure and race and ethnicity--two of the most important 
demographic predictors of youth poverty.  At the micro-level, I will assess whether the 
consequences of poverty have changed for youth’s violent victimization risks over time 
net of their family living arrangements and racial and ethnic origin. Three additional 
correlates of youth violence will serve as controls:  gender (‘0=female’ and ‘1=male’), 
urban residency (‘0=non-urban’ and ‘1=urban’), and whether adolescents are younger 
(‘0=12 to 14’) or older (‘1=15 to 17’). Table 3.2 summarizes the distribution of the 
sample along these measures. 
Dependent Variables 
 Violent victimization. The dependent variable for the micro-level portion of this 
project is violent victimization, which is coded ‘0=no’ or ‘1=yes’ if respondents reported 
at least one attempted or completed incident of the following crimes: simple assault, 
aggravated assault, robbery, and rape/sexual assault. Attacks not involving the use of a 
weapon are classified as simple assaults while aggravated assaults include attempted or  
completed attacks committed with a weapon or completed attacks resulting in serious 
injury. Robberies are classified as thefts committed with force or threat of force and  
rape/sexual assaults include attacks involving unwanted sexual contact or forced 
intercourse.   
 
White, Nicole, 2011, UMSL, p.66 
  
Table 3.2           
Characteristics of NCVS Youth Sample, 1993-2004a 
            
 
                      Family Structure*                   Race and Ethnicity* 
                    Poverty Status*   Married        Female           Non-Hispanic        Hispanic 
Year     Above     At/Below   Couple          Headed        White       Black   
 
1993        69.9 20.5       71.1 23.1       68.4          16.0   11.1  
 
1994        68.1 22.2       72.1 22.4       67.6          15.8   12.1  
 
1995        70.2 20.3       71.5 22.9       67.3          15.5   12.5 
 
1996        69.7 19.8       71.3 22.8       67.0          15.3   12.8 
 
1997        68.7 20.4       69.7 24.2       65.2          15.9   13.7 
 
1998        69.0            18.6            68.8  24.8       65.3          15.7   13.7 
 
1999        67.1 18.1       68.9 24.7       64.5          15.5   14.2 
 
2000            67.6 16.4       68.4 24.9       64.4          15.5   14.5 
 
2001        67.0 16.3       68.5 24.8       64.1          15.7   14.8 
 
2002        66.0 15.1       68.4 25.0       62.8          16.3   15.8 
 
2003            65.8 15.4       67.0 25.8       60.7          15.0   17.7 
 
2004        65.4            15.6       66.6 26.5       60.3          15.0   18.2 
 
Total        67.8            18.1       67.8 22.7       64.7          15.6   14.3 
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Table 3.2 (continued) 
                        
                            Violent 
                      Gender                    Age                  Urban Victimization Rate         
Year        Male      Female     12 to 14   15 to 17     Non-urban    Urban        (per 1,000)   
 
1993    51.3       48.7           51.7         48.3       73.7 26.3  125.6 
 
1994    51.3       48.7           51.0         49.0       72.9 27.1  127.5 
 
1995    51.2       48.8           51.0         49.0       72.9 27.1  112.9 
 
1996    51.2         48.8           50.7         49.3       72.6 27.4  102.1 
 
1997    51.3       48.7           50.0         50.0       71.5 28.5    93.3 
 
1998    51.1       48.9           50.3         49.7       72.3 27.7    87.0 
 
1999    51.2       48.8           50.4         49.6       73.1 26.9    77.4 
 
2000    51.2         48.8           50.2         49.8       72.2 27.8    59.9 
 
2001        51.1       48.9           50.2         49.8       72.5 27.5    58.4 
 
2002        51.4       48.6           51.1         48.9       72.4 27.6    49.1 
 
2003    51.2       48.8           51.8         48.2       71.2 28.8    55.8 
 
2004    51.2       48.8           51.1         48.9       72.7 27.3    46.3 
 
Total    51.2       48.8           50.8         49.2       72.5 27.5    81.8 
             
aValues represent percentages unless otherwise noted. 
*Total and within category percentages may not equal 100 because the percentage of 
  missing data and other excluded categories are omitted. 
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To assess the association between youth poverty and violent victimization rates at 
the macro-level, the youth violent victimization rate is also calculated for each year in the 
sample. To create this rate, the number of violent victimizations reported by youths 
during the interview year (numerator) is divided by the total youth population in that year 
(denominator) and multiplied by 1,000 as depicted below. The interview, or collection, 
year covers a 12 month interview period as opposed to the data year, which covers the 
entire 18 month NCVS interview period.  The former is used by the BJS to calculate 
victimization estimates in their annual Criminal Victimization reports. 
1,000 x
17)-(12 n populatioTotal
17)-(12incidents  violent # Totalrate  ionvictimizat violentYouth   


  
 
                                                                
 The total number of violent incidents is generated from the 1992-2005 
concatenated incident file and weighed by the NCVS person weight (v3080), which is an 
estimation of the population that each person in the sample represents.  By applying the 
person weight, therefore, it is possible to estimate the total number of violent 
victimizations in the national youth population. The denominators are generated in the 
person file and similarly weighed by the person weight to estimate the total youth 
population each year. Because estimates are not based on the full 18 month interview 
period, however, the person weight had to be adjusted to produce the appropriate annual 
estimates. This process was used to generate both total victimization rates and group 
specific rates by age, gender, family structure, race and ethnicity, and metropolitan status. 
The only difference is that the numerators and denominators are based on the number of 
victimizations reported by a specific group of youths and the total at-risk population 
respectively.  To generate the youth violent victimization rate for males in female-headed 
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families, for example, the numerator would consist of the number of violent incidents 
reported by young males in female-headed households and the denominator would 
consist of the total population of young males in female-headed households. 
Independent Variables 
 Poverty. To determine the poverty status of individuals and families, the Census 
Bureau uses a set of poverty thresholds that were initially developed by economist Molly 
Orchansky in 1963-64. The initial thresholds were based on an economy food plan 
developed by the Department of Agriculture and adjusted by family size, sex of the  
householder, the number of children under 18, and farm residency. In 1969, the 
thresholds were revised and the Consumer Price Index was established as the standard for 
annual inflation adjustments. That same year the thresholds were adopted as the federal 
definition of poverty. The adjustments for farm families and female-headed households 
were eventually eliminated in 1981 and family size was extended to 9 or more people, 
retaining family size and the number of children under 18 as the key factors used to 
adjust the federal threshold amounts (Fisher, 1992). Thus, a family and all of its members 
are considered to be in poverty if their total cash income falls below the designated 
poverty threshold for a family of their size and composition. 
Using the federal thresholds as a guideline, a similar method is used to create 
poverty thresholds in the NCVS. A precise replication is not possible because the NCVS 
lacks a continuous measure of household income.  Instead, threshold categories are 
created using the total number of members in each household and a categorical measure  
of household income that ranges from $5,000 to ≥ $75,000. Respondents are considered 
to be ‘0=above poverty’ if their household income category is greater than the federal 
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poverty threshold for a family of their size or ‘1=at or below poverty’ if their income 
category falls below, or includes, the poverty threshold. 
 Because the federal thresholds are updated annually for inflation, the threshold 
amount for a given family varies from year to year. For instance, the poverty threshold 
for a family of three was $13,738 in 2000 and $14,128 in 2001. Due to the variance in 
annual threshold amounts, separate poverty codes are created for each year in the NCVS 
sample. As previously noted, the code consists of two major components: household size 
and household income. The total household size is created by summing two continuous 
measures of the ‘number of household members 12 years and older’ and the ‘number of 
household members younger than 12 years’ and household income consists of fourteen 
categories: 1)  5,000; 2) 5,000-7,499; 3) 7,500-9,999; 4) 10,000-12,499; 5) 12,500-
14,999; 6) 15,000-17,499; 7) 17,500-19,999; 8) 20,000-24,999; 9) 25,000-29,999; 10) 
30,000-34,999; 11) 35,000-39,999; 12) 40,000-49,999; 13) 50,000-74,999; 14) ≥ 75,000.  
 Table 3.3 presents the information used to create the poverty code for 2004, the 
most recent year in the sample. According to these figures, respondents in a family of 
four are considered to be ‘at or below poverty’ if their category of household income is 
less than or equal to $17,500-$19,999, which encompasses the federal poverty threshold 
for a family of four--$19,307 (see U.S. Census Bureau, ‘Poverty Thresholds 2004’ for 
detailed threshold matrix). Thus, respondents in a family of four are considered to be 
poor if their income falls into categories 1 through 7.  
To assess the external validity of this measure, the NCVS youth poverty estimates 
are compared to those generated for all children under 18 in the Current Population 
Survey (see Appendix A). The estimates are similar to each other in trend and magnitude, 
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differing by no more than about two percentage points each year. The trends began to 
diverge after 2001 when missing income data in the NCVS approached 20%.  However, 
reducing this missing income data is challenging because the NCVS does not contain 
additional poverty and child well-being indicators such as household receipt of public 
assistance and food stamps, health insurance coverage, and child support receipt that can 
be used to impute family poverty or create alternative measures of child well-being.    
Family structure. In addition to household size and income, the NCVS also uses 
a family structure code to tap the composition of households in the survey. The family 
structure code broadly classifies families into those headed by husbands and wives or 
single males or females, and configures each family group according to the presence of  
children, other relatives, and non-relatives.  For example, married couple families with a 
male householder, or reference person, are configured in the following way: ‘1=Male ref 
wife/child/relative’;‘2=Male ref wife/child/non-relative’;‘3= Male ref wife/child/non-  
relative/relative’;‘4=Male ref wife/child’;‘5=Male ref wife/relative’;‘6=Male ref 
wife/non-relative’;‘7=Male ref wife/relative/non-relative’;‘8= Male ref wife’.  This  
classification scheme results in 33 configurations of family living arrangements, 
including other combinations not captured by the family structure code. 
These configurations may be coded into more refined categories of family 
structure including married couple families with or without children, single parent 
families headed by males or females, and single adult households. For example, the  
categories representative of married couples and their own biological children are 1-4 and 
17-20, but to capture all of the biological, related, and/or unrelated children residing in 
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Table 3.3 
Example of Census Bureau Poverty Thresholds and NCVS Threshold Categories, 2004 
(in dollars)  
             
 
Household size Census Poverty Thresholds       NCVS threshold categoriesa  
 1   9,645                5,000    (1) 
            5,000-7,499    (2) 
            7,500-9,999    (3) 
 
 2   12,334    10,000-12,499    (4) 
         
 3   15,067    12,500-14,999    (5) 
        15,000-17,499    (6) 
 
 4   19,307    17,500-19,999    (7) 
 
 5   23,831    20,000-24,999    (8) 
 
 6   25,788    25,000-29,999    (9) 
 
 7   29,236    25,000-29,999     (9) 
 
 8   32,641    30,000-34,999   (10) 
 
         ≥ 9    39,048    35,000-39,999   (11)  
             
aCategory number in parentheses. 
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married couple families, the categories must be expanded to include 1-7 and 17-23. 
Married couples without children include (8) ‘male reference wife’ and (23) ‘female 
reference husband’ (see Table 3.4).         
 Additionally, the specific relationship between the householder and each 
household member is measured and coded into general categories of spouses, children, 
parents, siblings, other relatives, and non-relatives. This information is useful for 
determining the respondent’s precise relationship to the head of household and estimating 
the percentage of related children in the sample. The NCVS does not assess the 
relationship between respondents and other members of the household, however, so 
estimates cannot be generated for youths living with cohabiting couples or single parents 
who ‘double up’ to share resources--an arrangement that increased significantly among 
low-income parents who were not receiving welfare during the early post-reform period 
(Loprest & Zedlewski, 2006). 
The two categories of family structure to be examined in this project are 
‘0=married couple’ and ‘1=female-headed families’, the latter being the primary target of 
welfare reform policies enacted in the 1990s. To create these two categories, the family  
structure code is reconfigured and categories 1-7 and 17-23 are coded as married couple 
families while categories 25-31 are coded as female-headed families. The remaining  
categories are collapsed into the ‘residue’ category, which is applied to those cases in 
which respondents were either unwilling or unable to provide information about family 
living arrangements or provided a response that did not fall into any of the pre-
determined categories in the family structure code.    
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Table 3.4 
Categories in NCVS family structure code 
             
 
1) Male ref wife/child/relative            18) Female ref husband/child/non-relative 
2) Male ref wife/child/non-relative           19) Female ref husband/child/relative/non-relative 
3) Male ref wife/child/relative/non-relative       20) Female ref husband/child 
4) Male ref wife/child             21) Female ref husband/relative 
5) Male ref wife/relative                        22) Female ref husband/non-relative 
6) Male ref wife/non-relative            23) Female ref husband/relative/non-relative 
7) Male ref wife/relative/non-relative           24) Female ref husband 
8) Male ref wife                         25) Lone female ref child/relative 
9) Lone male ref child/relative            26) Lone female ref child/non-relative 
10) Lone male ref child/non-relative           27) Lone female ref child/relative/non-relative 
11) Lone male ref child/relative/non-relative    28) Lone female ref child 
12) Lone male ref child             29) Lone female ref relative 
13) Lone male ref relative            30) Lone female ref non-relative 
14) Lone male ref non-relative            31) Lone female ref relative/non-relative 
15) Lone male ref relative/non-relative           32) Lone female ref 
16) Lone male ref             33) Other combination 
17)  Female ref husband/child/relative                                                                            
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 About 69% of the sample consists of youths who live in married couple families 
and the majority of these youths are the couple’s own children (95.2%). Those remaining 
are other relatives (4.0%) and non-relatives (0.7%). The percentage residing in female-
headed families is roughly 24%, which is comprised of about 87.2% of the householder’s 
own children, 11.0% of other relatives, and 1.7% of non-relatives. The remaining 9% of 
the sample consists of youths in other family living arrangements and missing data. 
 The external validity of these estimates is also assessed through comparisons with 
CPS estimates of children’s living arrangements (U.S. Census Bureau, no date). The 
NCVS estimates of the percentage of youths in married couple families are nearly 
identical to those produced by the CPS, save slightly higher percentages from 1994 to 
1997.  Comparatively, there is less precision in the female-headed family estimates but it 
is clear that the two sets of trends follow very similar patterns.  The apparent exception is 
the decrease in CPS and increase in NCVS estimates around 1997, at which point the 
former estimates fall slightly below the latter. Minor discrepancies aside, the trends are 
sufficiently similar to warrant the conclusion that the NCVS produces reliable estimates 
of children’s living arrangements.   
Race and ethnicity. The NCVS uses Census guidelines and practices to tap race 
and ethnicity. Prior to 2003, the federal guidelines for race classification were based on 
respondents self-reports of one of five racial categories: American Indian/Aleut/Eskimo, 
Asian/Pacific Islander, black, white, or other.  In an effort to reflect changes in national 
diversity, the guidelines were effectively changed in January 2003 to allow respondents 
to select one or more racial categories revised to identify Asians as a distinct racial 
group: American Indian/Alaska Native, Asian, Black or African American, Native 
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Hawaiian/Other Pacific Islander, or White.  These changes resulted in twenty categories 
of race alone or in combination in the 2003-2004 NCVS, though the overwhelming 
majority of youths reported only one race.  The NCVS also uses a self-report of ‘Hispanic 
origin’ to determine whether or not respondents are of Hispanic descent, regardless of 
race.   
 Responses to the ‘race’ and ‘Hispanic origin’ questions are combined to create 
categories representing the three largest racial and ethnic groups in the U.S., ‘1= non-
Hispanic whites’, ‘2=non-Hispanic blacks’, and ‘3=Hispanics’. Due to the 2003 revisions 
to the race category, a separate race and ethnicity code is created for the 2003 and 2004 
NCVS files that essentially recodes the twenty categories of race alone or in combination 
into the five original racial groups. The largest group in the sample is non-Hispanic 
whites (64.7%), followed by non-Hispanic blacks (15.6%) and Hispanics (14.3%); about 
5.4% of the data were missing. Between 2002 and 2004, however, the share of non-
Hispanic blacks declined from 16.3% to 15.0% while the share of Hispanics increased 
from 15.8% to 18.2% and surpassed blacks as the largest minority group in the sample in 
2003. 
Summary 
 The overall objective of this research is two-fold: 1) to assess the impact of recent 
macroeconomic conditions and welfare reform policies on youth violent victimization 
trends and 2) to determine whether the consequences of poverty for youth’s violence 
risks have changed over time and whether these changes are associated with welfare 
reform. To achieve these objectives, data from the 1993-2004 NCVS will be analyzed at 
both the macro- and micro-level. For the purposes of this research, the NCVS has several 
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advantages including a wealth of household and family demographic data such as 
household income and family structure, a measure of Hispanic origin, and a large sample 
of youth that is nationally representative of nearly 285 million persons. However, a 
disadvantage of using the NCVS is that it does not allow for theoretical testing or 
community-level analyses.  
 The key independent variables of poverty, race and ethnicity, and family structure 
are meant to capture individual and family characteristics that are associated with youth 
violence while gender, age, and metropolitan status serve as demographic controls. At the 
macro-level, race/ethnicity, family structure, and demographic controls will essentially 
serve as contingencies in the poverty-violence relationships of the economic expansion, 
early post-reform, and economic downturn periods while at the micro-level, all variables 
will be regressed on youth’s violence risks before, immediately after, and several years 
after TANF implementation--the independent variable for both sets of analyses being 
youth violence. The following two chapters will outline the analytic strategy and present 
findings for the macro- and micro-level analyses, beginning with the former. 
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CHAPTER 4 
MACRO-LEVEL ANALYTIC STRATEGY AND FINDINGS 
 The primary objective of this chapter is to present findings from the macro-level 
analysis, which centers on the association between poverty and youth violent 
victimization trends over three distinct time periods: economic expansion (1993-2000), 
early post-reform (1997-2000), and economic downturn (2001-2004). Before presenting 
the findings, however, the analytic strategy will be described. 
Analytic Strategy 
The macro-level analysis will employ the use of two strategies. The first will 
utilize a series of graphs to gather prima facie facts about the association between youth 
poverty and violent victimization trends for all youth and various youth subgroups. The 
information in the graphs will provide important details about poverty and violent 
victimization trends including the differences between the economic expansion, early 
post-reform, and economic downturn periods, the similarities and differences in various 
group trends, and the extent that violent victimization rates co-vary with overall and 
group-specific poverty rates. 
In the first series of graphs, violent victimization trends are disaggregated by race 
and ethnicity and plotted in tandem with overall and group-specific poverty rates, which 
will be reproduced for males and females, younger and older adolescents, and urban and 
non-urban youth. For all groups, graphs will be presented in pairs--one comparing the 
violent victimization rates of non-Hispanic white, non-Hispanic black, and Hispanic 
youth to overall poverty rates and the other comparing violent victimization rates to 
group-specific poverty.  
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A total of fourteen graphs will be produced for non-Hispanic white, non-Hispanic 
black, and Hispanic youth, all of which are based on the author’s own calculations and 
analysis of NCVS data: 1) total and 2) group-specific poverty and violent victimization 
rates for all non-Hispanic white, non-Hispanic black, and Hispanic youth; 3) total and 4) 
group-specific poverty and violent victimization rates for male sub-groups; 5) total and 6) 
group-specific poverty and violent victimization rates for female sub-groups; 7) total and 
8) group-specific poverty and violent victimization rates for younger adolescent sub-
groups; 9) total and 10) group-specific poverty and violent victimization rates for older 
adolescent sub-groups; 11) total and 12) group-specific poverty and violent victimization 
rates for urban sub-groups; 13) total and 14) group-specific poverty and violent 
victimization rates for non-urban sub-groups. To ease the comparison of poverty and 
violent victimization trends for the economic expansion, early post-reform, and economic 
downturn periods, each graph contains clear demarcations of the periods under review. 
For the second series of graphs, violent victimization trends are disaggregated by 
two categories of family structure: married couple and female-headed families. Again, 
these trends are compared to overall and group-specific poverty trends in the following 
series of graphs: 1) total and 2) group-specific poverty and violent victimization rates for 
all youth in married couple and female-headed families: 3) total and 4) group-specific 
poverty and violent victimization rates for male sub-groups; 5) total and 6) group-specific 
poverty and violent victimization rates for female sub-groups; 7) total and group-specific 
poverty and violent victimization rates for younger adolescent sub-groups; 9) total and 
10) group-specific poverty and violent victimization rates for older adolescent sub-
groups; 11) total and 12) group-specific poverty and violent victimization rates for urban 
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sub-groups; 13) total and 14) group-specific poverty and violent victimization rates for 
non-urban sub-groups. 
Because the trends are largely disaggregated, all of the poverty and violent 
victimization rates displayed in the graphs are smoothed using three-year moving 
averages. Smoothing is particularly important for this analysis because high levels of 
disaggregation produce groups with small numbers of cases, resulting in estimates with 
wide confidence intervals and low precision. In addition to high disaggregation, group 
sample sizes may also be affected by declining violent crime rates and NCVS sample 
reductions in 1995, both of which make it difficult to assess year-to-year changes in 
youth violent victimization in a meaningful way. Smoothing addresses these issues by 
essentially tripling sample sizes each year. 
While the graphs may illustrate the extent of co-variation between youth poverty 
and violent victimization trends, they cannot tell us about the strength of the relationship. 
Therefore, the second strategy involved in the macro-level analysis is the estimation of 
first differenced poverty-violent victimization correlations to determine the strength of 
the association between the two. More importantly, however, first differencing is used to 
correct for the possibility that the factors (i.e. observed or unobserved) that influence 
changes in youth poverty and violent victimization one year also affect similar changes in 
subsequent years throughout the series, thus removing the ‘common thread’ from the two 
trends and allowing for a better assessment of how year-to-year changes in poverty affect 
year-to-year changes in youth violent victimization. First-differenced correlations will be 
estimated for total groups and all youth groups as well as for the entire period (i.e. 1993-
White, Nicole, 2011, UMSL, p.81 
  
2004) and the economic expansion (i.e. 1993-2000), early post-reform (i.e. 1997-2000), 
and economic downturn (i.e. 2001-2004) periods.  
Results 
Before addressing the specific macro-level research questions, it is important to 
highlight the poverty and violent victimization trends for all youth in the sample. This 
information will provide a point of comparison for disaggregated trends. Figure 4.1 
depicts annual average poverty and violent victimization rates1 for the total sample of 
youth in the 1993- 2004 NCVS, the former plotted on the secondary y-axis and the latter 
plotted on the primary. As previously described, the highlighted segments of the graph 
demarcate the early post-reform and economic downturn periods. The figure reveals a 
fairly steady decline in both poverty and violent victimization over the economic 
expansion period, though victimization fell more steeply than poverty; while the former 
declined by more than forty-eight percent, the latter declined by roughly twenty-one 
percent.  Nonetheless, these patterns suggest some association between expansion-era 
poverty and violence trends, which is confirmed by the correlation of first differences 
(r=.67, p<.10). 
The reductions continued as expected throughout the early post-reform period but 
although poverty declines accelerated slightly after 1998, marked reductions in violence 
were not evident. Recall that the implementation of TANF coincided with the economic 
expansion, contributing to hastened declines in child poverty in the late 1990s. Hence, 
noting the presence or absence of marked post-reform violence reductions is helpful in 
determining the influence of welfare reform. The absence of marked reductions in total  
  
                                                 
1 The end-points, 1993 and 2004, consists of two-year averages.   
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Figure 4.1 
Total youth poverty and violent victimization rates, 1993-2004 
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violent victimization suggests that the implementation of TANF did not play an important 
role in the declines. 
 Nonetheless, steep violence declines resulted in the narrowing of the violence-
poverty gap, from roughly six-fold at the start of the series to less than four-fold by the 
end of the early post-reform period. Coinciding with the end of the early post-reform 
period, the height of the economic expansion also marked a seeming convergence in 
poverty and violence trends, although it is not a ‘true’ convergence because poverty and 
violence are plotted on different axes. Instead, it marks the distinct point in the series 
where steep violence declines intersect with slowing poverty declines.     
 Although it is unlikely that TANF influenced the violence trends of the early post-
reform period, the correlation of first differences suggests a strong association between 
poverty and violence trends (r=.99, p<.05). While there may be some association between 
the two, these findings most likely reflect the small number of data points during the 
early post-reform (and economic downturn) period, and thus is not a reliable indicator of 
post-TANF relationships. However, a review of the correlation results reveals wide 
variation in the strength of the poverty-violence relationships of the early post-reform and 
economic downturn periods, which suggest that the small number of data points do not 
result in strong associations in each case. More often than not, moreover, the 
relationships are not statistically significant, particularly in regards to the early post-
reform period.  Still, results from these two periods should be observed with caution.  
With this caveat in mind, the declines in poverty and violent victimization 
persisted throughout the 2001 recession, although at a much slower pace relative to the 
preceding periods. Both sets of rates also continued to decline throughout 2003 but 
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compared to violence, poverty declined only marginally from year-to-year. It was not 
until the last year of the series that both sets of rates upturned negligibly. After falling 
twenty-eight and sixty percent between 1993 and 2003, more specifically, poverty and 
violence rates respectively increased by less than (0.78) and slightly more than (1.29) one 
percent in 2004.   
 Again, these trends do not appear to follow the expected pattern. If the economic 
downturn impacted violence in the same manner that it impacted CPS child poverty, an 
increase in violence would also be expected from 2001 to 2004. However, the fact that 
both poverty and violence decreased throughout most of the period suggests that the 
weakened state of the economy did not play a significant role. The decreases in 
downturn-era NCVS poverty are peculiar but overall, the pattern does not diverge 
prominently from the CPS. While total child poverty increased by 1.5 points in the CPS, 
there was less than a one-point increase in NCVS total youth poverty. Nonetheless, there 
is substantial co-variation in these short-term poverty and violence trends as evidenced by 
the correlation of first-differences (r=.94, p<.10). 
Summary. There appears to be a fairly close association between total youth 
poverty and violent victimization during the economic expansion, early post-reform, and 
economic downturn periods as well as over the entire series (r=.79, p<.05), although the 
strength and statistical significance of the associations do vary; the strongest was found 
during the early post-reform period, followed by the economic downturn and economic 
expansion. These variations suggest that the poverty-violence association is more 
important during some time periods than others and underscore the importance of 
assessing how the relationship has changed over time.  However, the violence trends also 
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follow patterns that are inconsistent with macroeconomic and social policy effects, 
particularly during the early post-reform and economic downturn periods.   
The preceding discussion does reveal significant associations between total youth 
poverty and violent victimization, and provides general knowledge about the nature of 
the relationships each period. The following section will build upon this general 
knowledge by examining the relationship between poverty and violence trends 
disaggregated by race, ethnicity, and family structure, beginning with a brief overview of 
the general trends for each group and followed by a more detailed discussion of the 
influence of macroeconomic conditions and welfare reform policies on these trends. 
Racially disaggregated trends will be discussed first. 
Violence trends by race and ethnicity 
General patterns, 1993-2004 
 Figures 4.2 and 4.3 compare trends in total youth and group-specific poverty to 
violent victimization trends for non-Hispanic white, non-Hispanic black and Hispanic  
youth, providing important information that cannot be discerned from Figure 4.1. Perhaps 
the most apparent is that the early expansion period is marked by few distinguishable 
patterns in violent victimization for each group, though it is evident that white youth 
experienced the highest average rate in 1993. It is also apparent that violence rates 
declined rather uniformly for white youth while fluctuating somewhat for racial and 
ethnic minorities, but particularly for blacks. 
 Coinciding with the latter half of the expansion and implementation of TANF, 
discernable patterns in violence began to emerge around 1997. At this time, average rates 
were highest for white youth (97.51 per 1,000) followed by blacks (92.64 per 1,000) and 
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Figure 4.2  
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Figure 4.3  
Group-specific poverty and violent victimization rates by race and ethnicity, 1993-2004 
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Hispanics (89.53 per 1,000). Over the course of the early post-reform period, rates fell 
rather steadily and substantially for white (-31.35)2 and Hispanic (-29.72) youth, the latter 
experiencing the lowest overall victimization rates. Conversely, there was a small spike 
in black victimization rates in 1998 which was followed by a reduction of almost twenty-
two points over the next two years. 
 The implementation of TANF served to hasten child poverty reductions in the late 
1990s.  It follows, therefore, that the decline in violence would show a similar 
acceleration if influenced by TANF, but the small spike in black rates not only suggests 
that it did not contribute but that it may have had an adverse effect on black violent 
victimization. Because the spike is limited to the year immediately following 
implementation, however, it is most likely due to a slight shock effect. This line of 
reasoning is obviously speculative; there is no way of determining whether this increase 
occurred among black youth in welfare-to-work families. 
On the other hand, the sub-group trends make evident that the post-TANF spike in 
black violence is largely due to a substantial increase among females, although noticeable 
increases are also apparent among older adolescents and non-urban youth (see 
Appendices D, F, and H). Some research suggests that girls tend to shoulder a larger 
portion of the household and caretaking responsibilities in low-income and parent-absent 
(i.e. due to employment) families and it is this increased responsibility that may lead to 
adverse outcomes among youth (Dodson & Dickert, 2004; Brooks, Hair, & Zaslow, 
2001).   
Because TANF increased work efforts among single mothers, it stands to reason 
that girls’ responsibilities in the home increased which in turn contributed to adverse 
                                                 
2 Represents raw difference score (in points). 
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outcomes such as increased violent victimization. However, I argue that welfare reform 
only influences violence trends through its impact on poverty, and there is no evidence 
that poverty has differential effects on gender and racial groups. Nonetheless, the trends 
in black violence do arouse suspicion that welfare reform may have had harmful 
consequences for at least some groups of youth--a point I will explore in the following 
chapter.         
 As the economy entered the 2001 recession, the gap between white (57.69 per 
1,000), black (56.71 per 1,000), and Hispanic (55.29 per 1,000) violence rates narrowed 
considerably, which is significant because the 2001 recession affected workers of all 
families, earnings, racial, and ethnic groups and all groups of children experienced 
modest increases in poverty. In other words, there was greater racial and ethnic equality 
in the poverty increases of the economic downturn than the reductions of the economic 
expansion period. But while the symmetry in white and black violence trends persisted 
throughout 2004, there was a sharp divergence in Hispanic rates after 2002.  
When the 2001-2004 violence trends are disaggregated by gender, age, and 
metropolitan status, there is wide variation across black and white sub-groups. However, 
the post-2002 drop in Hispanic violence rates is observable across all sub-groups (see 
Appendices C-H). Other research has shown that Hispanic youth have lower violent 
victimization rates than non-Hispanic youth, although it is not clear whether the lower 
rates result from the marked drop in Hispanic violence in 2002; Baum (2005) reports that 
the 1993-2003 annual average violent victimization rates for non-Hispanic white (86.7 
per 1,000) and non-Hispanic black (87.0 per 1,000) youth were virtually the same, but the 
Hispanic rate was 76.9 per 1,000.  
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 To investigate the source of this divergence, violent victimization rates are further 
disaggregated by violent crime type for non-Hispanic whites, non-Hispanic blacks, and 
Hispanics. Displayed in Figures 4.4 through 4.7, the results reveal interesting trends in 
simple and aggravated assault that may shed some light on the racial differences in the 
violence patterns. In terms of simple assault, the trends were generally similar for black 
and Hispanic youth throughout 2002, at which point Hispanic rates began to veer from 
converging black and white rates. The aggravated assault series also begins with higher 
rates for black and Hispanic youth but after falling sharply in 2002, Hispanic rates 
intersect with and fall below black and white rates--the series ending with white youth 
having the highest overall rates and Hispanics the lowest.  It is also important to note that 
Hispanic youth experienced a marked reduction in post-2002 robbery that leveled off in 
conjunction with rising black and white rates. However, white youth maintained the 
lowest overall robbery rates throughout the entire series. It appears, then, that the trends 
in simple and aggravated assault are driving the divergence of Hispanic violence rates 
from white and black youth.  
In terms of the overall association between poverty and violent victimization 
trends, first-differenced correlations reveal fairly strong and statistically significant 
associations for white (r=.71, p<.05) and black (r=.67, p<.05) youth that are slightly 
weaker than that of all youth (r=.79, p<.01). For Hispanic youth, on the other hand, the 
1993-2004 association between total poverty and violent victimization is weak and 
statistically nonsignificant (r=.32). When the correlation between group-specific poverty 
and violent victimization was estimated, results reveal a relatively weaker relationship for 
white (r=.63, p<.05) and black (r=.11, ns) youth and a stronger, but statistically  
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Figure 4.4 
 
Rape and Sexual Assault Rates by Race and Ethnicity, 1993-2004 
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Figure 4.5 
 
Robbery Rates by Race and Ethnicity, 1993-2004 
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Figure 4.6 
 
Aggravated Assault Rates by Race and Ethnicity, 1993-2004 
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Figure 4.7 
 
Simple Assault Rated by Race and Ethnicity, 1993-2004 
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nonsignificant association for Hispanic (r=.46, ns) youth; all first-differenced correlation 
results are displayed in Tables 4.1 and 4.2.  
 For the overwhelming majority of white and black youth sub-groups, however, 
the total poverty-violent victimization association was stronger than that of group-
specific poverty and violence; there was no clear pattern for Hispanic sub-groups as the 
former was stronger for males, younger adolescents, and urban youth and the latter was 
stronger for females, older adolescents, and non-urban youth. These general patterns 
reveal important overall relationships between youth poverty and violent victimization 
for non-Hispanic youth. More specifically, these important relationships consist of 
statistically significant associations between total poverty and violence for all non-
Hispanic whites and non-Hispanic blacks as well as group-specific poverty and violence  
for non-Hispanic whites. Poverty was not significantly associated with Hispanic violence, 
whether measured in terms of overall or Hispanic youth poverty. 
 The following section aims to determine the impact of recent macroeconomic 
conditions and welfare reform policies on the poverty-violence relationship according to 
two criteria. The first requires that violence trends follow the same pattern as CPS child 
poverty trends, which form the bases of all macro-level research questions. Guiding this 
research is the general hypothesis that given the association between poverty and 
violence, larger economic conditions and social policy changes should influence violence 
through its impacts on poverty trends. If indeed influenced by the same economic and 
social forces that contributed to recent changes in child poverty, then, violence trends 
should display similar patterns.  
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Table 4.1 
 
First Differenced Correlations of Total Youth Poverty and Violent Victimization by Race, 
Ethnicity, and Family Structure 
 
 Economic 
Expansion 
(1993-2000) 
Early Post-
Reform 
(1997-2000) 
Economic 
Downturn 
(2001-2004) 
 
Total 
(1993-2004) 
TOTAL SAMPLE 
Race and ethnicity 
  
 Non-Hispanic white 
.50 
(.2575) 
.63 
(.3727) 
   .99** 
(.0106) 
   .71** 
(.0143) 
  
 Non-Hispanic black 
.42 
(.3443) 
.43 
(.5685) 
 .96** 
(.0352) 
  .67** 
(.0248) 
  
 Hispanic 
.55 
(.1961) 
.29 
(.7127) 
-.16 
(.8379) 
.32 
(.3392) 
Family Structure  
  
 Married couple  
.17 
(.7080) 
   -.99*** 
(.0091) 
   .98** 
(.0219) 
   .54* 
(.0884) 
  
 Female head 
   .73* 
(.0607) 
 .99** 
(.0131) 
.86 
(.1366) 
     .81*** 
(.0023) 
 
All youth 
    .67* 
(.0962) 
  .99** 
(.0129) 
   .94* 
(.0581) 
   .79*** 
(.0036) 
MALES 
Race and ethnicity 
  
 Non-Hispanic white 
.12 
(.8022) 
.05 
(.9529) 
     .99*** 
(.0065) 
  .61** 
(.0470) 
  
 Non-Hispanic black 
.46 
(.3002) 
.43 
(.5684) 
  .93* 
(.0730) 
 .69** 
(.0181) 
  
 Hispanic 
.42 
(.3505) 
-.07 
(.9272) 
.12 
(.8820) 
.30 
(.3638) 
Family Structure  
  
 Married couple  
.17 
(.7179) 
-.56 
(.4409) 
.88 
(.1242) 
   .54* 
(.0843) 
  
 Female head 
.66 
(.1066) 
   .94* 
(.0602) 
.89 
(.1054) 
    .77*** 
(.0053) 
FEMALES 
Race and ethnicity 
  
 Non-Hispanic white 
.48 
(.2775) 
.71 
(.2903) 
.84 
(.1595) 
   .53* 
(.0930) 
  
 Non-Hispanic black 
.14 
(.7572) 
.31 
(.6896) 
.84 
(.1575) 
.27 
(.4172) 
  
 Hispanic 
  .68* 
(.0945) 
.59 
(.4070) 
-.39 
(.6067) 
.27 
(.4153) 
Family Structure 
  
 Married couple  
.07 
(.8793) 
.02 
(.9780) 
.46 
(.5376) 
.23 
(.4897) 
  
 Female head 
  .69* 
(.0858) 
  .96** 
(.0423) 
.72 
(.2768) 
  .71** 
(.0147) 
***p<.01, **p<.05, *p<.10 
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Table 4.1 (cont’d) 
 
 Economic 
Expansion 
(1993-2000) 
Early Post-
Reform 
(1997-2000) 
Economic 
Downturn 
(2001-2004) 
 
Total 
(1993-2004) 
12 TO 14 YEAR OLDS 
Race and ethnicity 
  
 Non-Hispanic white 
  .83** 
(.0222) 
.66 
(.3449) 
  .98** 
(.0163) 
     .77*** 
(.0051) 
  
 Non-Hispanic black 
.09 
(.8493) 
.08 
(.9166) 
  .99** 
(.0141) 
  .60* 
(.0515) 
  
 Hispanic 
.08 
(.8570) 
-.44 
(.5609) 
-.16 
(.8356) 
.16 
(.6297) 
Family Structure 
  
 Married couple  
.34 
(.4579) 
-.66 
(.3420) 
  .92* 
(.0769) 
  .54* 
(.0849) 
  
 Female head 
.47 
(.2850) 
.86 
(.1388) 
.83 
(.1663) 
 .68** 
(.0214) 
15 to 17 YEAR OLDS 
Race and ethnicity 
  
 Non-Hispanic white 
-.53 
(.2243) 
.49 
(.5129) 
  .99** 
(.0123) 
.46 
(.1553) 
  
 Non-Hispanic black 
.59 
(.1621) 
.68 
(.3170) 
.82 
(.1782) 
.50 
(.1177) 
  
 Hispanic 
    .89*** 
(.0078) 
  .92* 
(.0827) 
-.19 
(.8083) 
.36 
(.2772) 
Family Structure 
  
 Married couple  
-.18 
(.6970) 
-.23 
(.7698) 
     .99*** 
(.0054) 
.38 
(.2494) 
  
 Female head 
.66 
(.1061) 
.84 
(.1639) 
.85 
(.1481) 
    .77*** 
(.0054) 
URBAN 
Race and ethnicity 
  
 Non-Hispanic white 
.41 
(.3614) 
.00 
(.9968) 
.53 
(.4663) 
.50 
(.1210) 
  
 Non-Hispanic black 
.56 
(.1886) 
.79 
(.2091) 
   .95* 
(.0531) 
    .76*** 
(.0062) 
  
 Hispanic 
.47 
(.2877) 
    1.00*** 
(.0006) 
.35 
(.6451) 
.49 
(.1234) 
Family Structure 
  
 Married couple  
.14 
(.7602) 
-.66 
(.3422) 
.74 
(.2551) 
.40 
(.2236) 
  
 Female head 
   .76** 
(.0483) 
  .93* 
(.0721) 
.76 
(.2449) 
     .78*** 
(.0046) 
***p<.01, **p<.05, *p<.10 
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Table 4.1 (cont’d) 
 
 Economic 
Expansion 
(1993-2000) 
Early Post-
Reform 
(1997-2000) 
Economic 
Downturn 
(2001-2004) 
Total 
(1993-
2004) 
NON-URBAN 
Race and ethnicity 
 
Non-Hispanic white 
.40 
(.3728) 
.88 
(.1228) 
   .99** 
(.0131) 
  .73** 
(.0110) 
  
 Non-Hispanic black 
.22 
(.6347) 
.07 
(.9349) 
   .95** 
(.0498) 
.44 
(.1697) 
  
 Hispanic 
.18 
(.7051) 
-.76 
(.2360) 
-.67 
(.3263) 
-.08 
(.8258) 
 
  
 Married couple  
.15 
(.7446) 
  -.97** 
(.0332) 
  .95* 
(.0551) 
  .55* 
(.0814) 
  
 Female head 
.41 
(.3595) 
.86 
(.1433) 
  .93* 
(.0666) 
  .72** 
(.0128) 
***p<.01, **p<.05, *p<.10 (Note: p-values in parentheses). 
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Table 4.2 
 
First Differenced Correlations of Group-Specific Youth Poverty and Violent 
Victimization by Race, Ethnicity, and Family Structure 
 
 
 
Economic 
Expansion 
(1993-2000) 
Early Post-
Reform 
(1997-2000) 
Economic 
Downturn 
(2001-2004) 
Total 
(1993-
2004) 
TOTAL SAMPLE 
Race and ethnicity 
  
 Non-Hispanic white 
.57 
(.1790) 
.79 
(.2139) 
   .97** 
(.0331) 
  .63** 
(.0358) 
  
 Non-Hispanic black 
-.23 
(.6186) 
-.46 
(.5389) 
.68 
(.3220) 
.11 
(.7516) 
  
 Hispanic 
.54 
(.2137) 
.81 
(.1925) 
.59 
(.4145) 
.46 
(.1568) 
Family Structure 
  
 Married couple  
.58 
(.1723) 
-.07 
(.9332) 
.78 
(.2187) 
  .71** 
(.0131) 
  
 Female head 
.45 
(.3045) 
.64 
(.3570) 
.76 
(.2399) 
.49 
(.1226) 
MALES 
Race and ethnicity 
  
 Non-Hispanic white 
.10 
(.8260) 
-.22 
(.7808) 
    .98** 
(.0189) 
    .67** 
(.0249) 
  
 Non-Hispanic black 
.03 
(.9562) 
.11 
(.8939) 
    .96** 
(.0354) 
.45 
(.1639) 
  
 Hispanic 
.03 
(.9513) 
-.26 
(.7435) 
.75 
(.2540) 
.13 
(.7062) 
Family Structure     
  
 Married couple  
.47 
(.2848) 
.13 
(.8647) 
.90 
(.1013) 
  .68** 
(.0219) 
  
 Female head 
.65 
(.1134) 
  .91* 
(.0864) 
 .94* 
(.0558) 
  .71** 
(.0154) 
FEMALES 
Race and ethnicity 
  
 Non-Hispanic white 
-.13 
(.7736) 
-.21 
(.7858) 
.74 
(.2555) 
-.05 
(.8927) 
  
 Non-Hispanic black 
-.50 
(.2555) 
-.80 
(.1989) 
-.06 
(.9386) 
-.45 
(.1624) 
  
 Hispanic 
.59 
(.1671) 
.52 
(.4827) 
.73 
(.2732) 
   .56* 
(.0730) 
Family Structure 
  
 Married couple  
.47 
(.2923) 
.42 
(.5767) 
-.09 
(.9042) 
.48 
(.1358) 
  
 Female head 
.18 
(.6936) 
.18 
(.8177) 
.29 
(.7139) 
.18 
 (.5905) 
***p<.01, **p<.05, *p<.10 
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Table 4.2 (cont’d) 
 
 Economic 
Expansion 
(1993-2000) 
Early Post-
Reform 
(1997-2000) 
Economic 
Downturn 
(2001-2004) 
Total 
(1993-
2004) 
12 to 14 YEAR OLDS 
Race and ethnicity 
  
 Non-Hispanic white 
    .84** 
(.0172) 
.73 
(.2722) 
    .98** 
(.0213) 
     .76*** 
(.0062) 
  
 Non-Hispanic black 
-.26 
(.5713) 
-.28 
(.7200) 
.81 
(.1905) 
.13 
(.7075) 
  
 Hispanic 
-.06 
(.8927) 
.06 
(.9364) 
.38 
(.6235) 
.08 
(.8230) 
Family Structure 
  
 Married couple  
  .68* 
(.0905) 
.25 
(.7531) 
.80 
(.1953) 
     .77*** 
(.0060) 
  
 Female head 
.21 
(.6473) 
.77 
(.2346) 
.64 
(.3578) 
.18 
(.5920) 
15 to 17 YEAR OLDS 
Race and ethnicity 
  
 Non-Hispanic white 
-.41 
(.3644) 
.87 
(.1322) 
  .97** 
(.0315) 
.31 
(.3533) 
  
 Non-Hispanic black 
-.51 
(.2406) 
-.63 
(.3652) 
-.22 
 (.7839) 
-.43 
(.1893) 
  
 Hispanic 
   .68* 
(.0955) 
.25 
(.7495) 
.17 
(.8235) 
.50 
(.1195) 
Family Structure 
  
 Married couple  
.11 
(.8132) 
 -.81 
(.1820) 
.01 
(.9918) 
.25 
(.4531) 
  
 Female head 
.23 
(.6230) 
.11 
(.8897) 
.71 
(.2891) 
.55 
(.0808) 
URBAN 
Race and ethnicity 
  
 Non-Hispanic white 
.50 
(.2530) 
.43 
(.5669) 
.30 
(.7015) 
.16 
(.6314) 
  
 Non-Hispanic black 
-.11 
(.8178) 
-.34 
(.6559) 
.15 
(.8531) 
.15 
(.6493) 
  
 Hispanic 
-.04 
(.9391) 
.69 
(.3140) 
.89 
(.1104) 
-.06 
(.8608) 
Family Structure     
  
 Married couple  
-.15 
(.7478) 
-.10 
(.9016) 
-.48 
(.5162) 
.30 
(.3667) 
  
 Female head 
.66 
(.1037) 
.69 
(.3087) 
.59 
(.4087) 
   .62** 
(.0418) 
***p<.01, **p<.05, *p<.10 
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Table 4.2 (cont’d) 
 
 Economic 
Expansion 
(1993-2000) 
Early Post-
Reform 
(1997-2000) 
Economic 
Downturn 
(2001-2004) 
Total 
(1993-
2004) 
NON-URBAN 
Race and ethnicity 
  
 Non-Hispanic white 
.25 
(.5868) 
.63 
(.3725) 
   .91* 
(.0899) 
  .65** 
(.0311) 
  
 Non-Hispanic black 
-.01 
(.9794) 
-.40 
(.5998) 
   .91* 
(.0914) 
.32 
(.3316) 
  
 Hispanic 
.33 
(.4692) 
.57 
(.4333) 
.58 
(.4175) 
.37 
(.2575) 
Family Structure 
  
 Married couple  
  .81** 
(.0240) 
.37 
(.6259) 
  .94* 
(.0641) 
    .86*** 
(.0007) 
  
 Female head 
.01 
(.9849) 
.30 
(.6997) 
.82 
(.1823) 
.35 
(.2872) 
***p<.01, **p<.05, *p<.10 (Note: p-values in parentheses). 
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The second criterion requires that there is a statistically significant association 
between youth poverty and violent victimization as determined by first-differenced 
correlation results. Because it is presumed that poverty is one of the key mechanisms 
through which macroeconomic conditions and social policy changes influence youth 
violence, a statistically nonsignificant relationship between poverty and violence trends 
would constitute a ‘break’ in the chain of influence . For the purposes of this research, 
then, a significant poverty-violence relationship is an essential component for the larger 
association between macroeconomic conditions, welfare reform policies, and youth 
violence trends. With these criteria in mind, the proposed poverty-violence relationship 
will be assessed for racially disaggregated violence trends first followed by those 
disaggregated by family structure. 
The Influence of Macroeconomic Conditions and Welfare Reform Policies 
Economic Expansion Period.  The economic expansion contributed to substantial 
reductions in child poverty from 1993 to 2000, but particularly for racial and ethnic 
minorities. If the expansion contributed similarly to violent victimization trends, black 
and Hispanic youth should also experience the most substantial reductions in violence 
from 1993 to 2000, which is addressed by the following research question:       
Research Question 1(a): Did youth violent victimization rates fall most 
substantially for black and Hispanic youth during the economic expansion period 
(i.e. 1993 to 2000)? 
The first step towards answering this question is the calculation and comparison of the 
1993-2000 violence reductions for non-Hispanic white, non-Hispanic black, and Hispanic 
youth.  In terms of percentage change, results show that rates of youth violent 
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victimization fell by forty-seven percent for blacks and fifty percent for whites and 
Hispanics.  However, the differences in percentage points reveal that black youth 
experienced the most substantial reductions (-78.57) followed by whites (-65.56) and 
Hispanics (-61.99), which is inconsistent with the expected pattern.  Hence, the 
discrepant findings for Hispanic youth suggest that the economic expansion did not 
influence violence reductions in the same manner that it influenced poverty. 
 Given the results for the entire study period, it is quite possible that the poverty-
violence dynamic differs for Hispanic and non-Hispanic youth. Hence, the inconsistent 
findings for Hispanic youth aside, it appears that violence fell more substantially for 
black youth than white during the economic expansion period, which is consistent with 
the reductions in child poverty.  However, results from the correlation of first differences 
reveal that poverty trends are not significantly associated with violence trends for non-
Hispanic white, non-Hispanic black, or Hispanic youth, which obviously disrupts the 
presumed path from macroeconomic conditions to youth violence trends. Similar results 
were also obtained for all youth sub-groups except younger white adolescents (r=.83, 
p<.05) and older Hispanic adolescents (r=.89, p<.01), but violence reduction patterns 
eliminate the possibility that the trends of older Hispanic adolescents were influenced by 
the economic expansion. 
It is important to note that the relationship between group-specific poverty and 
violence was slightly stronger than that of total poverty and violence for whites (r=.57 vs. 
r=.50), weaker for blacks (r=-.23 vs. r=.42), and about the same for Hispanics (r=.54 vs. 
r=.55), although none were statistically significant.  However, the general pattern across 
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sub groups is that the total poverty-violence relationship is stronger than group-specific 
poverty and violence, particularly for Hispanic youth.  
Early Post-Reform Period.  The early post-reform period was marked by a 
distinct drop in poverty for all groups of children, but the largest overall reduction was 
experienced by Hispanic youth. To determine the extent that violence trends replicated 
post-reform patterns in poverty, the following research question is addressed:    
Research Question 2(a): Did Hispanic youth experience the largest decrease in 
violent victimization during the early post-reform period? 
Estimates reveal that violent victimization fell by roughly one-third for non-black youth 
and twenty-seven percent for black youth, which translates into reductions of thirty, 
thirty-one, and thirty-three points for Hispanic, non-Hispanic white, and non-Hispanic 
black youth respectively. Therefore, the straightforward answer to this question is ‘no’-- 
not only did Hispanic youth fail to experience the largest overall reduction in violent 
victimization during the early post-reform period, but they experienced the smallest 
overall decrease. It is worth noting, however, that the magnitude of the violence 
reductions differed very little between groups.    
 In addition to the inconsistencies between poverty and violence patterns, results 
from first-differenced correlations reveal that total youth poverty is unrelated to violence 
for all white (r=.63), black (r=.43), and Hispanic (r=.29) youth while marginally 
statistically significant for older Hispanic youth (r=.92, p<.10) and urban residents 
(r=1.00, p<.01). However, it is not likely that welfare reform influenced violence among 
these two sub-groups as they did not experience the most substantial early post-reform 
reductions in violence. In terms of the relationship between group-specific poverty and 
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violence, results reveal a relatively stronger but statistically nonsignificant relationship 
for white (r=.79), black (r= -.46), and Hispanic (r=.81) youth as well as nonsignificant 
relationships across all sub-groups. Taken together, these findings suggest that welfare 
reform did not influence violence trends via changes in total or group-specific poverty.   
 Economic Downturn Period. Over the course of the economic downturn period, 
violence rates fell slowly for white and black youth from 2001 to 2003 and increased 
slightly in 2004, which paralleled the trend in total youth poverty. So, it is not surprising 
that first-differenced correlations reveal strong, statistically significant poverty-violence 
associations for both white (r=.99, p<.05) and black (r=.96, p<.05) youth from 2001 to 
2004, though it is important to keep in mind that the small number of data points weaken 
the reliability of these estimates.  Conversely, there was a weak, negative association for 
non-Hispanic youth (r= -.16, ns), which is expected given the sharp drop in Hispanic 
violence after 2002. 
The association between group poverty and violent victimization was statistically 
significant for the total sample of white youth only (r=.97, p<.05), although strong, 
significant relationships were found for white and black males and non-urban residents as 
well as white youth in both age groups. Again, the relationships between group-specific 
poverty and violence were substantially weaker and statistically nonsignificant for all 
sub-groups of Hispanic youth.  
 Because poverty is the presumed mechanism through which macroeconomic 
conditions influence violence, it is safe to assume that the economic downturn did not 
impact Hispanic youth violence. However, comparing the violence reductions of white 
and black youth will shed some light on its influence on non-Hispanic youth violence.  
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Because black children experienced the largest overall increase in poverty from 2001 to 
2004, the following research question asks:  
 Research Question 3(a): Did black youth also experience the largest increase in  
 violent victimization during the weak economic conditions of the early 2000s? 
For blacks, average rates of youth violent victimization rose from 56.71 per 1,000 in 
2001 to 57.28 per 1,000 in 2004, a nominal increase of less than one percentage point 
(+0.57).  In comparison, white rates fell from 57.69 per 1,000 in 2001 to 56.03 per 1,000 
in 2004--a decrease of almost two percentage points.  By virtue of this decrease, then, 
black youth experienced the largest overall increase in violence from 2001 to 2004, 
which is consistent with the expected pattern. Coupled with the statistically significant 
association between total poverty and violence, these findings suggest that the economic 
downturn influenced black violence trends.  
 For one sub-group--males--there was not only a strong, statistically significant 
association between total poverty and violent victimization, but white and black youth 
both experienced increases in violence from 2001 to 2004.  In fact, the increase in 
percentage points for black males (+18.94) was more than 2.5 times larger than the 
increase for white males (+6.94), which suggests that the economic downturn influenced 
the violence trends of these two sub-groups via total youth poverty. For the same reasons, 
moreover, the economic downturn also appears to have influenced white and black male 
violence trends via group-specific poverty. 
 Summary. A large body of findings for racial and ethnic youth has been 
discussed, revealing several noteworthy patterns in the poverty-violence relationship. 
One is that the relationship between poverty and violence is not statistically significant 
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across the majority of categories. Of the 28 total poverty-violence relationships assessed 
for each group, 11 or 39% reached statistical significance for non-Hispanic whites, 9 or 
32% for non-Hispanic blacks, and 4 or 14% for Hispanics. Even fewer relationships were 
statistically significant for group-specific poverty: 10 out of 28 (36%) for non-Hispanic 
whites, 2 out of 28 (7%) for non-Hispanic blacks, and 2 out of 28 (7%) for Hispanics, 
which coupled with the fact that the group poverty relationships were relatively weaker 
suggests that the more significant relationship was that of total poverty and violent 
victimization. When a large number of relationships are assessed, however, it is 
important for readers to observe the possibility that some are statistically significant by 
chance. Hence, the number of significant correlations is noted primarily for descriptive 
purposes and is less consequential to the findings than larger patterns in the poverty-
violence relationship. 
 Important differences in the poverty-violence relationships of Hispanic and non-
Hispanic youth were also consistently found. In addition to fewer statistically significant 
relationships, first-differenced correlations were substantially weaker than that of non-
Hispanic youth more often that not. Moreover, trends disaggregated by race and ethnicity 
reveal a marked reduction in Hispanic youth violence in the early 2000s that contrasts 
with converging trends among non-Hispanic youth; this marked reduction was observed 
not only for the total sample of Hispanic youth but across every Hispanic sub-group. 
Additional analyses identified trends in simple and aggravated assault as likely 
contributors, but the reasons behind the declines are unknown.   
 It is not surprising, then, that macroeconomic conditions and welfare reform 
policies did not influence Hispanic violence trends. Based on the established criteria, 
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however, the economic expansion does emerge as a plausible contributor to the violence 
trends of non-Hispanic white younger adolescents via total poverty and the economic 
downturn to black youth violence trends via total youth poverty as well as white and 
black male violence trends via total and group-specific poverty; no significant effects 
emerged during the early post-reform period.    
Violence trends by family structure 
General patterns, 1993-2004 
 Figures 4.8 and 4.9 display the trends in total and group-specific poverty and 
violent victimization disaggregated by family structure and clearly shows that youth in 
female-headed families experience higher average victimization rates than youth in 
married couple families. In 1993, the average victimization rate for youth in female- 
headed families (165.61 per 1,000) was nearly 150% of the rate for youth in married 
couple families (110.64 per 1,000), the former increasing to nearly 195% of the latter by 
the end of the series.  In contrast to the racial and ethnic gaps in violent victimization, the 
current trends do not narrow or widen noticeably at any point during the series. Instead it 
is poised at a roughly one and one-half to two-fold gap each year.      
 During the economic expansion period, youth in both female-headed and married 
couple families experienced sharp declines in violent victimization that outpaced that of 
total and group-specific poverty. While average poverty rates fell by twenty-one and 
twenty percent for all youth and youth in female-headed families respectively, violent 
victimization rates fell by more than forty-seven percent for the latter group. In 
comparison, youth in married couple families experienced poverty and violent 
victimization declines of roughly twenty-four and fifty-one percent respectively. 
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Figure 4.8 
Total youth poverty and violent victimization rates by family structure, 1993-2004 
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Figure 4.9 
Group-specific poverty and violent victimization rates by family structure, 1993-2004 
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 Throughout the early post-reform period, violent victimization rates fell steadily 
for youth in married couple families but after slowing somewhat in 1997, rates fell 
markedly for youth in female-headed families--the latter coinciding with a slight 
acceleration in the total poverty decline. Similar violence patterns were also observed for 
sub-groups of youth in married couple and female-headed families, with particularly 
striking post-TANF declines for males, younger adolescents, and urban youth in female-
headed families (see Appendices I-N).  
The 2001 recession marked an increase in violent victimization for youth in 
female-headed families, though rates fluctuated from year to year thereafter. The same 
general pattern was also observed for all subgroups of youth in female-headed families 
with the exception of females, whose rates declined throughout the economic downturn 
period. Violence also declined steadily for youth in married couple families, but 
stabilized in 2004. However, there was greater variation in sub-group trends relative to 
youth in female-headed families. While younger adolescent and non-urban trends 
mirrored those for all youth in married couple families, the violence decline continued 
noticeably throughout 2004 for females and older adolescents. Coupled with the findings 
for race and ethnicity, then, it is apparent that downturn-era violence declined rather 
substantially for females. For males and urban youth in married couple families, violence 
stabilized in 2001 and increased in 2004, respectively.  
 Over the entire study period, there was a moderate association between total 
poverty and violent victimization for youth in married couple families (r=.54, p<.10) 
which was weaker than the association between group-specific poverty and violence 
(r=.71, p<.05). For youth in female-headed families, the reverse was true: the association 
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between total poverty and violent victimization (r=.81, p<.01) was stronger than that 
between group-specific poverty and violence (r=.49, ns). These patterns reflect a larger 
trend of stronger group poverty-violence relationships for sub-groups of youth in married 
couple families and stronger total poverty-violence relationships among groups of youth 
in female-headed families. 
Economic Expansion Period. The economic expansion contributed to substantial 
reductions in poverty for all family groups, but particularly for female-headed families. If 
it also contributed to violence trends, youth in female-headed families would also 
experience more substantial reductions in violence than youth in married couple families, 
which is reflected in the following research question:  
 Research Question 1(b): Did youth in female-headed families experience a  
 more substantial decrease in violent victimization than youth in married couple  
 families during the economic expansion? 
Estimates reveal that the straightforward answer to this question is ‘yes’. Between 1993 
and 2000, violence fell by roughly fifty-one and forty-seven percent for youth in married 
couple and female-headed families, which translates to percentage point reductions of 
fifty-six and seventy-nine points, respectively. Consistent with expected patterns, then, 
violence fell more substantially for youth in female-headed families than youth in 
married couple families over the economic expansion period. 
 Despite the symmetry between poverty and violence patterns, however, results 
from first-differenced correlations suggest that the expansion’s influence on violence 
trends is limited to youth in female-headed families via total poverty (r=.73, p<.10), 
although the relationship was only marginally statistically significant. For girls in female-
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headed families, the significant total poverty-violence relationship and violence reduction 
pattern also suggests that the economic expansion contributed to female violence trends 
but again, the relationship was significant at α=.10. There was also a significant total 
poverty-violence association for urban youth in female-headed families (r=.76, p<.05), 
but the violence reduction patterns are inconsistent with an ‘expansion effect’. Urban 
youth in married couple families experienced a 1993-2000 violence reduction of nearly 
82 points while those in female-headed families experienced a 77-point reduction.   
There was a statistically significant association between group-specific poverty 
and violent victimization for younger adolescents (r=.68, p<.10) and non-urban youth 
(r=.81, p<.05) in married couple families, with both experiencing substantially smaller 
violence reductions than their counterparts in female-headed families. Taken together, 
these findings also suggest that the economic expansion may have indirectly influenced 
these violence trends via group-specific poverty rates.   
 Early Post-Reform Period. Because there is an overlap between the late 
economic expansion and early post-reform periods, it is not possible to isolate the effects 
of each on violent victimization trends. Nonetheless, the general patterns hint that this 
period is important for total poverty and violence reductions for youth in female-headed 
families because they appear to accelerate as the expansion gained momentum and TANF 
effectively replaced AFDC. Accelerated reductions were also generally observed in the 
group-specific poverty and violent victimization trends of youth sub-groups in female-
headed families, although similar patterns were not observed for those in married couple 
families.   
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 According to results from the correlation of first differences, the relationship 
between total poverty and violent victimization was statistically significant not only for 
all youth in married couple (r=-.99, p<.01) and female-headed families (r=.99, p<.01) but 
for males (r=.94, p<.10), females (r=.96, p<.05), and urban youth (r=.93, p<.10) in 
female-headed families, and non-urban youth in married couple families (r=-.97, p<.05). 
Conversely, the relationship between group-specific poverty and violence was 
statistically significant for males in female-headed families only (r=.91, p<.10), which 
clearly suggests that the total poverty-violence relationship is more important than the 
group poverty-violence relationship.  
The significant associations between poverty and violence cautiously established, 
the next step towards determining potential TANF effects is to estimate and compare the 
violence reductions of each group; because children in female-headed families 
experienced larger post-reform poverty reductions than children in married couple 
families, the following research question asks whether violence reductions followed the 
same pattern:     
 Research Question 2(b): Did youth in female-headed families also experience the 
 largest decrease in violent victimization during this time? 
 From 1997 to 2000, violence rates fell from 79.21 per 1,000 to 54.68 per 1,000 for 
all youth in married couple families, a reduction of about thirty-one percent or twenty-
five percentage points. Rates also fell by about thirty-two percent or forty-two percentage 
points for youth in female-headed families, from 127.83 per 1,000 in 1997 to 87.04 per 
1,000 in 2000. The same pattern was observed across all sub-groups, which means that 
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for all groups that experienced significant poverty-violence relationships, there is a 
reduction in violence that follows the post-reform pattern in poverty reductions.  
Therefore, it is plausible to assume that TANF implementation contributed to the 
violent victimization trends of all youth in married couple and female-headed families, 
non-urban youth in married couple families and males, females, and urban youth in 
female-headed families via total youth poverty. Also by way of group-poverty, TANF 
appears to have some indirect influence on violence among males in female-headed 
families.   
  Economic Downturn Period. To briefly review, the 2001-2004 violent 
victimization trends followed very different patterns for the two groups of youth. For 
those in married couple families, the decline in violent victimization persisted throughout 
the end of the series, stabilizing somewhat in 2004. This pattern was also observed in the 
violence trends of younger adolescents, older adolescents, and non-urban youth in 
married couple families, all of which were closely associated with trends in total poverty 
(see Table 4.1). For only one sub-group, non-urban youth, was there a significant 
association between group-specific poverty and violent victimization, however (r=.94, 
p<.10). 
  Violence rates for youth in female-headed families decreased in 2001, increased 
in 2002, decreased in 2003, and increased again in 2004, following no clear pattern. 
However, this period witnessed an aggregate violence increase of about four points, 
which is also reflected in the violence patterns of males, younger and older adolescents, 
and urban and non-urban youth in female-headed families, although the increase was 
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much larger for males (+25.92) and older adolescents (+17.60). Only for girls in female-
headed families was there an aggregate decrease in violence during this time. 
 To determine whether the economic downturn influenced these trends, the 
following research question is addressed:  
Research Question 3(b): Did youth in female-headed families experience the 
largest increase in violent victimization during the economic downturn period? 
Unlike previous sections, answering this question does not require comparing the 
magnitude of group violence increases for one reason: for all youth in married couple 
families and every sub-group, there was an aggregate decrease in violent victimization 
from 2001 to 2004. So regardless of the statistical significance of the various poverty-
violence relationships, these contradictory patterns suggest that the economic downturn 
did not influence the violence trends of youth in married couple families. 
 With the exception of girls in female-headed families, on the other hand, all youth 
in female-headed families and every sub-group experienced an aggregate increase in 
violent victimization over the economic downturn period. However, first-differenced 
correlations show that the total poverty-violence relationship is significant for only non-
urban youth in female-headed families (r=.93, p<.10) and the group poverty-violence for 
males (r=.94, p<.10), pointing to the economic downturn as a plausible contributor to 
these trends. 
 Summary. When trends are disaggregated by family structure, it is evident that 
the total poverty-violence relationship is more important for youth in female-headed 
families than married couple families, both in terms of the relative strength of the 
relationships and the number of statistically significant findings. Of the 28 total poverty-
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violence relationships assessed, 15 or 54% reached statistical significance for groups of 
youth in female-headed families, which is greater than any other group. In comparison, 
10 or 36% were significant for groups of youth in married couple families, which falls 
between non-Hispanic whites (39%) and non-Hispanic blacks (32%). Overall, the total 
poverty-violence relationship is least likely to be significant for Hispanic youth (14%).  
On the other hand, the group poverty-violence relationship for youth in married 
couple families was both relatively stronger and more likely to be significant than that of 
youth in female-headed families. However, the relationship between group poverty and 
violence was less likely to reach statistical significance than that of total poverty and 
violence for both groups. Of the 28 relationships assessed, only 4 (14%) were significant 
for youth in female-headed families and 7 (25%) for youth in married couple families, the 
latter being second only to non-Hispanic whites. 
In terms of the influence of macroeconomic conditions and welfare reform 
policies on the poverty-violence relationship, the effects appear more salient for family 
rather than racial groups. Where only the economic downturn contributed to the violence 
trends of non-Hispanic blacks via total youth poverty and non-Hispanic whites and blacks 
via total and group-specific poverty, it contributed to the violence trends of non-urban 
youth in female-headed families via total poverty and males in female-headed families 
via group poverty. However, the economic expansion also contributed to violence trends 
for females and all youth in female-headed families and younger adolescents and non-
urban youth in married couple families via total and group-specific poverty, respectively. 
Additionally, the early post-reform period, which encompasses TANF implementation 
and the latter half of the economic expansion, contributed to violence trends for all youth 
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in married couple and female-headed families, non-urban youth in married couple 
families, and males, females, and urban youth in female-headed families (total poverty),     
as well as males in female-headed families (group-specific poverty). Table 4.3 
summarizes these findings for racial/ethnic and family groups. 
These findings suggest that the impact of macroeconomic conditions and welfare 
reform policies on violence trends is more apparent for family rather than racial groups, 
particularly in regards to the early post-reform findings for youth in female-headed 
families. For no other time period is there more affirmative evidence that ‘female-headed 
family’ youth violence is influenced by larger economic or social effects than the early  
post-reform period. This finding is important because female-headed families comprise 
the overwhelming majority of welfare cases and if TANF had any immediate effects on 
violence trends, they would probably be most evident for youth in female-headed 
families. 
Summary 
 The preceding discussion reveals that there is an important link between youth 
poverty and violent victimization that varies widely across demographic groups, poverty  
measures, and time periods--providing important answers to secondary research 
questions. As such, this section will serve as an overall summary of key findings and 
important patterns in the poverty-violence relationship as they relate to the secondary 
research questions, beginning with the following question:    
Are there significant sub-group differences in the poverty-youth violence 
relationship? 
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Table 4.3 
 
Summary of Significant Findings for Macroeconomic Conditions and Welfare Reform 
Policies on Poverty-Violence Relationships 
             
Economic Expansion Period 
 
Total poverty-violence 
 Non-Hispanic white younger adolescents 
 All youth in female-headed families 
 Females in female-headed families 
 
Group poverty-violence 
 Younger adolescents in married couple families 
 Non-urban youth in married couple families 
 
Early Post-Reform Period 
 
Total poverty-violence 
 All youth in married couple families 
 Non-urban youth in married couple families 
 All youth in female-headed families 
 Males in female-headed families 
 Females in female-headed families 
 Urban youth in female-headed families 
 
Group poverty-violence 
 Males in female-headed families 
 
Economic Downturn Period 
 
Total poverty-violence 
 All non-Hispanic black youth 
 Non-Hispanic white males 
 Non-Hispanic black males 
 Non-urban youth in female-headed families 
 
Group poverty-violence 
 Non-Hispanic white males 
 Non-Hispanic black males 
 Males in female-headed families 
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 Across the categories of gender, age, and metropolitan status, the overall 
relationship between poverty and violent victimization was stronger for non-Hispanic 
whites, non-Hispanic blacks, and youth in female-headed families than Hispanics and 
youth in married couple families, and more likely to be statistically significant. For only 
two sub-groups of racial and ethnic youth was the poverty-violence relationship fairly 
strong and statistically significant for both white and black youth: males and younger 
adolescents. However, the strongest overall relationships were found for white younger 
adolescents (r=.77, p<.01), black urban youth (r=.76, p<.01), and white non-urban youth 
(r=.73, p<.05). 
When trends were disaggregated by family structure, significant poverty-violence 
associations were found for males, younger adolescents, and non-urban youth in both 
married couple and female-headed families and for all of these groups, the relationships 
were stronger for youth in female-headed vis-à-vis married couple families. In fact, there 
was virtually no variation in the magnitude of the relationships for the married couple 
family sub-groups; the relationships were moderately strong and marginally significant 
for males (r=.54, p<10), younger adolescents (r=.54, p<.10), non-urban youth (r=.55, 
p<.10), and all youth in married couple families (r=.54, p<.10). The corresponding 
relationships for the female-headed family groups were fairly strong for males (r=.77, 
p<.01), younger adolescents (r=.68, p<.05), and non-urban youth (r=.72, p<.05), although 
these relationships also do not vary substantially. 
Clearly, the sum of the evidence suggests that the overall relationship between 
poverty and violent victimization is more important for some sub-groups of youth than 
others. More specifically, it appears to be most significant for males and younger 
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adolescents, for which moderate to strong and statistically significant relationships were 
found for every group except Hispanic youth; significant relationships were also found 
for non-urban youth in both married couple and female-headed families. 
The next research question is concerned with whether group violence trends are 
more closely related to group vis-à-vis total youth poverty trends, presuming that the 
greater impact will come from the more proximate poverty measure:  
Are group-specific changes in youth poverty more closely related to group-
specific youth violent victimization trends than changes in the overall youth 
poverty rate? 
 As previously noted, there were far fewer statistically significant group poverty-
violence relationships relative to total poverty-violence for all groups of youth, which 
also tended to be weaker in magnitude. Between 1993 and 2004, in fact, there were no 
significant group poverty-violence associations for neither the total sample of non-
Hispanic black and Hispanic youths or any sub-groups with the exception of a 
moderately strong and marginally significant association for Hispanic females; there were 
only four groups of non-Hispanic whites for which significant overall associations were 
found: all youth   (r=.63, p<.05), males (r=.67, p<.05), younger adolescents (r=.76, 
p<.01), and non-urban youth (r=.65, p<.05)--the same groups for which significant total 
poverty-violence relationships were found. So regardless of measurement, poverty trends 
appear to be significantly related to violence trends for all non-Hispanic white youth as 
well as males, younger adolescents, and non-urban residents.   
In terms of the relative strength of the overall relationships, total poverty-violence 
also tended to be stronger in magnitude than group poverty-violence for both non-
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Hispanic white and non-Hispanic black youth. Conversely, group poverty-violence 
tended to be the stronger relationship for Hispanic youth. Of the seven groups assessed 
(i.e. total sample of youth and six sub-groups), one category each of non-Hispanic whites 
and non-Hispanic blacks yielded stronger group poverty-violence relationships while 
stronger relationships were found for four categories of Hispanic youth. 
It is important to note that there are important similarities and differences in the 
findings for non-Hispanic white youth and those in married couple families. As was the 
case with white youth, poverty was significantly associated with violence trends for all 
youth in married couple families and males, younger adolescents, and non-urban youth, 
regardless of measurement. Unlike white youth, on the other hand, group poverty was 
more strongly associated with violence than total poverty for each of the above groups.  
Across all groups of youth in female-headed families, the group poverty-violence 
relationship was relatively weaker than that of total poverty and violence, but violence 
was significantly associated with both total and group poverty for males and urban youth 
only.  Therefore, the sum of the evidence suggests that violence was more closely 
associated with total poverty for non-Hispanic whites, non-Hispanic blacks, and youths in 
female-headed families while the reverse tended to be true for Hispanics and youths in 
married couple families. Regardless of the measure used, however, poverty trends were 
not significantly associated with Hispanic youth violence trends over the twelve years in 
the sample. 
In addition to sub-group differences in the poverty-violence relationship and the 
relative impact of global and proximate poverty measures on violence trends, an 
additional concern of this research is the general differences in the relationships of the 
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economic expansion, early post-reform, and economic downturn periods, as addressed in 
the following research question: 
Are there significant differences between the poverty-youth violence relationships 
of the economic expansion, early post-reform, and economic downturn periods?   
  According to results for the overall relationships, the strongest association was 
found for the early post-reform period followed by the economic downturn and economic 
expansion periods. When results are compared across all sub-groups, however, a clear 
pattern emerges: the strongest total poverty-violence and group poverty-violence 
associations are found during the economic downturn period. Despite being strong in 
magnitude, however, the associations were not statistically significant for several groups 
including males in married couple families, non-Hispanic white females, and all youth in 
female-headed families.  
 This pattern does not hold up for Hispanic youth. For males, females, and all 
Hispanic youth, the strongest ‘total poverty’ relationship was found during the economic 
expansion period while for younger adolescents, older adolescents, urban, and non-urban 
youth, it was strongest during the early post-reform period. However, the ‘group poverty’ 
relationship did appear to be strongest for the majority of Hispanic sub-groups during the 
economic downturn period. The other notable exception is female-headed families. For 
the total sample and every sub-group except non-urban youth, the relationship between 
total poverty and violence was strongest for the early post-reform period. There is less 
consistency in the findings for group-specific poverty, but across the majority of 
categories, the strongest relationship was found during the economic downturn period. 
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Overall, the relationship between poverty and violence appears to be stronger 
during the economic downturn than any other period, although for youth in female-
headed families and more than half of the Hispanic sub-groups, the strongest 
relationships were found during the early post reform period--the two groups that 
experienced the most prominent declines in family and child poverty in the immediate 
wake of TANF.  However, it is important to remember that these relationships were not 
significant for Hispanic youth.   
Additional analyses (not shown) were also conducted, extending the post-reform 
period to the end of the series. First-differenced correlations were then estimated pre-
TANF (i.e. 1993-1997) and post-TANF (i.e. 1997-2004) in an attempt to gauge the 
general differences in the poverty-violence relationship of each group before and after 
welfare reform. Despite the fact that the pre-TANF period consists of only five data 
points and thus is prone to producing high correlations, the results show that the post-
TANF relationship between total poverty and violent victimization is substantially 
stronger (and statistically significant) for non-Hispanic whites, non-Hispanic blacks, and 
youths in female-headed families compared to the pre-TANF relationship. The pre-TANF 
relationship was moderately and substantially stronger than the post-TANF relationship 
for Hispanics and youths in married couple families respectively, which obviously stands 
in stark contrast to patterns observed for non-Hispanics and youths in female-headed 
families and offers further evidence of important differences in the poverty-violence 
dynamic of Hispanic youth. Moreover, these findings hint at important differences in the 
poverty-violence relationship before and after the implementation of TANF. The 
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following chapter explores whether youth’s risks for violence have also changed over 
recent decades, and whether these changes are associated with TANF.
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CHAPTER 5 
MICRO-LEVEL ANALYTIC STRATEGY AND FINDINGS 
 The macro-level analysis identified some important patterns in the poverty-
violence relationship.  First, it confirmed a significant association between youth poverty 
and violence trends from 1993 to 2004, not only for the total sample of youth but for non-
Hispanic whites, non-Hispanic blacks, and youths in both married couple and female-
headed families. Second, the significance of the overall poverty-violence relationship 
varied across demographic sub-groups, with male, younger adolescent, and non-urban 
groups being more likely to experience significant relationships. Third, there are 
substantive differences in the poverty-violence relationships of Hispanic and non-
Hispanic youth--Hispanic relationships tending not only to be substantially weaker than 
non-Hispanic relationships but overwhelmingly statistically nonsignificant.  
 Finally, there are pre-post TANF differences in the poverty-violence relationship, 
particularly for non-Hispanic youth and those in female-headed families. For these 
groups, post-TANF relationships were strong in magnitude and highly statistically 
significant while the pre-TANF relationships were weak in magnitude and highly 
statistically nonsignificant, particularly for non-Hispanic whites and blacks; both pre- and 
post-TANF relationships were strong for youth in female-headed families, but only the 
post-TANF relationship was statistically significant. These findings are important 
because they hint that TANF did impact the consequences of poverty for violence among 
certain groups of youth. Also, when the relationships between poverty and violence 
trends were assessed for the economic expansion, early post-reform, and economic 
downturn periods, results suggest that TANF plausibly contributed to violence trends for 
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non-urban and all youth in married couple families and males, females, urban, and all 
youth in female-headed families. Thus, family structure appears to be an important 
contingency in the poverty-violence relationship, particularly in the wake of welfare 
reform. 
 With pre-post TANF differences in the poverty-violence relationship already 
established, the broad objective of the micro-level analysis is to assess whether the 
consequences of poverty for youth’s violence risks have also changed in recent decades 
and whether these changes are associated with the mandatory work requirements enacted 
by TANF; based on recent trends in the percentage of poor children in working poor 
families, more specifically, it is presumed that the consequences of poverty for youth’s 
violence risks will be exacerbated in the immediate wake of welfare reform and 
diminished over the long-run, if welfare reform indeed had any impact. In light of 
findings from the macro-level analysis, however, it is also important to consider how 
family structure has affected the relationship between poverty and youth’s violence risks 
before and after TANF implementation. 
Analytic Strategy 
 Pursuant to these objective, survey weighted logistic regression analyses will be 
conducted for the years 19933 to 2004. The initial strategy employed yearly analyses to 
determine the changing nature of the poverty-violence relationship over time. For a 
couple of reasons, however, the data will be pooled into three distinct time periods: pre-
TANF (i.e. 1993-1996), early post-TANF (i.e. 1997-2000), and late post-TANF (i.e. 
2001-2004). First, pooling the data will allow for more efficient analyses. Second, more 
                                                 
3 The first two quarters of the 1993  NCVS were omitted from the analysis due to the exclusion of one of 
the essential sampling weights--v2118. 
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substantive meaning can be drawn from patterns observed over the three time periods 
than yearly changes in the poverty-violence relationship. Last, the specified time periods 
lend themselves well to the determination of whether TANF exacerbated the consequence 
of poverty for youth’s violence risks in the immediate wake of implementation (i.e. 1997-
2000) relative to before (i.e. 1993-1996), and whether this consequence diminished in the 
long-run according to expected findings. 
 Due to its ability to correct standard errors for clustering, Stata 9.2 is used to 
conduct the analyses.  Also due to memory limitations, however, Stata could not handle a 
large dataset consisting of all 1993-2004 NCVS files. Instead, three separate datasets 
were created by merging 1993-1996 into ‘pre-TANF’, 1997-2000 into early post-TANF, 
and 2001-2004 into late post-TANF. In each dataset, a baseline model is first established 
regressing youth’s violent victimization risks on the poverty status variable. Next, 
race/ethnicity and family structure variables are added to the model to assess the 
consequences of poverty for youth violence risks net of important demographic 
predictors. Finally, gender and metropolitan status are added to the model as additional 
controls. Because it is unimportant for youth’s violence risks, the age variable is omitted 
from the analysis. 
 In addition to the outcome variable (i.e. whether or not youth experienced a 
violent victimization incident), all of the explanatory variables are dummy coded (see 
Chapter 3 for a review of coding schemes). The only exception is the ‘race and ethnicity’ 
measure, which was originally coded into three distinct categories: non-Hispanic white, 
non-Hispanic black, and Hispanic youth. The advantage of combining the race and 
ethnicity categories as such is that it produces more accurate estimates of group violence 
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risks. Because Hispanics are commonly lumped into ‘white’ race categories, for example, 
stark black-white comparisons will serve to inflate ‘white’ violence risks. This 
classification scheme overcomes this problem by separating whites and Hispanics. 
However, an obvious disadvantage of employing a three-category race and ethnicity 
variable in a logistic regression analysis is that the coefficients cannot be interpreted in 
terms of group differences in risks, so the race and ethnicity measure was transformed 
from its original form into a series of three dummy-coded variables: non-Hispanic white 
(0=‘no’, 1=‘yes’); non-Hispanic black (0=‘no’, 1=‘yes’), and Hispanic (0=‘no’, ‘1=yes’). 
Of these three variables, ‘non-Hispanic black’ and ‘Hispanic’ are included in the analysis 
to assess the differences in youth’s violence risks between these two groups and non-
Hispanic whites.    
 One issue of concern with the explanatory variables is multicollinearity, which 
occurs when two or more are strongly inter-related. Generally speaking, multicollinearity 
makes it difficult to obtain an unbiased estimate of the distinct effect of each explanatory 
variable on the outcome of interest but more specifically, it may serve to inflate standard 
errors, which in turn decreases the likelihood of obtaining statistically significant 
coefficients (Allison, 1999). 
 To test for multicollinearity among the explanatory variables, a bivariate 
correlation matrix was estimated (not shown) and results reveal that none are strongly 
associated. The largest in magnitude pre-, early, and late post-TANF, the association 
between ‘female-headed family’ and ‘poverty’ was .34, .35, and .31 for each of the 
respective periods, which suggests that multicollinearity is a non-issue. However, it is 
important to note that the bivariate correlation is a conservative test. Considered more 
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superior alternatives to the bivariate correlation matrix, VIF and tolerance statistics were 
also estimated as additional tests for multicollinearity. Again, results revealed mean 
VIF’s of  1.16 for the five explanatory variables and tolerances that ranged from a 
minimum of .79 (poverty) to a maximum of 1.00 (gender) for the pre-reform, early post-
reform, and late post-reform periods, which further rules out high collinearity between 
the explanatory variables. Multicollinearity is generally a concern when VIF and 
tolerance values exceed 10 or fall below 0.1 (Chen, Ender, Mitchell, & Wells, 2003), 
although Allison (1999) suggests that respective values above 2.5 and below .40 may 
indicate a problem in logistic regression analyses. Descriptive statistics for all 
explanatory variables are presented in Table 5.1.  
Results 
 Table 5.2 displays the baseline model regressing youth’s risk for violence on 
poverty for the pre-TANF, early post-TANF, and late post-TANF periods. The results 
show that there is a direct, statistically significant relationship between poverty and 
violence for each period and the sign of the coefficients suggest that poor youth are 
significantly more likely than non-poor youth to experience violence. To better gauge the 
strength of this association, coefficients are exponentiated to obtain the odds ratios; in 
this case, the odds ratio simply reflects the ratio of the odds of violent victimization 
occurring in poor vs. non-poor youth. Results reveal that the odds of violence associated 
with poverty are not particularly substantial. When the coefficients are exponentiated, the 
odds for poor youth are 1.14, 1.36, and 1.29 times larger than those for non-poor youth 
during the pre-, early, and late post-TANF periods, respectively. 
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Table 5.1 
Descriptive Statistics for Logistic Regression Explanatory Variables a,b 
             
 
          Pre-reform     Early post-reform   Late post-reform 
            Mean     S.E.      Mean     S.E.         Mean     S.E.                         
 
At/Below Poverty  .23 .006    .21    .008          .19        .008 
 
Non-Hispanic Black  .16 .007    .16    .010          .15        .010 
 
Hispanic  .13 .009    .15    .013          .18        .015 
 
Female-headed Family  .24 .005    .26    .007          .27        .006 
 
Male  .51 .004    .51    .004          .51        .005 
 
Urban  .26 .012    .26    .016          .27        .016 
          
a Variable names reflect reference categories. 
b Descriptive statistics are survey weighted to reflect sample design characteristics. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
White, Nicole, 2011, UMSL, p.132 
 
 
Table 5.2 
Logistic Regression Analysis of Youth’s Risk for Violence on Poverty Status 
          
 
 Pre-TANF  Early Post-TANF    Late Post-TANF 
          
 
Poverty                          .127*     (.064)   .306*** (.079)       .256**   (.098) 
 
Constant                     -3.032*** (.033)         -3.402*** (.044)    -3.803*** (.052) 
 
Model F-Statistic 3.94*         15.23***    6.87** 
             
***p<.001, **p<.01, *p<.05 
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 It also appears that the consequences of poverty for youth’s violence risks do 
strengthen during the early post-TANF period (i.e. relative to pre-TANF) and weaken 
during the late post-TANF period (i.e. relative to early post), which is consonant with 
expected findings that the mandatory work requirements legislated by PRWORA and 
implemented by TANF exacerbated the consequences of poverty for youth’s violence 
risks during the early post-reform period and diminished over the long-run, presumably 
as parents cultivated the necessary skills and experience to secure better paying jobs with 
more benefits. However, only the increase between the pre- and early post-TANF periods 
is statistically significant.4 
 Another pattern from the baseline model worth noting is that the odds of violent 
victimization associated with poverty increased more substantially in the wake of TANF 
than decreased over the long-run. Between the pre-reform and early post-reform periods, 
more specifically, odds increased by nineteen percent and decreased by only five percent 
between the early and late post-reform periods, the former being more than three times 
larger than the latter. This pattern suggests that while TANF immediately exacerbated the 
consequences of poverty for youth’s violence risks, it failed to affect a significant 
reduction in these consequences over the long-run.  
 However, it is important to keep in mind that the odds ratios are not sizeable, with 
the odds of violence for poor youth being less than two times larger than the odds for 
non-poor youth each period. Given that children in working poor families comprised a 
little more than one-third of all children in poor families in 1997 and greater than one-
half in 2004 (Wertheimer, Moore, and Burkhauser, 2008), one would expect TANF to 
influence more substantial changes in the odds ratio. Hence, it is not likely that TANF 
                                                 
4 (z=1.76, p<.10) 
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contributed to the relationship between poverty and youth’s risks for violence, despite the 
fact that it adhered to the hypothesized manner. 
 Still, it is important to consider how the covariates of race, ethnicity, and family 
structure affect the poverty-violence relationship, particularly in light of the macro-level 
findings that the relationship between poverty and violence trends did vary considerably 
by race, ethnicity, and family structure--the latter emerging as the most important 
contingency in the relationship. Will family structure also emerge as an important 
contingency in the poverty-violence relationship at the micro-level? Are race and 
ethnicity also important contingencies? To answer these questions, Model 2 adds ‘non-
Hispanic black’, ‘Hispanic’, and ‘female-headed family’ variables to the baseline model 
and results are presented in Table 5.3.  
 In terms of the relationship between race, ethnicity, and youth’s risks for violence, 
the magnitude and sign of the coefficients suggests that both non-Hispanic blacks and 
Hispanics are slightly less likely than non-Hispanic whites to experience violence each 
period. With the exception of the late post-reform Hispanic coefficient, however, none of 
the relationships were statistically significant. Net of poverty and family structure, then, 
there were no pre-reform and early post-reform relationships between race, ethnicity, and 
violence risks, but Hispanic youth were about 1.45 times less likely than non-Hispanic 
white youth to experience violent victimization between 2001 and 2004; race and 
ethnicity variables also failed to exert significant direct effects on youth’s violence risks 
(not shown) each period, save that of the late post-reform Hispanic coefficient. 
 Conversely, family structure is significantly related to violence risks both directly  
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Table 5.3 
Logistic Regression Analysis of Youth’s Risk for Violence on Poverty Status, Race and 
Ethnicity, and Family Structure 
          
 
        Pre-TANF Early Post-TANF    Late Post-TANF 
          
 
Poverty                            .018      (.072)     .160       (.093)       .127     (.107) 
 
Non-Hispanic Black      -.147      (.097)    -.128       (.100)      -.162     (.122) 
 
Hispanic                         -.106      (.089)            -.164       (.108)             -.375***(.112) 
 
Female-headed Family   .485*** (.064)            .502*** (.064)             .653*** (.097) 
 
Constant                       -3.106*** (.039)         -3.480*** (.056)   -3.906*** (.060) 
 
Model F-Statistic          16.06***          20.34***           17.42*** 
                
***p<.001, **p<.01, *p<.05  
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(not shown) and net of poverty, race, and ethnicity for the pre-reform, early post-reform, 
and late post-reform periods. More specifically, the results suggest that youth in female-
headed families are more likely than youth in married couple families to experience 
violence and this likelihood appears to have increased over time. The exponentiated 
coefficients show that the odds of violent victimization for youth in female-headed 
families were 1.62 and 1.65 times larger than the odds for youth in married couple 
families, increasing by roughly two percent over the pre-reform and early post-reform 
periods. Conversely, odds increased sixteen percent to 1.92 over the early and late post-
reform periods, seeming to suggest increasing post-reform consequences of female-
headed families for youth’s violence risks. However, these post-reform changes in the 
family structure effect were not significant.    
 More important than the relationship between family structure and violence is the 
assessment of how race, ethnicity, and family structure affect the poverty-violence 
relationship. When these variables are introduced into the model, one of the most 
apparent differences in the poverty coefficient is the change in magnitude, which 
declined eighty-six, forty-eight, and fifty percent during the pre-reform, early post-
reform, and late post-reform period, respectively. But despite these reductions, the 
changes in the poverty-violence relationship still conform to the hypothesized pattern of 
strengthening early post-reform and weakening thereafter. 
 Despite this consistency with expected patterns, however, the most important 
change in the poverty-violence relationship net of race, ethnicity, and family structure is 
that it is no longer statistically significant. For each period, the family structure variable 
fully mediates the relationship between poverty and violence, which essentially means 
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that poverty loses its ability to predict youth’s violence risks once family structure is 
accounted for. It appears, then, that family structure is the underlying mechanism that is 
responsible for the relationship between poverty and violence risks, and more 
specifically, living in a female-headed family. These results are consistent with macro-
level findings that identify family structure as an important contingency in the 
relationship between youth poverty and violent victimization trends.         
 Family structure is clearly an important predictor of violence risks net of poverty, 
race, and ethnicity, but it is also important to consider the impact of the demographic 
controls of gender and metropolitan status on both the family structure-violence and 
poverty-violence relationships. While research has firmly established that male and urban 
youth are at greater risk for violence than their female and non-urban counterparts, the 
following questions are of particular concern of this analysis: Will the introduction of 
gender and metropolitan status improve or worsen poverty’s ability to predict youth 
violence risks? Will family structure also emerge as the most important predictor of 
violence risks net of the additional controls? The full model presented in Table 5.4 
addresses these questions. 
Although the relative impact of gender and metropolitan status on violence risks 
is not the focal concern of this analysis, they are worth noting. The results show that 
gender is significantly related to violence risks in the expected direction. That is, males 
are more likely than females to experience violence each period, though not substantially 
so; when the coefficients are exponentiated, the odds of violence for males are 1.74 times 
larger than females prior to TANF, 1.52 in the immediate wake of TANF, and 1.61  
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Table 5.4 
Logistic Regression Analysis of Youth’s Risk for Violence on Poverty Status, Race and 
Ethnicity, Family Structure, and Demographic Controls 
          
 
        Pre-TANF Early Post-TANF    Late Post-TANF 
          
 
Poverty                             .011     (.072)      .152     (.092)         .100      (.109) 
 
Non-Hispanic Black       -.239*    (.098)    -.199*    (.098)       -.267*     (.123) 
 
Hispanic                         -.106       (.090)           -.235*    (.110)               -.464*** (.119) 
 
Female-headed Family   .472*** (.065)            .492*** (.065)               .659***  (.098) 
 
Male                                .556*** (.055)  .421*** (.059)       .479***  (.083) 
 
Urban                              .277*** (.067)     .247**   (.078)       .298**    (.107) 
 
Constant                       -3.475*** (.051)         -3.759*** (.073)    -4.228***  (.074) 
 
Model F-Statistic          30.97***           20.55***  20.01*** 
             
***p<.001, **p<.01, *p<.05 
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several years post-TANF.  Still, it is evident that gender is a significant predictor of 
youth’s violence risks and the most important overall predictor in the pre-TANF model.  
Metropolitan status also emerged as a significant predictor of violence risks before and 
after the implementation of TANF, with urban youth expectedly being slightly more 
likely to experience violent victimization than non-urban youth. Relative to gender, 
however, the coefficients for metropolitan status were weaker and hence, the odds ratios 
smaller; for the pre-TANF, early post-TANF, and late post-TANF periods, the odds of  
violence for urban youth were 1.32, 1.28, and 1.35 times larger than that of non-urban 
youth, respectively. For both gender and metropolitan status, the respective relationships  
to violence risks stand in direct opposition to the hypothesized pattern in the poverty-
violence relationship; the coefficients weakened in the immediate wake of welfare reform 
and strengthened thereafter, expectedly suggesting that the implementation of TANF did 
not impact the consequences of gender and metropolitan status for youth’s violence risks.    
 The introduction of the demographic controls also influenced the impact of race 
on violence risks; statistically nonsignificant in previous models, there is a significant 
relationship between race and violence risks in the present. The sign and magnitude of 
the coefficients suggests that non-Hispanic black youth are slightly less likely than 
minority youth to be victims of violence and again, this likelihood appears to decrease 
during the early post-reform period and increase thereafter. So while there is a significant 
association between race and violence risks each period, it does not appear to be related 
to the mandatory work requirements implemented by TANF. The early post-reform 
Hispanic coefficient is also statistically significant net of poverty, family structure, and 
demographic controls, with Hispanic youth being 1.26 times less likely to experience 
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violence than non-Hispanic white youth; the late post-reform coefficient also increased   
by roughly twenty-four percent and remained statistically significant. 
 The respective relationships between gender, metropolitan status, and violence 
risks aside, of greater concern is the impact of these demographic controls on the 
poverty-violence relationship before, immediately, and several years after the 
implementation of TANF.  The results show that the introduction of gender and 
metropolitan status did not improve poverty’s ability to predict violence risks but instead 
reduced coefficients by an additional thirty-nine (pre-TANF), five (early post-TANF), 
and twenty-one (late post-TANF) percent from the previous model, remaining highly 
statistically nonsignificant. Again, family structure emerged as a significant predictor of 
violence risks net of gender and metropolitan status, and the most important overall 
predictor for each of the post-TANF periods. The coefficients were altered by less than 
five percent each period relative to the previous model, but remained statistically 
significant at the α=.001 level. 
According to these results, then, it appears that family structure is not only the 
most important overall predictor of youth’s violence risks but the underlying mechanism 
that accounts for the relationship between poverty and violence. In the full model, the 
odds of violent victimization was 1.60 times greater for youth in female-headed vis-à-vis  
married couple families, which increased by less than three percent to 1.64 during the 
early post-reform period. However, the odds ratio increased to 1.93 during the late post-
TANF period, a six-fold increase of nearly eighteen percent. This pattern clearly reveals 
that despite the introduction of the demographic controls, the consequences of female-
headed families for youth’s violence risks still increased more substantially between the 
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early and late post-TANF periods than the pre- and early post-TANF periods, although 
they did not increase significantly across the three periods. However, this pattern also 
suggests that the consequences are not related to the mandatory work requirements that 
contributed to the post-reform growth in working poor families.  
A Brief Note on Model Fit 
 To assess the closeness of a fitted logistic regression model to the observed data, 
goodness-of-fit tests should be performed. Sensitive to the introduction of sampling 
weights, however, traditional tests such as the Homer-Lemeshow and Pearson’s chi-
square are inappropriate for use with surveys that employ complex sampling designs such 
as the NCVS (Archer & Lemeshow, 2006). To overcome this problem, Archer and 
Lemeshow (2006) developed a procedure in Stata to test goodness-of-fit in survey 
weighted logistic regression analyses. The test produces an F-adjusted mean residual 
statistic that estimates lack-of-fit rather than goodness-of-fit--a statistically nonsignificant 
result indicating that lack-of-fit is not an issue. After fitting the full models for each 
period, this procedure was used to assess lack-of-fit. The results reveal that lack-of-fit is 
not a problem for the pre-TANF (F=1.538, p value=.133), early post-TANF (F=.208, p 
value=.993), or late post-TANF (F=.958, p value=.475) period.  
Summary 
 The primary objective of this chapter is to determine whether the mandatory work 
requirements implemented by TANF impacted the consequences of poverty for youth’s 
risk for violence over recent decades, which is presumed to be indicated by an immediate 
exacerbation of consequences that is eventually allayed as working parents accumulate 
the work experience and skills necessary to secure better paying jobs. The direct 
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relationship between poverty and violence risks did indeed follow this pattern, but the 
small changes in the odds ratio were inconsistent with a welfare reform effect. 
Additionally, the poverty-violence relationship was fully mediated by family structure, 
which in addition to serving as a key mediator, also emerged as the most important 
overall predictor of youth’s violence risks in the full post-TANF models. 
 Though in line with macro-level findings that identify family structure as an 
important contingency in the post-reform relationship between poverty and violence 
trends, however, the pattern in its consequences for violence risks is inconsistent with 
that of working poor family trends, which forms the basis of the micro-level hypothesis. 
Hence, it is not likely that the mandatory work requirements enacted by welfare reform 
contributed to the increasing consequences of youth’s living arrangements for their 
violence risks. In addition to family structure, race, gender, and metropolitan status also 
emerged as important predictors of violence risks in the full model, but failed to impact 
the relationship between poverty and violence.  
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CHAPTER 6 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
 There has been a long tradition of criminological research on the relationship 
between economic deprivation and crime, yet little attention has been paid to the effects 
of macroeconomic conditions and social welfare policies on youth violence trends. The 
present study aimed to fill this gap in the literature by assessing the impact of recent 
changes in macroeconomic conditions and welfare reform policies on youth violent 
victimization trends. Equally important, this study also proposed to determine whether 
the relationship between poverty and youth’s risks for violence has changed over recent 
decades and if welfare reform played a significant role in these changes.    
 Drawing from a study conducted by Messner, Raffalovich, and McMillan (2001) 
that found an important association between child poverty and juvenile homicide arrest 
trends for both black and white youth, this research supposes that the changes in 
macroeconomic conditions and federal welfare policies that contributed to the child 
poverty trends of the 1990s and early 2000s also contributed to other youth violence 
trends, or in this case youth violent victimization. In addition to race, however, this study 
also examined trends disaggregated by Hispanic origin, family structure, and other 
demographics in an effort to understand how these relationships differ across various 
youth sub-groups.  
 First, findings from the macro-level analysis confirm that there is a significant 
overall association between poverty and violence trends not only for all youth, but for 
non-Hispanic whites, non-Hispanic blacks, and youth in married couple and female-
headed families. The strength and significance of the relationship varied substantially 
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across youth groups and economic periods, with the most important relationships being 
found among female-headed families and the post-reform periods (i.e. early post-reform 
and economic downturn), respectively. Overall, however, the poverty-violence 
relationship tended to be strongest and most consistently significant for groups of youth 
in female-headed families.  
 The fact that family structure is important to the poverty-violence relationship is 
not surprising. More so than race and ethnicity, family structure is strongly related to 
children’s poverty. While black and Hispanic children are a little more than two and one-
half times as likely as white children to be poor, youth in female-headed families are 
more than four times as likely as youth in married couple families to experience poverty 
(DeNavas-Walt, Proctor, & Smith, 2010). Research has extensively documented the 
detriments of growing up in poor, female-headed families, many of which place youth at 
greater risk for a host of adverse economic and social outcomes--including greater 
exposure to violence in the impoverished, high crime areas in which they are more likely 
to reside.  
 Another key contingency in the poverty-violence relationship was ethnicity, or in 
this case, Hispanic origin. Across the total sample and every sub-group of racial and 
ethnic youth, a very clear pattern emerged: the overall relationship between poverty and 
violence was not statistically significant for Hispanic youth. In fact, the only significant 
finding was that of female poverty and violence trends, which was only moderately 
associated and marginally significant. While the absence of significant findings does not 
mean that poverty is not related to Hispanic violence trends, it does suggest that other 
factors beyond the scope of this study may be involved. One omitted variable that may 
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shed some light on the differences between Hispanics and non-Hispanics is immigration 
status.  
  Immigrant families face a number of unique challenges that place them at 
particularly high risk for poverty and other social disadvantages. Although immigrants 
have high employment rates, for example, they are more likely than native-born workers 
to be employed in low-skilled, low-wage jobs. However, they also have relatively less 
access to public assistance and social service programs that may otherwise provide vital 
supports to working poor families. In addition to economic barriers, immigrant children 
also have less access to head start programs, health insurance, and other social services, 
which places them at greater risk for a host of long-term social, academic, and physical 
health challenges (National Center for Children in Poverty, no date), which in turn places 
them at greater risk for violence. Because they comprise the vast majority of the poor in 
both recent and established immigrant families, these disadvantages should have 
particular significance for Hispanic youth (Wight, Thampi, & Chau, 2011), and more 
specifically, Hispanic youth violence. 
 On the other hand, poor children in immigrant families also have certain 
advantages over poor, native born children. The parents of poor children in both recent 
and established immigrant families exhibit stronger attachment to the labor force than 
those of poor, native born children and have higher marriage rates. In established 
immigrant families, moreover, poor children are more likely to be residentially stable 
than those in native born and recent immigrant families (Wight, Thampi, & Chau, 2011).  
There are also important contextual differences in black and Hispanic poor communities, 
the latter tending to have more racial and economic heterogeneity and greater proportions 
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of two-parent families--all of which may serve as protective factors against negative 
adolescent outcomes. Whether these factors counteracted the negative effects of poverty 
on Hispanic youth violence is unknown, but it is important for future research to pursue 
this line of inquiry. A great deal of our knowledge about the group differences in violent 
crime is based on black-white comparisons, but with significant growth in the current and 
projected Hispanic youth population, it is increasingly important for researchers to 
consider the roles of ethnicity and immigration status on poverty, violence, and other 
youth outcomes. This information will help practitioners to address the unique needs of 
immigrant youth in violence prevention and other social intervention programs. 
 Another key factor that emerged in the significance of the poverty-violence 
relationship was the poverty measure used in the analysis. While the overwhelming 
majority of the total poverty-violence and group poverty-violence relationships were not 
statistically significant, it was total youth poverty that tended to be more closely 
associated with victimization trends both in terms of strength and statistical significance. 
When disaggregated by race, ethnicity, and family structure, however, it was presumed 
that violence trends would be more closely associated with group poverty rather than 
total poverty, which represents a more global measure of youth economic deprivation.  
 While the present findings suggest that changes in global poverty have a more 
significant impact on group violence trends than changes in that group’s own poverty 
rate, it is also possible that more proximate measures are needed to reliably assess the 
differences in the effects of national-level deprivation and that of youth’s immediate 
environments on violent crime trends. For example, an analysis comparing changes in 
neighborhood violence rates to those in national- and neighborhood-level poverty would 
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prove informative. However, such an assessment was not possible in the present study 
because the NCVS does not contain neighborhood-level variables. Future research is 
needed to determine how differences in the measurement of poverty affect its impacts on 
violence trends, not just in terms of its proximity to subjects but also in the use of other 
alternative measures.   
 The significance of the overall poverty-violence relationship also varied across 
demographic sub-groups. Although predominately statistically nonsignificant, there was 
an important overall association between the total poverty and violence trends of male 
and younger adolescent sub-groups in the non-Hispanic white, non-Hispanic black, 
married couple and female-headed family categories. On the other end of the spectrum, 
the only significant association found among the older adolescent sub-group was for 
youth in female-headed families. The variability in these findings underscores the 
complexity in the macro-level relationship between youth poverty and violent 
victimization trends, which otherwise could not be determined without the level of 
disaggregation employed in this study. So despite the long-standing tradition of research 
on the poverty-violence relationship, similar analyses are needed to understand why and 
how this relationship differs for various youth sub-groups.  
 More important than the association between poverty and violence trends is the 
larger impact of macroeconomic conditions and welfare reform policies on this 
relationship. Of particular concern in the present study was the impact of the economic 
expansion, TANF implementation, and economic downturn on recent trends in youth 
violent victimization. Prior research has offered little empirical support for a relationship 
between economic growth and violent crime trends. However, the established association 
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between child poverty and juvenile violence trends calls for another look at this 
relationship. It is my argument that the complexities of the economy-crime relationship 
may not be understood in terms of a direct association, but through some other process or 
intervening mechanism--a contention that is supported by Rosenfeld’s (2009) findings 
that economic conditions (as measured by the Index of Consumer Sentiment) indirectly 
affect homicide rates via acquisitive crimes such as burglary, motor vehicle theft, and 
robbery. Research reported by Arvanites and Defina (2006) also suggests that business 
cycles are negatively associated with economically motivated violent crime via 
reductions in criminal motivation. Despite this evidence, however, the processes and 
mechanisms that link economic conditions to violent crime are largely unknown. 
Presuming that the changes in macroeconomic conditions that influenced recent child 
poverty trends also influenced trends in youth violent victimization, this study seeks to 
contribute to the understanding of this complex relationship.  
 Mixed support was found for this hypothesis. For the total sample of youth and 
the overwhelming majority of sub-groups, there was no relationship between 
macroeconomic conditions and youth violent crime trends. However, certain groups of 
youth were significantly impacted. Findings suggest that the economic expansion was 
associated with the violence declines of females and all youths in female-headed families 
via total poverty as well as younger adolescents and non-urban youths in married couple 
families via group poverty. On the other hand, the economic downturn attributed to the 
violence trends of non-Hispanic white and non-Hispanic black males via both total and 
group poverty, as well as the total sample of non-Hispanic blacks via total poverty trends.  
In addition, the downturn influenced violence trends among males and non-urban youth 
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in female-headed families through associations with group and total poverty, 
respectively. 
 These findings make evident the intricacies in the relationship between 
macroeconomic conditions and youth violent crime trends--intricacies that have not been 
uncovered in previous analyses because researchers have failed to consider how shifts in 
macroeconomic conditions impact violence among youth in various sub-groups. Take the 
results from the economic expansion period, for example. If the analysis had been 
conducted only on the total sample of youth, the significant relationships for certain 
groups in married couple and female-headed families would have gone undetected. 
Moreover, the fact that the expansion’s effect on violence was limited to certain groups 
of youth in families while the downturn’s effect was limited largely to racial groups 
would have also been overlooked, a fact that the macro-level findings cannot readily 
explain.  
 It is possible that the anti-poverty measures targeted towards poor families in the 
1990s also served to reduce violence among youth in female-headed families and certain 
groups in married couple families. Although research has identified substantial 
improvements in the 1990s job market as a significant contributor to the child poverty 
reductions of that time (Nichols, 2006), mandatory work requirements and tax incentives 
enacted by federal welfare reforms and EITC expansions also played an important role in 
the increased work efforts of single mothers and low-income families. By increasing 
work efforts among poor families, then, it is also plausible that these measures had some 
indirect influence on youth violence reductions.  
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 Prior analyses have not addressed these potential relationships, partly because 
data and methodological limitations have made it difficult to disentangle the effects of the 
economic expansion, Earned Income Tax Credit, and welfare reform on the growth in 
maternal employment, reductions in child poverty and welfare caseloads, and other 
economic developments of the 1990s, which in turn have hampered research efforts to 
determine the distinct impact of each factor on various aspects of family and child well-
being. This limitation is particularly characteristic of welfare reform evaluations as states’ 
administrative data do not include direct indicators of family and child well-being, 
changes in family living arrangements, and recipients’ access to other sources of non-
public support (Acs and Loprest, 2007). Nonetheless, there is at least some evidence that 
expansions to the Earned Income Tax Credit contributed to a significant portion of the 
increase in maternal employment between 1984 and 1996 while smaller contributions 
were made by welfare experimentation programs and other work incentive initiatives 
(e.g. Meyer and Rosenbaum, 2006), which included mandatory participation in welfare-
to-work programs, temporary time limits, and child-care for working mothers. However, 
this work pre-dates the implementation of the Temporary Assistance to Needy Families 
program.  
  While the inability to resolve these issues is an obvious limitation of this research, 
the findings will hopefully illustrate the importance of ‘thinking outside of the box’ when 
it comes to the study of the economy-violent crime relationship. Doing so will allow 
researchers to shed new light on the effects of long-studied indicators such as 
unemployment on violent crime rates; while there is a close, historical association 
between adult unemployment and child poverty rates, researchers have failed to consider 
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whether long-term changes in adult unemployment have impacted youth violence trends 
through this association. A more creative approach would also lend itself to the study of 
the relationship between violent crime and other less common, but equally relevant, 
indicators of economic growth--the importance of which is illustrated by the previously 
noted findings of Arvanites and Defina (2006), Rosenfeld (2009), and more recent 
research conducted by Lauritsen and Heimer (2010) which provides evidence of an 
association between long-term changes in consumer pessimism and serious violent 
victimization among black and Latino males.  
 As mentioned in the preceding discussion, the economic downturn appeared to 
have a particularly significant impact on the violence trends of non-Hispanic white and 
non-Hispanic black males, which followed very similar patterns between 2001 and 2004.  
Past research has established that minorities tend to suffer greater economic 
consequences than whites during periods of recession, primarily because they are more 
likely to be employed in the low-skilled, low wage jobs that are disproportionately 
affected by downturns in the economy--a pattern that is observed not only in employment 
but child poverty trends as well. Given the inter-relationships between economic growth, 
child poverty, and youth violence, it was expected that minorities would also experience 
the most significant growth in violence rates during the weakened economic state of the 
early 2000s. While rates expectedly increased for white and black males (as well as the 
total sample of white and black youth), however, there was a sharp drop in Hispanic 
victimization after 2002.  Thus, the downturn-era trends in violent victimization were 
more similar for white and black youth than black and Hispanic youth, which is 
inconsistent with expected findings. 
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 One potential explanation for this inconsistency is that the 2001 recession affected 
workers of all racial, family, and earnings groups and unlike past recessions, did not 
impact minorities more significantly than whites. Other research has suggested that 
modern recessions like that observed in 2001 also differ from past recessions in that 
unemployment rises because of the difficulty finding new jobs rather than the loss of jobs 
(e.g. Hall, 2007), although the recent downturn challenges this notion. Indeed, the growth 
in unemployment between 2001 and 2004 was modest and although the increase in black 
child poverty was more than three times larger than that of white children, neither 
experienced substantial increases; rates increased by one percentage point for white 
children, three and one-half points for black children, and less than one percentage point 
for Hispanic children.  
  Thus, the nature of the 2001 recession was not one that lent itself to 
disproportionate consequences for minority youth, neither in terms of poverty nor 
violence trends, so it makes sense that downturn-era trends in violent victimization were 
similar for white and black youth. However, longer time series should be examined to 
determine whether these findings also apply to past recessions or indeed reflect the nature 
of the 2001 downturn. Because this study is based on one expansion and recession period, 
results cannot be generalized to other periods of economic growth.  
 An additional disadvantage of analyzing a relatively short time series is that the 
economic downturn and early post-reform periods both contain only four data points, 
which makes a strong association between trends more likely. The overall relationship 
between total poverty and violent victimization exhibits this tendency, with correlations 
approaching 1.00 for the early post-reform and economic downturn periods. Excluding 
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Hispanic groups, moreover, a large portion of the sub-group relationships also follow this 
pattern. However, there is enough variation in the strength of these relationships to 
conclude that inflated correlations are not inherent to the shorter time periods. The same 
general pattern was observed for the group poverty-violence results, but the relationships 
were substantially weaker than those observed for total poverty-violence. Still, these 
findings should be interpreted with caution as reliability issues with the shorter time 
periods weaken any conclusions that may be drawn about the effects of welfare reform 
and the economic downturn on youth violence trends. 
 With this caveat in mind, the association between poverty and violence trends was 
also assessed during the early post-reform period in an attempt to uncover the larger 
influence of TANF on the relationship. Prior research has examined the effects of 
PRWORA and other welfare reforms on maternal employment and family income, 
welfare caseloads, marriage and children’s living arrangements, and family and child 
well-being, but criminologists have largely ignored the potential impacts of welfare 
reform for youth violence trends. While there is evidence of a cross-national relationship 
between welfare spending levels and child homicide rates (e.g. Briggs & Cutright, 1994), 
the national-level relationship between welfare reform and trends in youth violent 
victimization has not been assessed. While this omission is due partly to a lack of 
relevant data, existing data sources such as the NCVS provide an opportunity to examine 
this relationship via the association between poverty and victimization trends. 
 In the wake of welfare reform, there was a marked acceleration in child poverty 
declines for all children, but most substantially for Hispanics and those in female-headed 
families. I argue that similar patterns in victimization trends would reflect the influence 
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of welfare reform. For urban minorities and Hispanic females, victimization trends did 
display a marked acceleration during the early post-reform period. However, the pattern 
in the group victimization reductions was inconsistent with a welfare reform effect. For 
the majority of black youth sub-groups and in particular females, older adolescents, and 
non-urban youth, there was a spike in victimization that coincided roughly with the 
implementation of TANF, indicating that welfare reform may have had a shock effect on 
these groups. Because poverty declined for all black sub-groups during the early post-
reform period, however, any adverse effects that welfare reform might have had on black 
victimization rates would have come through some other mechanism beyond the scope of 
this study. In terms of the present hypotheses, it does not appear that welfare reform 
contributed to victimization reductions for either non-Hispanic white, non-Hispanic 
black, or Hispanic youth.    
 Victimization trends disaggregated by family structure exhibited more prominent 
early post-reform reductions, but while rates fell more uniformly for groups in married 
couple families, they declined markedly for the majority of groups in female-headed 
families. Occurring in 1998 for all sub-groups in female-headed families, this marked 
decline was most apparent for males, younger adolescents, and urban youth, which 
suggests that any effects of welfare reform were most likely not immediate. These 
effects, according to the findings, came through an association with total poverty for non-
urban and all youth in married couple families and males, females, urban, and all youth in 
female-headed families. Through its association with group poverty, moreover, welfare 
reform also contributed to male victimization in female-headed families. More than any 
other group examined, therefore, welfare reform appears to have impacted youth violent 
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victimization in female-headed families, which is consistent with the fact that welfare is 
almost exclusively targeted towards single mothers with children. However, additional 
analyses also confirmed that relative to the pre-reform period, the post-reform association 
between youth poverty and violence trends was also more statistically important for non-
Hispanic whites and non-Hispanic blacks. 
 The potential criminogenic effects of welfare reform were also explored by 
examining the changes in the relationship between poverty and youth’s risks for violence 
before and after TANF implementation. Drawing on trends in working poor families and 
the consequences of these trends for poor adolescents, I argue that if TANF had any 
influence on the relationship, the consequences of poverty for youth’s violence risks 
would be exacerbated as the proportion of poor children in low-income working families 
increased (i.e. early post-reform period). As the proportion of poor children in low-
income families decreased, however, the consequences of poverty for youth’s violence 
risks would also diminish over time (i.e. late post-reform period). This pattern partially is 
in line with findings that children in working poor families, who fared just as bad 
children in non-working poor families at the time of TANF implementation, tended to 
fare significantly better seven years later (see Wertheimer, Moore, and Burkhauser, 
2008), which suggests that the increased work efforts associated with welfare reform 
have longer term benefits for affected youth. 
 Across the pre-reform, early post-reform, and late post-reform periods, the direct 
relationship between poverty and youth’s violence risks did follow the hypothesized 
pattern, seeming to suggest that the mandatory work requirements enacted by welfare 
reform did influence violence risks. However, the fact that poverty’s consequences for 
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violence risks varied only slightly across the three periods suggests that welfare reform 
most likely failed to influence the relationship. Still, examining the influence of race, 
ethnicity, family structure, and other demographic controls on the poverty-violence 
relationship was another objective of the micro-level analysis. Findings from the full 
model identify race, family structure, gender, and metropolitan status as significant 
predictors of violence risks, with non-Hispanic white, female-headed family, male, and 
urban youth being slightly more likely than their counterparts to experience violent 
victimization. However, the relationship between poverty and violence risks was not only 
fully mediated by family structure, but it also emerged as the most important overall 
predictor of violence risks in the early and late post-reform models. 
 The findings for family structure were consistent with macro-level results 
identifying family structure, and especially female-headed families, as an important 
contingency in the relationship between total youth poverty and violence trends, 
particularly during the early post-reform period. And although the consequences of 
family structure for violence risks increased more substantially between the early and late 
post-reform periods than the pre- and early post-reform periods, the changes did not 
appear to be associated with the mandatory work requirements enacted by TANF--at least 
in a manner consistent with the presumed relationships between mandatory work 
requirements, working poor family trends, and the implied consequence for poor youth. 
Given the pattern in the relationship, however, it is possible that some other aspect of 
welfare reform may have exacerbated the consequences of family structure for violence 
risks, perhaps even aggravating already increasing consequences.  However, a longer 
time series would have to be analyzed to confirm this speculation. 
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 One consequence of welfare reform with potential impacts for female-headed 
families is the increased rules and stricter eligibility requirements that often discourage 
TANF participation. Evidence from the National Survey of American Families suggests 
that between 1997 and 2002, there was a considerable decline and concurrent increase in 
the proportion of ‘leavers’ exiting welfare for employment and other reasons such as not 
wanting or needing benefits or too much hassle involved with receipt (Loprest and 
Zedlewski, 2006). Data from states’ administrative records also show that rule-related 
reasons for welfare desistance far outweigh employment.  
 During the 2003 fiscal year, for example, more than forty percent of cases were 
closed due to federal time limits, sanctions, state policies, or failure to cooperate with 
eligibility requirements while another fourteen percent were voluntary closures. In 
comparison, employment accounted for only eighteen percent of closures (U.S. 
Department of Health and Human Services, 2006).  It is important to note that the 
estimates for employment closures in the administrative data are substantially smaller 
than those derived from empirical data, primarily because employment is often coded as a 
failure to cooperate or other reason due to non-reporting. Regardless of the data source, 
however, evidence suggests that the stricter rules enacted by welfare reform resulted in 
the closure of a substantial proportion of cases and according to the evidence from the 
NSAF, the proportion of these cases has increased over time. One of the obvious 
implications of these findings is that otherwise eligible families are being excluded from 
the TANF program and no doubt, these families include a significant proportion of 
female-headed families. 
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 Again, this line of reasoning is only speculative. This study offers no definitive 
evidence that TANF program restrictions contributed to the increasing consequences of 
family structure for violence risks, or whether TANF contributed at all. The inability to 
draw a sound conclusion about the effects of welfare reform is due largely to the absence 
of direct measures of specific welfare policies, which along with the reliability of the 
early post-reform and economic downturn correlations and the inability to distinguish the 
effects of the economic expansion from other economic and policy developments of the 
1990s, is a major limitation of the current study. In addition to inhibiting the ability to 
draw sound conclusions, this absence also prevents the identification of the specific 
provisions that may deter eligible families from participating in TANF or otherwise 
contribute to negative family and child outcomes (i.e. mandatory work requirements, time 
limits, threat/use of sanctions for noncompliance, etc.). While the observed patterns offer 
some clue of how the poverty-violence relationship changed before and after welfare 
reform, the findings are largely descriptive. More research is needed to determine 
whether these patterns indeed reflect the influence of welfare reform or the unique 
intersection of the macroeconomic and welfare policy changes of the 1990s and early 
2000s.  
 Despite these limitations, this study offers promising directions for future 
research. National-level studies on the long-term effects of welfare reform are scant (Acs 
and Nelson, 2007), and virtually non-existent are studies examining the long-term effects 
of welfare reform on youth violence trends, as previously mentioned. Because welfare 
and other public assistance programs play an integral role in the economic and material 
White, Nicole, 2011, UMSL, p.159 
 
well-being of poor children, it is likely that large-scale changes in social welfare policy 
have had indirect influences on youth violence through child poverty trends.  
 This omission from the analyses of youth violent crime trends paints an 
incomplete picture of public policy’s role in these changes, and more generally, the 
potential criminal justice impacts of social policies targeted toward the alleviation of 
child poverty, or by the same token, those that inadvertently contribute to increased 
deprivation--particularly among disadvantaged groups such as poor children and female-
headed families. This area of research would yield valuable information that would help 
policymakers to anticipate the unintended benefits and consequences of anti-poverty or 
other social policies for criminal justice outcomes, and allocate funds and resources to 
achieve the best outcomes for youth. 
 Though not definitive, the sum of the evidence suggests that macroeconomic and 
social policy changes do indeed have the potential to influence violent victimization 
trends, particularly among youth in female-headed families. In addition, changes in 
federal welfare policy appeared to impact the direct relationship between poverty and 
youth’s risk for violence over recent decades, but family structure fully mediated this 
relationship both before and after the implementation of TANF. While highlighting the 
significance of family structure for the poverty-violence relationship, this research has 
also identified some of the specific challenges associated with the study of the economy-
youth violence relationship. By addressing these challenges, future research may shed 
significant light on the relationship between recent economic and policy developments 
and youth violence trends. More specifically, some of the important lessons learned for 
future research include: 
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 In addition to macroeconomic conditions and welfare reform policies, tax 
 incentives such as the EITC also have important implications for recent 
 youth violence trends. Although the economic expansion and associated
 improvements in the job market contributed substantially to child poverty
 reductions in the 1990s, some research attributes as much as one-fifth and  
 one-third of the early ‘90s increase in maternal employment to welfare reform 
  and the EITC, respectively (e.g. Meyer and Rosenbaum, 2001).  Given the 
 obvious implications of these findings for child poverty reductions, it is important 
 for researchers to consider the role that the EITC may have played in recent youth 
 violence trends; with continued expansions to the EITC, including the availability 
 of local credits in New York City, the District of Columbia, and twenty-two states 
 including Illinois, Michigan, and New Jersey (Internal Revenue Service, 2011), it 
 is particularly important for researchers to consider how its targeted support of 
 vulnerable groups such as low-income, female-headed families may inadvertently 
 influence criminal justice outcomes. 
 
 To accurately assess how year-to-year changes in one variable affect year-to 
 year changes in another, longer time series should be analyzed. As evidenced 
 by the findings for the poverty-violence associations of the early post-reform and  
 economic downturn periods, a small number of data points may artificially inflate 
 estimates of the association between two trends. To produce more reliable 
 estimates in trend analyses, particularly when distinct eras or conditions are of  
 interest, series covering several decades of data are ideal. While this study 
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 is concerned with the impact of recent macroeconomic and social policy changes 
 on youth violence trends, extending the analysis will allow researchers to  
 determine the extent that the present findings apply to other economic and policy 
 contexts.    
 
 The strength and significance of the poverty-violence relationship is contingent 
 upon several factors, including the measurement of poverty. This study used a 
 variation of the official definition of poverty to estimate both total and group-
 specific poverty rates for various groups of youth, and results from the macro-
 level analysis clearly suggests that the total poverty-violence association is more 
 statistically important than that of group poverty and violence. Whether this  
 pattern represents a true difference in the nature of the relationship between  
 poverty and violence trends or some artifact of the poverty measure is unknown,  
 but experimentation with alternative poverty measures may provide some clue.    
 Additionally, alternative measures may make some difference in the micro-level 
 relationship between poverty and youth’s risks for violence, which appeared to be 
 fairly weak in the present study.   
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Appendix A 
 
Comparison of NCVS and CPS National Youth Poverty Estimates, 1993-2004 
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Appendix B 
 
Comparison of Children’s Living Arrangements in the NCVS and CPS 
 
Married Couple Families 
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Appendix B (cont’d) 
Female-headed Families 
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Appendix C 
 
Male Youth Poverty and Violent Victimization Rates by Race and Ethnicity, 1993-2004 
 
By Total Poverty Rates 
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Female Youth Poverty and Violent Victimization Rates by Race and Ethnicity, 1993-2004 
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12 to 14 Youth Poverty and Violent Victimization Rates by Race and Ethnicity, 1993-2004 
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15 to 17 Youth Poverty and Violent Victimization Rates by Race and Ethnicity, 1993-2004 
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Urban Youth Poverty and Violent Victimization Rates by Race and Ethnicity, 1993-2004 
 
By Total Poverty Rates 
0.0
20.0
40.0
60.0
80.0
100.0
120.0
140.0
160.0
180.0
200.0
1
9
9
3
1
9
9
4
1
9
9
5
1
9
9
6
1
9
9
7
1
9
9
8
1
9
9
9
2
0
0
0
2
0
0
1
2
0
0
2
2
0
0
3
2
0
0
4
R
a
t
e
 
p
e
r
 
1
,
0
0
0
0.0
5.0
10.0
15.0
20.0
25.0
30.0
35.0
40.0
45.0
50.0
P
e
r
c
e
n
t
 
b
e
l
o
w
 
p
o
v
e
r
t
y
Total Poverty
    Hispanic Violence
      Non-Hispanic Black Violence
        
         Non-Hispanic White Violence
      Economic Expansion
  Early Post-Reform   Economic Downturn
 
White, Nicole, 2011, UMSL, p.189 
 
 
Appendix G (cont’d) 
 
By Group Poverty Rates 
0.0
20.0
40.0
60.0
80.0
100.0
120.0
140.0
160.0
180.0
200.0
1
9
9
3
1
9
9
4
1
9
9
5
1
9
9
6
1
9
9
7
1
9
9
8
1
9
9
9
2
0
0
0
2
0
0
1
2
0
0
2
2
0
0
3
2
0
0
4
R
a
t
e
 
p
e
r
 
1
,
0
0
0
0.0
5.0
10.0
15.0
20.0
25.0
30.0
35.0
40.0
45.0
50.0
P
e
r
c
e
n
t
 
b
e
l
o
w
 
p
o
v
e
r
t
y
   Hispanic Violence
Non-Hispanic Black Violence
   Non-Hispanic White Violence
           Non-Hispanic White Poverty
           Hispanic Poverty
    Non-Hispanic Black Poverty
Economic Expansion
     Early Post-Reform Economic Downturn
 
 
White, Nicole, 2011, UMSL, p.190 
 
Appendix H 
 
Non-Urban Youth Poverty and Violent Victimization Rates by Race and Ethnicity, 1993-2004 
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Male Youth Poverty and Violent Victimization Rates by Family Structure, 1993-2004 
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By Group Poverty Rates 
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Appendix J 
 
Female Youth Poverty and Violent Victimization Rates by Family Structure, 1993-2004 
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Appendix J (cont’d) 
 
By Group Poverty Rates 
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12 to 14 Youth Poverty and Violent Victimization Rates by Family Structure, 1993-2004 
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15 to 17 Youth Poverty and Violent Victimization Rates by Family Structure, 1993-2004 
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Urban Youth Poverty and Violent Victimization Rates by Family Structure, 1993-2004 
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Appendix M (cont’d) 
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Non-Urban Youth Poverty and Violent Victimization Rates by Family Structure, 1993-2004 
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